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f o r e W o r d
Since t he t ur n  of the century, there has been an increasing interest in the corporate governance practic-es of the Nordic region. This interest has been inspired 
by the rapid increase in foreign ownership on the Nordic stock 
exchanges as well as the active corporate governance regula-
tion agenda of the European Union. This new eu-regulation 
has not always taken the specific features of the governance 
practices in the Nordic region sufficiently into account, which 
has created challenges for policymakers, owners and business-
es in the region. 
This has spurred a debate throughout the region regarding 
the possibility to define and describe a common Nordic cor-
porate governance model. The first initiative for implement-
ing this idea was taken by the Directors’ Institute of Finland 
through its late chairman, Tomas Lindholm, who was a long-
standing, keen proponent of Nordic cooperation within this 
field. 
The idea was picked up by sns, the Stockholm-based Cen-
tre for Business and Policy Studies, which decided to undertake 
it as a policy roundtable project within sns. This book is the 
result of this roundtable.
The project has been made possible by financial support 
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from the Nordic Council of Ministers and the following com-
panies and organisations in the four countries concerned: 
Axcel Fund, ba-hr da Law Firm, Carl Bennet ab, Cevian 
Capital ab, Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, Confed-
eration of Swedish Enterprise, Danske Bank, Finnish Founda-
tion for Share Promotion, Government Pension Fund Norway, 
ab Industrivärden, Investor ab, kpmg Finland, kpmg Swe-
den, Melker Schörling ab, Nordea Bank, Norwegian Corpo-
rate Governance Board, Roschier Attorneys Ltd, Swedish Cor-
porate Governance Board, Solidium Oy, and Varma Mutual 
Insurance. 
A considerable number of individuals from the four coun-
tries concerned have contributed to the execution of the pro-
ject. First and foremost among those are the members of the 
Working Group, made up of leading experts from each coun-
try. Their names are listed in Chapter I of the report. This out-
standing group of people has carried out the bulk of the pro-
ject work and generously shared their profound expertise in 
the field. It has been a highly rewarding experience to work 
with this group, both from a professional and personal point 
of view. I am deeply grateful to all of its members for their 
strong commitment, outstanding contributions and boundless 
patience in dealing with the details of this study.
Furthermore, a Reference Group made up of high-level 
representatives of the business and financial sectors has been 
organised in each country with the task of acting as advisors to 
the country experts and reviewers of the consolidated report. 
These names are also listed in the section mentioned above. 
Their input has been invaluable to the project work, and I sin-
cerely thank all members of these groups for the considerable 
amount of time spent on the study and their great willingness 
to share their views and experiences to the benefit of its quality.
In June 2014, an early version of the report was reviewed at 
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the 6th Annual Workshop of the Nordic Corporate Governance 
Network, a network of Nordic academics within this field. I 
sincerely thank the organisers of the event for this opportu-
nity and especially the discussant of our paper, Professor Trond 
Randøy, University of Agder, Norway, for his very useful 
remarks.
A crucial contribution to the study has further been pro-
vided by sis Ägarservice through the special study on owner-
ship structures in Nordic listed companies. I wish to thank its 
founding partner, Mr. Sven-Ivan Sundqvist, and his staff very 
much for excellent work. 
Another contribution of utmost value to the study is pro-
vided by Professor Ronald J. Gilson, who as an inde pen dent 
author of Chapter iv of the report has taken an outside look 
at the Nordic model and reviewed its significance in a broader 
international context. On behalf of the project and all of us 
who have participated in the work, I sincerely thank Professor 
Gilson for his eminent contribution to the report.
I also wish to express my appreciation of the superb work 
of Mr. John Kokko, Korrelat Legal English ab, as language 
reviewer and editor of the report. Many thanks for highly stim-
ulating and rewarding work together on these matters.
Finally, I wish to express my great personal gratitude to 
sns for having undertaken this very timely study and for the 
privilege of having been assigned the responsibility as its pro-
ject manager. I particularly wish to thank my main contact per-
sons at sns, Ms. Pernilla Klein, deputy ceo, and Ms. Caroline 
Schmölzer, Assistant Project Manager, for their enthusiastic 
support and never-ending encouragement throughout the pro-
ject.
There are a number of authors of different parts of this 
report. The »country reports« in Appendices a−d are written 
by the respective national expert teams, and Chapter iv, as just 
12 f o r e W o r d
mentioned, is authored by Professor Ronald J. Gilson. These 
authors are independently responsible for their respective 
contributions. Although, as explained above, I have had the 
privilege of unlimited support from an array of highly qualified 
experts, the ultimate responsibility as the main author and edi-
tor of the other parts of the report rests with me alone. 
The mandate of sns is to commission and present fact-
based analyses addressing key issues in society. The organisa-
tion does not take a position on the issues and topics discussed 
in this book. 
Gothenburg, Sweden, September 2014
per lek vall
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E x E c u t i v E  
s u m m a r y
T he k ey observat ion of this book is that the Nordic corporate governance model allows the shareholder majority to effectively control and take 
long-term responsibility for the company that they own. 
The alleged risk of such a system – the potential that a 
shareholder majority misuses its power for its own benefit at 
the expense of minority shareholders – is effectively curbed 
through a well-developed system of minority protection. 
The result is a governance model that encourages strong 
shareholders to engage in the governance of the company in 
their own interest, while creating value for the company and all 
its shareholders.
The Nordic supermodel 
In recent years, the Nordic region has attracted considerable 
positive attention around the world. In a special report about 
the Nordic region published in February 2013, The Economist 
used the title »The next supermodel«, pointing to the fact that 
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the Nordic countries cluster at the top of global league tables 
of everything from economic competitiveness to social health. 
The countries also stand out by being home to a notable 
share of world-leading companies, which by far exceeds the 
region’s share of the world economy. About 60 Nordic com-
panies qualify on the Forbes list of the world’s 2000 largest 
publicly listed companies. This significantly exceeds the num-
ber for Germany, although the combined size of the Nordic 
economies is less than half of that of that country. The chart 
below shows the number of companies on the Forbes 2000 list 
in relation to gdp. All the Nordic countries except Norway 
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,0
0,5
sweden Finland Denmark Norway uK Germany usa
Share of the world’s 2 000 largest listed companies in relation to share of  
global GDP. 
Comment: the size of the oil economy distorts the comparison for Norway. Looking 
instead at the ratio between companies on the Forbes list in relation to population size, 
the number for Norway also exceeds those of the uK and the us.
norDIC ComPanIeS oVerrePreSenteD  
amonG the WorLD’S LarGeSt ComPanIeS.
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have about three times as many companies on the list in rela-
tion to gdp as Germany and distinctly more than both the uk 
and the us.
Although there may be a variety of factors underlying this 
outcome, it is reasonable to assume that the way Nordic com-
panies are governed has played a role in creating favourable 
conditions to build and develop world-leading companies. In 
a ranking of the efficacy of corporate boards, the World Eco-
nomic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014 
ranked three of the Nordic countries among the six highest and 
the fourth as number 20, just ahead of the uk and Germany.
What is a ‘governance model’? 
The purpose of this book is to identify the common features of 
the corporate governance systems of the Nordic countries and, 
on this basis, to define a common Nordic corporate governance 
model. 
By corporate governance we mean the framework through 
which a company is governed in order to ensure that the com-
pany is run in the best interest of its owners. A corporate gov-
ernance model is how this framework is set up for a certain type 
of company, e.g. a listed company, or a geographical region. It 
is determined mainly through three types of norm systems:
•	 Statutory regulation in the form of company law and 
 other mandatory rules issued by the government or official 
authorities. 
•	 Self-regulation defined and enforced by the business sector 
itself. 
•	 Informal norms and practices that influence how corporate 
governance is carried out in practice. This type is of particu-
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lar interest in the Nordic region due to the relatively strong 
and homogenous norms and value systems, combined with 
the high degree of social control typical of small communi-
ties that characterise these societies.
Why a book about  
 Nordic corporate governance?
The book aims at providing a Nordic perspective on two key 
issues in the current European corporate governance debate:
l ack of acTive loNG -TerM oWNers iN Today ’ s cap iTal 
MarkeTs . The perceived short-termism and lack of steward-
ship of institutional owners has resulted in a quest for policy 
solutions that would lead to more active owners with a long-
term view of the companies they own. We believe that Nor-
dic corporate governance, through its emphasis on tools and 
incentives for long-term active ownership, can provide a timely 
contribution to this policy discussion. 
Tidal Wave of eu - le vel reGul aTioN of corpor aTe 
 Gover NaNce . These harmonisation efforts have made visible 
the considerable diversity of corporate governance systems in 
place among the eu member states. This book aims at promot-
ing better knowledge and understanding of the Nordic corpo-
rate governance model within the eu and on the broader inter-
national scene. 
17e x e c u T i v e  s u M M a r y
incentives and tools for shareholders  
 to act as real owners
The fundamental principle of Nordic corporate governance is 
to provide the shareholder majority with strong powers to con-
trol the company while providing minority shareholders with 
effective protection against abuse of power by the majority. 
The system thus gives dominating shareholders the motivation 
and tools to act as engaged owners and take long-term respon-
sibility for the company. The primary means to obtain this is a 
clear-cut and strictly hierarchical chain of command between 
the general meeting, the board and the executive management. 
sTroNG GeNer al MeeTiNG poWers .  At the top of this chain 
is the general meeting, which is the company’s highest decision-
making body and the main forum for the shareholders to exer-
cise their ownership rights. The Nordic general meeting has 
far-reaching powers to govern the company. This ensures strict 
accountability of the board to the shareholders and creates a 
strong incentive for a regular dialogue between shareholders 
and the board. 
Board iNTeGriT y vs .  MaNaGeMeNT. The board is appointed 
by and fully subordinate to the general meeting. Except for 
employee representatives, boards of Nordic listed companies 
are mostly comprised exclusively of non-executive directors. 
An important implication of this is a clear-cut division of duties 
and responsibilities between a monitoring and strategically 
steering board and a purely executive management function. 
This division of roles also serves to strengthen the integrity of 
the board vis-à-vis the executive function.
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shareholder- orieNTed audiTor . The external auditor 
(mandated by law and company statutes) is appointed by the 
general meeting. In the Nordic context, the auditor is primarily 
seen as the shareholders’ instrument for reviewing the work of 
the board and management. 
eNGaGed oWNers . Especially in companies with a concen-
trated ownership structure, major owners generally take active 
part in the governance of the company, e.g. by taking seats on 
the board, being involved in the nomination of candidates for 
board assignments and maintaining ongoing contacts with 
the board. In Norway and Sweden, shareholder engagement 
in board nomination is mainly pursued through nomination 
committees predominantly made up of representatives of the 
largest owners. 
effective minority protection
The potential risk associated with a model that gives the share-
holder majority far-reaching powers is that this power can be 
misused to extract private benefits for the controlling owner at 
the expense of minority shareholders. To provide safeguards 
against this, the Nordic corporate governance model includes a 
system of rules and practices that effectively protects the rights 
of minority shareholders from such abuse by the majority. 
The most important of these minority-protection measures 
are:
1. The principle of equal treatment of shareholders, which 
prohibits the general meeting, the board or the executive 
management from taking decisions that unduly favour one 
group of shareholders at the expense of the company or 
other shareholders. 
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2. Extensive individual shareholder rights to participate 
actively in general meetings and to take legal action. For 
example, any shareholder may challenge a decision by the 
general meeting in a court of law on the grounds that it is 
illegal or in breach with the articles of association of the 
company. The court may then decide that the decision has 
no legally binding force. 
3. Majority vote requirements of up to total unanimity for 
general meeting resolutions of particular potential detri-
ment to the interests of minority shareholders. Examples 
of resolutions that require full consent are changes of the 
shareholders’ obligations towards the company and com-
pulsory redemption of shares. 
4. Minority powers to take action. In a number of situations, 
the shareholder minority can force resolutions to be taken 
by the general meeting (see fact box below). 
5. Strict rules for related-party transactions, that is business 
dealings between the company and counterparties relat-
ed to the company (shareholders, board members, etc.). 
These types of transactions can be used to unduly extract 
money from the company. In the Nordic context, safe-
guards against this type of abuse are primarily based on the 
requirement that all such transactions must be made strictly 
on market terms.
6. A high degree of transparency towards the shareholders, 
the capital market and the society at large. Names and cre-
dentials of board directors as well as the ceo and other 
se nior executives are to be found on the company’s website. 
The remuneration of board directors as well as the ceo is 
disclosed in detail on an individual level. Share registers are 
generally public, which means that anyone can at any time 
have full insight into the ownership structure of any listed 
company.
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Although each of these features of Nordic minority protection 
may not seem unique within a European perspective, togeth-
er they make up an effective system, developed and refined 
through many years of accumulated experience, to counter-
balance the strong powers that the governance model gives to 
majority shareholders. 
r i g h t s 
of minority shareholders to take action
•	  Shareholder minorities of 5 % (Denmark and Norway) 
or 10 % (Finland and Sweden) can require an extraordi-
nary general meeting to be held.
•	 Except in Denmark, a minority of 10 % (5 % in Nor-
way) of the shareholders can also require a minimum 
dividend to be paid out. 
•	 A minority of 10 % in Sweden and Denmark (5 % in 
Norway) of the shareholders can, under certain circum-
stances, have the district court or a public authority 
appoint a second auditor. 
•	 If a shareholder minority of typically 10 % (25 % in 
Denmark) believes that certain circumstances in the 
company should be subject to an in-depth investigation, 
it has the right to demand that the district court or a 
public authority appoint a »special investigator«, paid 
for by the company, with the duty to specifically exam-
ine these circumstances and report its findings to the 
general meeting. 
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effectiveness of the model –  
 research evidence
The ability of the Nordic corporate governance model to safe-
guard against the extraction of private benefits by controlling 
shareholders has been the subject of a number of academic 
studies. This body of research indicates that such misuse of 
power largely appears to have been successfully curbed in the 
Nordic markets.
For example, World Bank governance expert Tatiana Nen-
ova has analysed the market value of controlling voting rights 
in 18 countries from around the world. The study showed 
that, whereas the value of control-block votes in relation to 
total firm value ranged from 5 % to 30 % in the other Euro-
pean countries studied, representing French, German as well as 
Anglo-Saxon judicial traditions, it was nearly zero in the Nor-
dic region. 
In short, Nenova concluded that in the Nordic markets 
the problem of controlling owners who misuse their power to 
extract money from the company at the expense of other share-
holders was almost non-existent. Her explanation of this result 
was that the Nordic markets are characterised by a strict legal 
environment in the areas of investor protection, high-quality 
law enforcement and strict takeover regulation.
a tradition of self-regulation
Self-regulation is a long-standing tradition in many aspects 
of societal life in the Nordic countries. Where applicable, it is 
often preferred to legislation because of its greater flexibility, 
22 e x e c u T i v e  s u M M a r y
generally better regulatory precision and higher acceptability 
among the actors subject to the regulation. 
Since the early years after the turn of the century, corporate 
governance codes have been the main form of self-regulation 
within the field of corporate governancen in the Nordic coun-
tries. At face value, these codes may appear to differ quite sig-
nificantly. However, in terms of crucial substance matter they 
are all founded on common concepts and principles and resem-
ble one another to a great extent.
All the Nordic codes are based on the comply-or-explain 
principle. This entails a strict requirement to apply the code 
properly and to provide explanations for any deviations. The 
general attitude of the bodies responsible for administering the 
code is to emphasise the importance of transparency towards 
the market rather than to promote strict compliance with the 
code. As long as there is transparency, companies are even 
encouraged to choose solutions other than those prescribed by 
the code. 
Well-functioning code enforcement
An important aspect of corporate governance self-regulation 
is how the code is administered and how its implementation 
is monitored and enforced. The Nordic countries share a well-
functioning system in this respect, in short set up as follows:
•  The national corporate governance committee is the 
»law-maker« with the duty to administer the code and the 
authority to decide on its content, typically after consulta-
tion with the market.
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•  The stock exchanges supervise the appropriate application 
of the code by listed companies and have the duty to take 
action when they detect significant deviations.
•  The market participants, i.e. the investors and their advi-
sors, are the ultimate judges through their decisions to 
invest in or divest of companies based on fully transparent 
information about the governance practices of these com-
panies. 
In the Nordics, the corporate governance codes are viewed 
as tools for on-going improvement of corporate governance 
practices by setting higher standards than the minimum levels 
required by law. These standards are to be strived for but not 
necessarily achieved by all companies all the time. With this 
approach, there is no point in aiming to achieve 100 % compli-
ance with the code provisions. In fact, such an outcome might 
imply that the code is not challenging enough.
a model flexible to different  
 ownership structures 
The Nordic markets are generally characterised by a high 
degree of ownership concentration in listed companies. As 
shown in the chart below, for the region as a whole, close to 2/3 
of all listed companies have at least one shareholder control-
ling more than 20 % of the total number of votes, and about 
1/5 are under the absolute control of a single majority share-
holder. The numbers vary between the countries, but they are 
all high in comparison with the uk, the European market most 
generally associated with highly dispersed ownership of listed 
companies.
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This highly concentrated ownership structure of many list-
ed companies has long prevailed and no doubt constitutes an 
important factor underlying the shaping of Nordic corporate 
governance. Yet, far from all Nordic companies have a control-
ling owner, as is also evident from the chart. On the contrary, 
there are many listed Nordic companies with as widely held 
shareholdings as are commonly found in markets generally 
associated with more dispersed ownership structures. That the 
model works well also under such circumstances is witnessed 
by the many successful Nordic companies of this kind.
CoNTRol owNERSHIP in different markets. This graph shows the pres-
ence of control ownership in companies on the Nordic and uk primary stock 
markets in 2014. The bars indicate the share of companies with at least one 
shareholder controlling more than 20 % (grey) and 50 % (red), respectively, of 
the total number of votes. 
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In fact, the model is highly flexible, providing a generally 
shareholder-friendly governance framework that works well 
within a wide range of different ownership structures.
an ownership model of 
 corporate governance
The book also includes a comment by Ronald J. Gilson, profes-
sor of Law and Business at Columbia Law School and Stan-
ford Law School. Gilson’s starting point is the classic notion 
that someone has to watch over management to ensure that it 
works diligently in the interests of the shareholders. To date, 
Anglo-American corporate governance has tried to solve this 
problem through a combination of organisational measures, 
e.g. by requiring a certain number of independent directors 
on the board, and external forces involving threats of hostile 
takeover of underperforming companies by firms with more 
efficient management. The problem, Gilson notes, is that both 
approaches have proved to be rather blunt instruments.
Gilson contrasts this with the Nordic model, which he 
describes as an ownership model of corporate governance, 
based on the »simple intuition that an active owner will be a 
more efficient and less costly monitor of management« than 
the techniques generally associated with dispersed-ownership 
models.
However, this approach gives rise to other problems by 
creating incentives for controlling owners to divert profits to 
themselves rather than sharing them with the other sharehold-
ers. Gilson defines three such agency problems of ownership 
and assesses their prevalence and ramifications in the Nordic 
context. His conclusion is that Nordic corporate governance 
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has been able to check these problems quite effectively, thus 
creating a governance framework that has fostered a remark-
able number of globally successful companies. Gilson attrib-
utes this to a combination of effectively enforced legal rules 
and non-legal constraints on the possibi lity to extract private 
benefits in closely held companies.
convergence of ownership patterns?
Gilson proceeds to examine the much-debated issue whether 
different national and regional governance systems will con-
verge over time. Citing recent developments in the us as well 
as the Nordic markets, he sees no general trend towards such 
a convergence. On the contrary, both dispersed and concen-
trated ownership appear to be thriving in both market areas. 
Hence, Gilson argues, the relevant issue is whether we will see a 
convergence of ownership patterns within markets rather than 
between markets.  
On this point the outcome is as yet unpredictable, with con-
centrated ownership becoming more common on the us mar-
ket whereas a trend towards decreased control ownership may 
be foreseen in the Nordic context. A decisive factor, Gilson 
speculates, may be the increased importance of institutional 
owners on both markets and how those shareholders choose to 
exert their ownership power. For example, what might be the 
impact on the Nordic markets if minority institutional share-
holders are able to join forces to form institutional block-hold-
ings in companies with a controlling shareholder?
( 27 )
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Background
The quest for active and engaged shareholders with a long-
term view of their investee companies has received increased 
attention in the current European debate on corporate govern-
ance. The issue is particularly pertinent in the uk, the eu mar-
ket most closely associated with widely held, listed companies, 
but is also subject to considerable concern in many other Mem-
ber States and in the European Commission. 
The corporate governance framework of the Nordic coun-
tries provides some timely contributions to this debate. Its 
most distinctive feature is that it allows a shareholder majority, 
whether in the form of a single controlling owner or a group 
of shareholders with a shared interest, to effectively control 
and take long-term responsibility for the company. The alleged 
flip side of such a system, which is the potential scope for a 
shareholder majority to extract undue benefits at the expense 
of minority shareholders, is effectively curbed through a well-
developed system of minority protection. The result is a gov-
ernance model that, while being flexible to different ownership 
structures, encourages shareholders to engage in the govern-
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ance of the company in their own long-term interest in a way 
that also benefits the company as a whole. 
The model is Nordic in the sense that it is shared among 
all the Nordic countries,1 while distinctly different in crucial 
respects from those of other parts of Europe. To what extent 
certain aspects of it may be of relevance also in a broader inter-
national perspective falls outside the scope of this study. Its key 
premise is, rather, that the model works well in the Nordic con-
text, having fostered a remarkable number of globally success-
ful companies in relation to the size of the countries, as shown 
in Table i.1 below, and that it therefore deserves to be recog-
nised and cherished as a well-functioning governance model 
for this region.
1. Generally including also Iceland, although this country is not part of this 
study. 
2. This analysis is contributed by Professor Tom Berglund, member of the 
Finnish expert team of this study.
TABlE I .1 share of the world’s largest listed companies in relation to share of  
global Gdp and population.2
  Denmark finland Norway Sweden uK Germany uSA
share of global population 0.08 % 0.08 % 0.07 % 0.13 % 0.89 % 1.15 % 4.48 %
share of global Gdp 0.43 % 0.34 % 0.69 % 0.72 % 3.42 % 4.73 % 22.41 %
No. of companies in forbes’ 2000 largest 14 12 9 26 92 52 563
share of companies in forbes’ 2000 largest 0.70 % 0.60 % 0.45 % 1.30 % 4.60 % 2.60 % 28.15 %
large company share/Gdp share 1.63 1.76 0.65 1.81 1.35 0.55 1.26
large company share/population share 8.86 7.89 6.43 9.70 5.19 2.26 6.28
SouRCES: population and Gdp data: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org). forbes 
2000 data: forbes (http://www.forbes.com/global2000/)
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The table shows the ratios of the share of companies includ-
ed in the Forbes 2000 Global Leading Companies list to the 
share of global gdp and of global population, respectively, for 
the Nordic countries and Germany, the uk and the us. As is 
apparent from the table, all the Nordic countries except Nor-
way have about three times as many companies on the Forbes 
2000 list in relation to their gdp as Germany, and also dis-
tinctly more than the uk and the us. In terms of the second 
ratio – share of large companies in relation to share of global 
population – the difference is even greater and includes also 
Norway.3 It is further notable that the total number of Nordic 
companies on the list exceeds that of Germany although the 
gdp of this country is more than twice that of the combined 
Nordic countries.
3. The significant difference between the two ratios for Norway is largely 
due to the exceptionally high gdp per capita of this country compared with the 
other countries in the table.
  Denmark finland Norway Sweden uK Germany uSA
share of global population 0.08 % 0.08 % 0.07 % 0.13 % 0.89 % 1.15 % 4.48 %
share of global Gdp 0.43 % 0.34 % 0.69 % 0.72 % 3.42 % 4.73 % 22.41 %
No. of companies in forbes’ 2000 largest 14 12 9 26 92 52 563
share of companies in forbes’ 2000 largest 0.70 % 0.60 % 0.45 % 1.30 % 4.60 % 2.60 % 28.15 %
large company share/Gdp share 1.63 1.76 0.65 1.81 1.35 0.55 1.26
large company share/population share 8.86 7.89 6.43 9.70 5.19 2.26 6.28
SouRCES: population and Gdp data: World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org). forbes 
2000 data: forbes (http://www.forbes.com/global2000/)
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purpose and scope of the study
Against this backdrop, the principal purpose of this study is to 
identify the key common features of the corporate governance 
systems of the Nordic countries and to convey, on this basis, 
a coherent representation of a pan-Nordic governance model. 
The underlying aim is to contribute to an increased recogni-
tion and better understanding of this model in the international 
business community, especially among actors with an interest 
in the Nordic capital market. As hinted at above, it may also 
contribute to the ongoing debate on shareholder engagement 
and long-term ownership. 
The study comprises the four major Nordic countries of 
Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. As separate enti-
ties, these countries are small and of little economic weight in 
a broader international context. However, looked upon as a 
coherent region, in terms of 2013 gdp it made up about 2/3 
of the size of the uk, exceeded that of Spain, and would have 
qualified as member no. 12 of the g20 group, shortly ahead of 
Australia.4
A key premise of this study is the aim of corporate govern-
ance to reduce agency costs,5 i.e. to ensure that companies are 
run as efficiently as possible in the interest of their sharehold-
ers. Nordic corporate governance is firmly founded on prevail-
ing institutional, regulatory and general practice preconditions 
4. Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 1 July 
2014.
5. This term refers to the so-called Principal-Agent Theory, which suggests 
in short that there may be discrepancies between the interests of the owners 
of a company, the principal, and its board and management, the agent. To 
the extent that such discrepancies lead to the company not being run in the 
full interest of the principal, the difference is generally referred to as »agency 
costs«.
31Introduction
in each of the countries involved. The corporate legislation and 
other statutory regulation of these countries are the corner-
stones, but Nordic corporate governance also builds heavily 
upon self-regulation, mainly in the form of corporate govern-
ance codes, and on generally accepted, non-codified practice 
and traditions. 
The study is purely descriptive, presenting a factual account 
of the state of the art of Nordic corporate governance in the 
first half of 2014. It entails no ambitions to promote changes 
to this framework, either pertaining to individual countries or 
at the consolidated level, and the model presented should not 
be interpreted as any kind of pan-Nordic regulatory initiative. 
Consideration of if and when such a development might be 
worth pursuing is outside the scope of this study.
The main target groups of the report are thought to be the 
following:
 (i) Investors and governance professionals of a non-Nordic 
background, active on the Nordic capital markets and 
therefore in need of a better understanding of the corpo-
rate governance framework of these markets. 
 (ii) Politicians, officials and staff of the eu institutions with 
a need to grasp the diversity of corporate governance sys-
tems prevailing throughout the Union. Naturally, the sig-
nificance of the individual Nordic Member States is quite 
limited in this context. By comparison, seen as a coher-
ent region with a well-defined, common corporate gov-
ernance model, which is distinctively different from other 
parts of Europe, its weight increases significantly.
 (iii) Domestic audiences, e.g. company owners, entrepre-
neurs, board directors and executives engaged in the prac-
tical governance of listed as well as unlisted companies, 
wanting better knowledge of the corporate governance 
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systems of their neighbouring countries and/or a deeper 
understanding of the ideological roots, key characteristics 
and practical functioning of their domestic system.
Project organisation
The study has been carried out as a policy roundtable project 
within sns, the Centre for Business and Policy Studies, Stock-
holm, Sweden, under the management of Per Lekvall, former 
Executive Director, currently ordinary member, of the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board and member of the Policy Com-
mittee of the European Confederation of Directors’ Associa-
tions (ecoDa).
The main project work has been pursued through a pan-
Nordic working group made up of two members from each 
country, i.e. one legal expert focused on corporate legislation 
and other formal corporate governance regulation, and one 
management-oriented expert of corporate governance theory 
and/or practice. The respective country teams have been com-
prised of the following members:
denmark:  Jesper Lau Hansen, Professor of Financial 
Markets Law, University of Copenhagen, and Carsten Løn-
feldt, business professional with extensive experience as cfo, 
board director and chair in listed and non-listed Danish com-
panies, and member of the Nasdaq Copenhagen Advisory 
Board.
finland :  Manne Airaksinen, partner of Roschier Law 
Firm, Helsinki, and Tom Berglund, Professor of Applied 
Microeconomics and Theory of the Firm, Hanken School of 
Economics, and director of the Hanken Centre for Corporate 
Governance, Helsinki.
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norway:  Gudmund Knudsen, partner of ba-hr da Law 
Firm, Oslo, and Harald Norvik, business professional with a 
long career as ceo, board director and chair in major listed 
Norwegian companies, and co-founder and board member of 
the Norwegian Institute of Directors.
sw eden :  Rolf Skog, adjunct professor at the Department 
of Law, University of Gothenburg, and Erik Sjöman, partner of 
Vinge Law Firm, Stockholm.
In addition, Tom von Weymarn, member of the Finnish ref-
erence group, has been permanently co-opted to the working 
group as an advisor with particular expertise in Finnish and 
Swedish corporate governance practice.
In each country, a high-level Reference Group represent-
ing various aspects of the business and financial sectors of the 
country has been organised for the purpose of acting as advi-
sors to the national expert teams and reviewers of subsequent 
drafts of the study report. These groups have been comprised 
as follows:
denm a rk:  Sten Scheibye (chair), chair of Novo Nordisk 
Foundation and former chair of the Danish Corporate Gov-
ernance Committee (dcgc); Frederik Bjørn, board secretary, 
Danske Bank Group; Lars Nørby Johansen, former chair of the 
dcgc; Anne Pindborg, Chief Legal Counsel, Mærsk Group; 
and Bjørn Sibbern, ceo, Nasdaq Copenhagen and member of 
the dcgc. 
finl a nd :  Stig G. Gustavson (chair), chair of Konecranes 
Oy; Maarit Arni-Sirviö, Secretary General, Directors’ Institute 
of Finland (dif); Gunvor Kronman, ceo, Hanaholmen/sns 
Helsinki; Leena Linnainmaa, deputy ceo, Finland Chamber 
of Commerce; Sixten Nyman, member of the dif Policy Com-
mittee and partner and chair, kpmg Finland; Tapani Varjas, 
member of the dif Policy Committee and General Counsel, 
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Solidium Oy; and Tom von Weymarn, partner of Boardman 
Oy and chair of Hartwall Capital. 
norway:  Ingebjørg Harto (chair), chair of the Norwegian 
Corporate Governance Committee and department director, 
Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise; Finn Jebsen, chair 
of Kongsberg Group; John Giverholt, ceo, the single-family 
office ferd; and Christina Stray, General Counsel, The Gov-
ernment Pension Fund Norway. 
sw eden :  Hans Dalborg (chair), former chair of Nordea 
Bank and the Swedish Corporate Governance Board; Petra 
Hedengran, General Counsel, Investor ab; Annika Lundius, 
Executive Vice President, the Confederation of Swedish Enter-
prise; Anders Nyrén, chair of Svenska Handelsbanken ab and 
ceo, ab Industrivärden; George Pettersson, ceo, kpmg Swe-
den; and Ulrik Svensson, ceo, Melker Schörling ab. 
The role of the reference groups has been solely advisory. 
Hence, the views expressed by the respective authors of various 
parts of this report may not necessarily be shared by individual 
group members.
outline of the report
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter ii gives an over-
view of two crucial aspects of the institutional context in which 
Nordic corporate governance prevails: its regulatory basis and 
the structure of the Nordic stock markets. Then Chapter iii, as 
the core compartment of the report, presents the key findings 
of the study in the form of a coherent account of a joint Nor-
dic corporate governance model, based on the corresponding 
models of the four countries involved as described in Appendi-
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ces a–d. Finally, in Chapter iv, Professor Ronald J. Gilson of 
Columbia Law School and Stanford Law School, comments on 
the model from an international point of view and puts it into 
the context of a wider discussion of the role of ownership for 
the efficient governance of companies.
Appendices A to D contain summary accounts of the cor-
porate governance systems of each of the countries involved, 
following a common structural template. These »country 
reports« make up the main factual basis for the consolidated 
model presented in Chapter iii.
Appendix E contains a summary report of the ownership 
concentration study which was carried out within the frame-
work of the main study, as well as a note on the methodology 
used for this study. 
( 36 )
 
 
c h a p T e r  i i
T h e  i N s T i T u T i o N a l 
 f r a M e W o r k  o f  N o r d i c 
 c o r p o r aT e  G o v e r N a N c e
Nordic corporate governance rests upon a set of cultural, 
judicial and economic preconditions, which are more or less 
unique to the region and together make up its institutional 
basis. This chapter will focus on two such aspects that are of 
particular pertinence to the discussion in subsequent parts of 
the report. These are (i) the regulatory framework that defines 
the rules, norms and practices of corporate governance in the 
Nordic countries, and (ii) the overall size and structure of the 
Nordic market for listed-company equity.
The regulatory framework
The corporate governance system of a jurisdiction is defined by 
complex sets of written and unwritten rules, norms and prac-
tices which are collectively referred to here as the regulatory 
framework. Generally speaking, it is comprised of three main 
categories:
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 (i) Statutory regulation in the form of companies acts and 
other laws and mandatory prescriptions, issued by the 
government or its subordinate authorities. See Appendi-
ces a–d for a review of the relevant legal structure of each 
of the countries concerned. The aim of this chapter is to 
supplement these accounts with a short review of the com-
mon heritage of the corporate legislation of the Nordic 
countries that constitutes a fundamental premise of this 
study.
 (ii) Self-regulation, i.e. regulation defined and enforced by the 
business sector itself, with no or only limited interference 
by the government. Such regulation can have different 
forms and be more or less mandatory for the actors sub-
ject to the regulation, as will be further discussed below.
 (iii) Non-codified rules, norms, and customary practice that 
largely govern the way real-world governance is pursued. 
Although the balance between these norm systems may vary 
from country to country, they all play a crucial role as determi-
nants of the way corporate governance is carried out in prac-
tice. 
The third category is of particular interest in the Nordic 
context due to the relatively strong and homogeneous norms 
and value systems prevailing in theses societies in combination 
with a high degree of social control which is typical of small 
communities. Nonetheless, the scope of this report does not 
permit a deeper discussion of this aspect of the regulatory 
framework.
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A common heritage of corporate legislation1
The companies acts of the Nordic countries have a long-stand-
ing common background. They all stem from a combination 
of French and German corporate legislation of the 19th Cen-
tury but have also been subject to significant influence from the 
Anglo-Saxon judicial tradition. Furthermore, for over a cen-
tury, there have been recurrent efforts to harmonise corporate 
legislation between the Nordic countries.
Thus, in the decades following World War ii, there were 
far-reaching plans to develop an essentially common compa-
nies act for the Nordic countries as part of a general quest for 
closer Nordic economic integration at that time. Indeed, in 
the years around 1970, after lengthy and complicated nego-
tiations, almost identical bills of new acts were submitted to 
the legislators of the five Nordic countries, including Iceland. 
However, the appetite for Nordic economic co-ordination had 
substantially weakened by this time. Instead, the co-opera-
tion within the then European Economic Community (eec) 
appeared more promising, and the formal Nordic harmonisa-
tion efforts came to an end. Still, the new companies acts which 
were introduced in all Nordic countries during the 1970’s 
closely resembled one another.
In the subsequent decades, these acts began drifting apart 
again as a result of different political agendas and the fact that 
the countries were members of different economic co-opera-
tion frameworks. When new companies acts were again intro-
duced in all Nordic countries during the first decade of the new 
century, they thus differed significantly in several aspects. It 
should be noted, though, that the partition process since the 
1. This section draws largely upon a speech delivered by Rolf Skog, mem-
ber of the Swedish expert team of this study, at a seminar on May 10, 2007, in 
celebration of the centennial jubilee of Stockholm University.
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1970’s had mainly concerned aspects of the acts other than 
how companies are to be governed, thus leaving the highly co-
ordinated regulation of corporate governance matters from the 
previous acts largely untouched. The result is the far-reaching 
resemblance of the governance regimes of the Nordic countries 
appearing from Appendices a–d. This, in turn, constitutes a 
key precondition of this study. 
A tradition of self-regulation
Self-regulation is a long-standing tradition in many aspects of 
societal life in the Nordic countries. It exists in many differ-
ent forms, from mandatory membership rules of professional 
organisations to more loosely defined voluntary codes of con-
duct in various contexts. Where applicable, it is often preferred 
to legislation because of its greater flexibility, generally better 
regulatory precision and higher acceptability among actors 
subject to the regulation. 
Since the early years of the new century, corporate govern-
ance codes have been the main form of self-regulation within 
this field in the Nordic countries. The development began in 
2001 when the Nørby Committee2 presented the first proposal 
of a Danish national corporate governance code. In the subse-
quent years, this was followed by similar initiatives in all four 
countries and, by December 2005, comprehensive corporate 
governance codes based on the comply-or-explain principle 
were part of the mandatory listing requirements on all primary 
2. Named after its chair, Mr. Lars Nørby Johansen, who subsequently 
chaired the first Danish national corporate governance committee and has 
been a member of the Danish reference group of this study. 
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Nordic stock exchanges.3 Although these codes may appear 
at face value to differ quite significantly, in terms of crucial 
substance matter they are all based on universally adopted 
concepts and principles of modern corporate governance and 
resemble one another to a great extent.
An important aspect of the regulatory impact of corporate 
governance codes is how they are implemented and set to work 
in practice, particularly with respect to the comply-or-explain 
principle. In this regard, Nordic code regulation is true to the 
original uk-based principle which, in short, imposes a strict 
requirement on companies to apply the code properly but takes 
a soft attitude toward their compliance with individual pro-
visions. Thus, companies listed on a Nordic, regulated stock 
exchange are contractually bound to apply the corporate gov-
ernance code adopted by the exchange. On the other hand, 
there is no obligation to comply with individual provisions as 
long as all non-compliance is duly reported and explained. It is 
the general attitude of Nordic code-administering bodies4 that, 
in individual cases, it may be as good – or occasionally even 
better – corporate governance to choose a different solution 
than the one provided by the code. 
Rather than as a »soft law« that should be observed to the 
greatest extent possible, codes are thus viewed in the Nordic 
context as tools for on-going improvement of corporate gov-
ernance practices by setting a higher standard than the mini-
mum level required by law, a standard to be strived for but not 
3. A more comprehensive discussion of the origin and regulatory role of 
the Nordic corporate governance codes can be found in Hansen, J.L.: Catching 
up with the crowd, but going where? International Journal of Disclosure and 
Governance 213, 2006.
4. The Danish Corporate Governance Committee, www.corporategovern-
ance.dk; the Finnish Securities Market Association, www.cgfinland.fi/en; the 
Norwegian Corporate Governance Board, www.nues.no; and the Swedish 
Corporate Governance Board, www.corporategovernanceboard.se.
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necessarily achieved by all companies all the time. With this 
view, there is no point setting a goal of 100 % compliance with 
the code provisions. In fact, such an outcome might be seen as 
implying that the code is not challenging enough rather than as 
a sign of high corporate governance standards.
Another crucial aspect of code implementation is how the 
monitoring and enforcement of the code are organised. In this 
regard, the Nordic countries have developed a well-defined 
division of duties between the main actors of the system, in 
short to the effect that:
•	 the	national	corporate	governance	committee	is	the	»law-
maker« with the duty to administer the code and the 
authority to decide on its content, typically after due con-
sultation with the market;
•	 the	 relevant	 stock	 exchanges	 supervise	 the	 appropriate	
application of the code by »their« listed companies and 
have the duty to take action if and when they detect signifi-
cant deviations from this;
•	 the	market,	which	is	comprised	of	present	and	prospective	
shareholders, their advisors and other actors on the capital 
market, is the judge as to whether the corporate govern-
ance behaviour of a company is confidence-inspiring from 
an investor’s point of view.
The appropriate performance of this system is paramount to 
the effectiveness of corporate governance codes as self-regula-
tory instruments.
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The market for publicly traded stock  
The Nordic markets for publicly traded company stock are 
active, versatile and technically up to date. Since the dis-
mantling of the previous monopolies during the 1990’s, all 
exchanges are currently operated by privately owned compa-
nies. Individual ownership of listed-company equity is wide-
spread, although today mainly channelled through various 
forms of institutional investors such as life insurance compa-
nies, pension funds and mutual investment funds. Thus, a high 
percentage of the general public of the Nordic countries has a 
direct or indirect ownership interest in the stock market, and 
the development of share prices as well as the governance and 
performance of stock-listed companies are closely monitored 
and reported by media.
Size and structure of the stock market
Since the turn of the century, the importance of the pub-
lic stock market for the supply of risk capital to companies 
has decreased relative to other sources of capital in the Nor-
dic countries as well as in many other parts of the developed 
world.5 Nonetheless it still carries considerable economic 
weight in the Nordic economies, well comparable to that of 
other European countries (see Table ii.1 below). Although the 
figures in this table must be interpreted with care,6 it conveys 
5. Jakobsson, J. & Wiberg, D.: Vem ska styra de svenska företagen? [Who 
is to Control the Swedish Companies?]. Report to the project Entrepreneurial 
Ownership of the Association of Swedish Enterprise, Stockholm 2014, pp. 
16–17 (available only in Swedish).
6. For at least two reasons, one being that the numbers are sensitive to 
diverging general share price developments between the exchanges, and anoth-
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a »snapshot in time«, indicating that the economic importance 
of the stock markets in the Nordic countries is well at par with 
that of some other European countries, generally known for 
significant stock markets.
er that a significant – and increasing – share of the stock of companies listed on 
these exchanges is being traded on so called multilateral trading facilities (e.g. 
Chi-square, Turquoise, etc.).
TABlE II .1 importance of national primary stock market vs. country  economy.
Primary national Country GDP Market Cap Market Cap / 
stock exchange 2013 (b€) end 2013 (b€) country GDP
Nasdaq copenhagen 249  221 89 %
Nasdaq helsinki 193 162 84 %
Nasdaq stockholm  420 539 128 %
oslo stock exchange 386 233 60 %7
Total Nordic area 1,248 1,155 93 %
london stock exchange 1,908 2,884 151 %
deutsche Börse 2,737 1,710 63 %
euronext paris 2,060 1,670 81 %
euronext amsterdam 603 594 99 %
SouRCES: copenhagen-helsinki-stockholm: Nasdaq and eurostat; oslo stock 
exchange: oslo stock exchange and national statistics; london stock exchange: euro-
stat and euronext; euronext paris and amsterdam: eurostat and ecB statistical data 
Warehouse.
7. The modest number for Norway in view of its sizable stock market (see 
Tables ii.2 and ii.3) is largely due to its significantly higher gdp per capita 
than all other countries in the comparison. If, instead, the average gdp of Den-
mark and Finland, both of which are about the size of Norway in terms of 
population, is applied to Norway, its ratio of Market Cap to gdp increases to 
105 %.
44 c h a p T e r  i i  
TABlE II .2 overview of Nordic markets for publicly traded stock as of  
2013-12-31. Number of companies listed on the respective trading facilities.
       Nordic 
  Denmark finland Norway Sweden area
REGulATED MARKETS
Primary Nasdaq Nasdaq oslo  Nasdaq  
market  copen- helsinki stock  stockholm 
  hagen  exchange
  154 120 1868 251 711
Secondary  —  — oslo axess  NGM equity 
market                     32                    14            46
Total regulated  
markets 154                   120 218 265 757
uNREGulATED   
MARKETS 42 4 64 ~ 240 ~ 350
ToTAl PuBlICly  
TRADED  
CoMPANIES 196 124 282 ~ 500 ~ 1,100
The primary stock exchanges of Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden are currently owned and operated by the privately 
owned company Nasdaq Nordic Ltd., including the  exchanges 
of the Baltic states and Iceland, which is, in turn, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of the us-based Nasdaq Group Inc.The pri-
mary Norwegian exchange, Oslo Stock Exchange, is owned by 
Oslo Børs vpc Holding asa, the result of a merger between 
8. Including 15 non-incorporated savings banks which issue a special kind 
of equity instrument.
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Oslo Børs Holding and vps Holding in 2007. In some of the 
countries there are also secondary stock exchanges as well as a 
number of unregulated multilateral trading facilities (see Table 
ii.2).
As shown in the table, the primary regulated markets of the 
Nordic countries comprised in all slightly over 700 companies 
at the end of 2013. In Norway and Sweden there is also a minor 
secondary regulated market, increasing the total number of 
companies listed on a Nordic regulated market to about 750. 
However, most of the companies on these exchanges are quite 
small and of little economic significance in the overall picture. 
For example, the 32 companies of Oslo Axess, which make up 
15 % of the total number of companies listed on the Norwe-
gian regulated market, accounted for a mere 0.2 % of the total 
market capitalisation value of this market.
In addition to this, most of the countries have one or several 
unregulated stock markets, listing in all about 350 companies, 
most of which are also quite small. Hence, the total number of 
publicly traded companies in the Nordic countries amounts to 
well over a thousand.
Table ii.3 shows a size classification of the companies listed 
on the primary market of each country. For Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden it is based on numbers obtained from Nasdaq 
according to their standard size classification as follows:
•	 Large-cap	=	companies	with	a	market	value	exceeding	m€ 
1,000.
•	 Mid-cap	=	 companies	with	 a	market	 value	of	m€ 150–
1,000.
•	 Small-cap	=	companies	with	a	market	value	of	less	than	m€ 
150.
Since there is no official size classification on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, a corresponding break-down has been done »man-
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ually« for these companies based on the same size categories.9
As appears from the table, the size structure of the com-
panies is extremely uneven. The roughly 15–25 % of the total 
number of companies classified as large-cap across all exchang-
es account for almost 90 % of the market value, whereas more 
than half of the companies classified as small-cap account for 
a mere 2 %, a pattern that is remarkably consistent across the 
markets. All companies listed on the secondary regulated and 
unregulated markets shown in Table ii.2 can also be added to 
the small-cap category. All in all, this means that, although the 
Nordic stock market comprises a respectable number of rela-
tively large companies, not least in view of the limited size of 
the countries (see Table i.1, p. 28), there is also a long »tail« 
of quite small, listed companies, especially as seen in a broader 
international context. Many of these companies are in fact ear-
ly-stage entrepreneurial projects for which the stock exchange 
9.  Carried out in-house at the ba-hr Law Firm, Oslo, for this study.
TABlE II .3 size composition of companies listed on the primary Nordic stock 
exchanges.
Number of companies / Share of market value  
 large-cap Mid-cap Small-cap Total
copenhagen  22/89 % 29/9 % 103/2 % 154/100 %
helsinki  26/87 % 40/11 % 54/2 % 120/100 %
oslo  32/86 % 66/12 % 88/2 % 186/100 %
stockholm  58/90 % 71/8 % 122/2 % 251/100 %
Total Nordic  138/88 % 206/10 % 367/2 % 711/100 %
SouRCES: copenhagen-helsinki-stockholm exchanges: Nasdaq Nordic; oslo stock 
exchange: Ba-hr law firm, oslo.
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offers access to a broader capital base for their often first steps 
towards international expansion.
Major shareholder categories
The ownership structure of Nordic publicly traded companies 
has undergone significant changes over the last half-century 
and differs today considerably between the countries. Details 
about these developments are to be found in the respective 
country reports in Appendices a–d. What follows here is a 
brief review of the most important trends seen in an overall 
Nordic perspective.
Direct share ownership by private households has decreased 
drastically from having dominated stock market ownership in 
some countries a few decades ago to a share of the total market 
value of about 15 % in Denmark, Finland and Sweden and a 
mere 4 % in Norway.
Instead, (domestic) institutional investors in the form of 
pension funds, life insurance companies, mutual funds, etc., 
have picked up much of private households’ savings in listed 
shares, thus increasing institutional ownership from virtu-
ally nothing 50 years ago to a very significant role in the dec-
ades preceding the turn of the century. Their relative share 
has decreased again since that time, leaving domestic institu-
tional investors to account today for about 10 % in Norway 
and 35–50 % in the other countries. This development has 
been offset by a rapid increase of foreign ownership, mainly 
in the form of uk- and us-based institutional investors, which 
has increased sharply from insignificant levels 20 years ago to 
more than 40 % for the region as a whole today. Hence, the 
total institutional ownership on Nordic markets has remained 
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largely unchanged since the turn of the century. 
Except for Denmark, public ownership, mainly through 
the State, has traditionally played a significant role on Nordic 
stock markets. However, particularly in Sweden but increas-
ingly also in Finland, the State has reduced its holdings in 
recent years and is now down to about 23 % of the total stock 
market value in Finland and 5 % in Sweden. In Norway, the 
State remains the largest investor on the stock market and is, in 
fact, the dominant shareholder in eight of the largest Norwe-
gian companies, together accounting for about one third of the 
total Oslo Stock Exchange market value.
ownership concentration in listed companies
The distinction between concentrated versus dispersed owner-
ship in listed companies has been a matter of considerable 
attention in academic research within the corporate govern-
ance field. Still, there is a lack of comprehensive empirical data 
on the degree of ownership concentration in different jurisdic-
tions to be found in the literature. A notable exception is a book 
edited by Barca and Becht from 20029 containing voting-block 
analyses for nine European countries and the us. However, 
the only Nordic country included in this study was Sweden, 
and the analyses were confined to a 25 % vote control level. 
Two other sources of ownership control data are a classic study 
from 1999 by La Porta et al.,10 covering 27 countries around 
the world, and an eu study from 2007.11 Although these stud-
9. Barca, F. and Becht, M. (eds): The Control of Corporate Europe. 
Oxford University Press, 2002.
10. La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Schleifer, A.: Corporate Owner-
ship around the World. Journal of Finance 54(2) 1999, pp. 471–517.
11. European Commission Study on Proportionality between Ownership 
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ies had a broader geographical coverage, between them includ-
ing the four Nordic countries of this study, they were both con-
fined to about the 20 largest listed companies in each country, 
and both looked only at 20 % of the voting power as the cut-off 
level for corporate control. 
Therefore, and since the prevalence of corporate con-
trol among broader circles of listed companies is of crucial 
importance for this study, a special investigation of this issue 
among Nordic listed companies, including both a 20 % and a 
50 % control level, was carried out within the framework of 
this study. In order to obtain a broader frame of reference for 
assessing the Nordic results, a sample of companies on the uk 
stock market was also included.
The research was commissioned to sis Ägarservice, a 
Stockholm-based consultancy specialised in the analysis of 
ownership and board data for listed companies.12 For the Nor-
dic countries, the study comprised all domestically domiciled 
companies listed on the primary national stock exchange of 
the respective countries during the period April–June 2014. 
For the uk, a sample of 116 companies was randomly select-
ed from uk-domiciled companies listed on the London Stock 
Exchange, in all a uk population of 820 companies. In order 
to obtain some measure of comparability with the two earlier 
studies mentioned above, but also to facilitate the comparison 
of various degrees of control ownership, two cut-off levels of 
corporate control were applied, i.e. at least one shareholder 
controlling more than 20 % and 50 %, respectively, of the total 
votes of the company. 
Detailed results of the study, as well as a note on the method-
ology used, are to be found in Appendix E. Below follows an 
overview of the main results (see Figure ii.1).
and Control, 2007.
12. sis Ägarservice ab: www.aktieservice.se.
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Looking first at the 20 % control level, the overall picture 
is, as expected, one of high degrees of ownership concentration 
across the Nordic markets. Norway and Sweden lead the way 
with approximately two thirds of all companies having at least 
one shareholder in control of more than 20 % of the votes. The 
corresponding numbers for Denmark and Finland are lower, 
yet more than half of their companies display the same degree 
of concentration. For the Nordic region as a whole, about six 
companies out of ten have at least one controlling shareholder 
at the 20 % control level.
The pattern is remarkably different at the 50 % control 
level. Here, Denmark displays the highest degree of concentra-
tion with a single shareholder in full control of almost three 
companies out of ten, whereas especially Finland and Sweden 
show distinctly lower figures. For the Nordic region as a whole, 
about one fifth of all companies are under absolute control of a 
single shareholder. 
fIGuRE II .1 presence of control ownership on the Nordic and uk primary 
stock markets. share of companies with at least one shareholder controlling 
more than 20 % and 50 %, respectively, of the total number of votes (numbers 
rounded off to the nearest whole number).
%
20 % control level
70
60
Denmark
28
57
50
40
30
20
10
0
Finland
15
54
Norway
23
65
Sweden
17
67
Nordic
region
21
62
UK
5
27
25 % control level
51The Institutional  framework of Nordic  Corporate Governance
As expected, the uk benchmark sample displays distinctly 
lower concentration levels. Still, it may come as a surprise that, 
in more than a quarter of the uk sample of companies, at least 
one shareholder controls more than 20 % of the voting power 
(which equals the share of capital for companies on the lse 
Main Market). Perhaps even more surprising is that about 5 % 
of the companies, corresponding to six individual companies, 
have a single shareholder in control of more than 50 % of the 
votes. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these data 
– in contrast to the Nordic data – are based on a sample survey 
and are thus subject to statistical sampling error.13 
13. For the 20 % control level, this error margin amounts to ± 7.4 percent-
age points at the 95 % confidence level. With a slight simplification, this may be 
interpreted to mean that, with 95 % certainty, the true share lies between about 
a fifth and a third of all companies (for further details, see Appendix e).
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The essence of the model 
The key distinctive feature of Nordic corporate governance is 
the strong powers vested with a shareholder majority to effec-
tively control the company. This forms the basis for dominant 
owners to engage in, and take long-term responsibility for their 
company, but it also offers shareholders of more widely held 
companies the potential to exert genuine ownership powers, 
e.g. by forming ad hoc coalitions to deal with issues of common 
interest. In fact, the model is highly flexible, providing a gener-
ally shareholder-friendly governance framework that is func-
tional within a wide range of different ownership structures.
The underlying philosophy is that the shareholders should 
be in command of the company. The board and management 
are seen as the shareholders’ agents for running the company 
during their mandate period under strict accountability to the 
shareholders for the outcome of their work. This is manifested 
through a clear-cut and strictly hierarchical governance struc-
ture based on four pillars:
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 (i) Supremacy of the general meeting to decide on any mat-
ters that do not expressly fall within the exclusive compe-
tence of another company organ;
 (ii) A non-executive board of directors appointed by, and 
fully subordinate to, the shareholders in general meeting; 
 (iii) An executive management function appointed by, and 
fully subordinate to, the board; and 
 (iv) A statutory auditor appointed by, and reporting back pri-
marily to, the shareholders in general meeting. 
The strong ownership powers inherent in this structure may 
be further enhanced in all four countries through the use of 
dual-class shares with different voting rights. This option is 
currently mainly used in Denmark and Sweden, less in Finland 
and seldom in Norway.
Major owners, especially in companies with a concentrated 
ownership structure, generally take active part in the govern-
ance of the company, e.g. by taking seats on the board, being 
involved in the nomination of candidates for board assign-
ments and maintaining ongoing contacts with the board, pri-
marily through its chair. In Norway and Sweden, shareholder 
engagement in board nomination is mainly pursued through 
the shareholder-led nomination committees generally used in 
these countries (see page 72), whereas in Denmark it usually 
takes the form of informal consultations with board-appointed 
nomination committees of the Anglo-American type, typically 
through the chair as the main liaison with major sharehold-
ers. In Finland, the practice varies with closely held companies 
increasingly using shareholder-led nomination committees of 
the Norwegian/Swedish type, whereas more widely held com-
panies generally apply the Anglo-American nomination model.
Another distinctive feature of Nordic corporate governance 
is the entirely or predominantly non-executive board. This has 
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several important implications, one being a clear-cut division 
of duties and responsibilities between a monitoring and stra-
tegically steering board and a purely executive management 
function. Another is the stronger integrity of the board vis-à-
vis the executive function than what is generally the case in 
mixed boards of the one-tier type. This, in turn, has fundamen-
tal implications for the rationale in the Nordic context of such 
board integrity-preserving measures in the one-tier system as 
director independence and board subcommittees, as will be 
further discussed later in this chapter. 
The far-reaching powers thus vested with a shareholder 
majority to effectively control the company are balanced by 
comprehensive measures to protect minority shareholder 
rights, aimed at preventing controlling owners from extracting 
private benefits from the company. This is obtained through a 
set of statutory provisions, the most important of which are the 
following: 
 (i) The principle of equal treatment at all levels, which pro-
hibits any company organ from taking any action render-
ing undue favours to certain shareholders at the expense 
of the company or other shareholders;
 (ii) Extensive individual shareholder rights to actively par-
ticipate in shareholders’ meetings;
 (iii) Majority-vote requirements of up to total unanimity for 
resolutions by general meeting of particular, potential 
detriment to minority shareholder interests;
 (iv) Minority powers to force certain resolutions at the gener-
al meeting, especially on matters regarding shareholders’ 
economic rights;
 (v) Prescriptions for handling related-party transactions 
strictly on market terms; and
 (vi) A generally high degree of transparency towards the 
shareholders, the capital market and the society at large.
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Although these points may not individually seem very unique 
within a European perspective, together they make up a com-
prehensive system which has been developed and refined 
through many years of accumulated experiences and which 
counter-balances the strong shareholder powers outlined 
above. That the system works well in practice is shown by 
the competitiveness of Nordic companies on international 
markets (see Table i.1, p. 28), the substantial levels of foreign 
ownership in Nordic listed companies, and the remarkably few 
instances of major corporate scandals in the Nordic countries 
in recent years. 
Each of the points highlighted above will be further elabo-
rated below.
* * *
Although this model is generally considered well adapted to 
prevailing circumstances in the Nordic region, from a govern-
ance-efficiency point of view it is sometimes associated with 
mainly three matters of concern in the international debate.
The first is an alleged potential for a controlling sharehold-
er to extract private benefits from the company at the expense 
of other shareholders, a risk that is often held against control-
owner-oriented governance models in the international debate. 
However, such behaviour appears largely to have been suc-
cessfully curbed in the Nordic context. Thus, Nenova (2003)1 
showed in a cross-country study that the median value of con-
trol-block votes2 was 23 % on average among the jurisdictions 
1. Nenova, T.: The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
country Analysis. Journal of Financial Economic 68 (2003), pp. 325–351.
2. Defined as the total value of control-block votes as a share of firm market 
value, ibid., p. 332. Shares of 5 % and above are here rounded off to the nearest 
whole number.
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examined originating in French civil law (including France at 
27 %, Italy at 30 % and Mexico at 37 %), 16 % in jurisdic-
tions of German civil law origin (including Germany at 5 % 
and Switzerland at 1.5 %), 1.6 % in Anglo-Saxon common law 
jurisdictions (including the uk at 7 % and the us at 0.7 %), 
but a mere 0.5 % across the four Nordic countries. Nenova 
associates these differences with the relative strictness of the 
legal environments, in particular with regard to such factors 
as »general investor protection, higher quality of law enforce-
ment, and stricter take over laws«.3
Gilson (2005)4 further elaborates on this by comparing the 
prevalence of pecuniary, private benefits of corporate control 
in Sweden and the us with that of a number of other coun-
tries, including Italy, Mexico and some Southeast Asian coun-
tries. He concludes that the appropriate dichotomy is not that 
between countries with widely held and controlling sharehold-
er structures but, rather, that between functionally »good law« 
and »bad law« jurisdictions, in respect of which he regards 
Sweden and the us as qualifying for the first category. It is a 
reasonable assertion that these conclusions apply to the entire 
Nordic region.
A second concern is that the prevalence of control owner-
ship may tend to counteract an active corporate-control mar-
ket, thus weakening the »creative-destruction« function of a 
dynamic stock market.5 However, the prevalence of control-
ling shareholders in Nordic listed companies does not gener-
ally appear to have restricted takeover activity to any great 
3. Ibid., p. 344.
4. Gilson, R. J.: Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. Harvard Law Review Vol. 119 
(2005), p. 1641 ff. 
5. I.e. the processes by which poorly managed companies are taken over 
by more efficiently run companies, thus hopefully creating value for the share-
holders of both companies.
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extent. For example, a 2004 analysis of the takeover market on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange compared to that of the Lon-
don Stock Exchange showed that the annual average share of 
listed companies subject to successful takeover bids during the 
period 1990–2002 was significantly higher on the Stockholm 
market than on the London market, with the latter generally 
considered to be the most open equity market in Europe.6 As 
appears from the country reports in Appendices a–d, there 
appears to have been no general lack of takeover activity on the 
Nordic stock exchanges also in the subsequent decade.
A third point of concern is a sometimes alleged tendency 
of controlling shareholders, who typically have asset portfo-
lios with a relatively low degree of risk diversification, to be 
more risk-averse than the boards and managements of more 
widely held companies. Considering the recent financial crisis 
and the cases of excessive risk-taking exposed through it, this 
might not necessarily have been an entirely bad outcome. Still, 
there is little empirical evidence in support of such a tendency, 
especially for the type of controlling owners that dominate the 
Nordic capital markets: families, foundations, pension funds, 
etc., managing predominantly long-term capital. 
In fact, such owners may in many cases exhibit considera-
ble, but generally well-calculated, risk appetite. The difference 
is that their risk-taking is typically aimed at creating long-term 
and sustainable value rather than short-term gains. In support 
of this view, it is notable that there appears to be no lack of 
examples of control-owner dominated Nordic companies that 
have exhibited remarkably bold and successful global expan-
sion strategies, e.g. A.P. Møller-Mærsk and Novo Nordisk in 
Denmark, Kone and Wärtsilä in Finland, Schibsted and Tel-
6. Skog, R.: The European Union’s Proposed Takeover Directive, the 
»Breakthrough« Rule and the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock. 
Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 45, Jure, Stockholm 2004.
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enor in Norway (the latter with the State as the controlling 
owner) and h&m and ikea in Sweden. It is also worth not-
ing that, among the approximately 60 Nordic companies on 
the Forbes 2000 list of the world’s largest listed companies, 
referred to in Table i.1 (p. 28), well over two thirds have at 
least one shareholder controlling more than 20 % of the com-
pany’s votes.7
an owner-oriented governance structure
Brief historical review8
The corporate governance structure of the Nordic countries 
originally resembled the Anglo-American system with a unitary 
board accountable to the general meeting. However, already in 
the early 20th century, there was a growing recognition of the 
division within the board between the overall strategic deci-
sion-making and monitoring function of outside directors and 
the special role of the executive function, whether in the form 
of a single managing director or a group of executive direc-
tors. Still, this distinction was not explicitly reflected in existing 
legislation. Therefore, in its new Companies Act of 1930, the 
Danish legislature decided to transform the existing executive-
management function into a legally defined company organ 
separate from, but subordinate to, the board of directors and 
make such transformation mandatory for larger companies. 
Since, in Danish practice, the executive function was usually 
7. Observation based on the special study on ownership concentration, 
referred to in Section ii.3 above.
8. This and the subsequent subsection owe much to J.L. Hansen, A Scandi-
navian Approach to Corporate Governance, Scandinavian Studies in Law, Vol. 
50, Jure, Stockholm 2007.
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a collective body of senior officers, it was defined as a manage-
ment board, comprised of one or more executives headed by 
the administrative director or, in today’s language, the ceo. 
This development was later followed by the other Nordic 
countries with the difference that, in these countries, the execu-
tive body was defined as a single-person ceo function. Still, 
as in Denmark, the function was defined as a separate com-
pany organ with its own legal duties and responsibilities. It was 
made subordinate to the board with the obligation to comply 
with any instructions from the board and with its members 
subject to appointment and dismissal at will by the board. The 
executive officers could be members of the board but not chair 
it. In the Danish version, where the executive level might com-
prise more than one member, it was further provided that they 
could only make up a minority of the board in order to ensure 
the board’s non-executive character and capability as a moni-
tor of the executive function.
A hierarchical chain of command
The core model
This development gave rise to the Nordic governance structure 
of today, characterised by a hierarchical chain of command 
from the general meeting through the board to the executive 
management function, whether in the form of a single-person 
ceo or a Management Board. The model may be illustrated 
within the context of the more widely known one- and two-tier 
systems which are prevalent in countries with an Anglo-Saxon 
and German judicial tradition, as shown in Figure iii.1 below.
The left-hand side of the figure depicts the two-tier sys-
tem, typically used in countries with a German judicial tradi-
tion but with some variations also in several other continental 
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European countries. This system draws a strict line of sepa-
ration between a supervisory board, with sole oversight and 
controlling functions, and a management board vested with 
virtually all executive powers. Thus, no individual can serve 
on both bodies simultaneously. In principle, the powers of the 
supervisory board to control the executive board are limited 
to (i) the appointment and dismissal of the executive directors 
(although the latter only if material reason can be proven), and 
(ii) the right to veto certain proposals of the executive board 
(although, in such cases, the executives may bring the matter to 
the general meeting for final determination). 
The decision-making competence of the general meeting 
is in this model quite constrained, particularly with regard to 
corporate governance matters, where it primarily pertains to 
appointing non-employee-representing members of the super-
visory board and to adopting the annual accounts of the com-
pany. All in all, especially the traditional German version of 
fIGuRE III .1 The Nordic vs. the one- and two-tier governance structures.
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the two-tier system vests far-reaching powers with the manage-
ment board, effectively entrenching it against influence from 
the supervisory board and the general meeting, and the powers 
of the shareholders to have an impact on the management of 
the company are quite limited. The dashed lines in Figure iii.1 
symbolise this limited power of command throughout the gov-
ernance chain.  
This is in stark contrast to the one-tier structure shown on 
the right-hand side of the figure. Here, the supervisory/control 
and the executive functions are combined in a single compa-
ny organ – the board – comprised of both executive and non-
executive directors. In the us version of the model, this concen-
tration of power is often further enhanced by combining the 
positions of Chair and ceo in a single individual. Tradition-
ally, this practice was customary also in the British version, but 
today the uk Corporate Governance Code advises against this 
arrangement for listed companies. Still, the »mixed« composi-
tion of the one-tier board entails an inherent integrity problem 
of the board vis-à-vis the executive management, particularly 
regarding matters of potential conflict of interest for its execu-
tive members. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the situation in the two-tier mod-
el, the general meeting of the one-tier model theoretically has 
total, superior power over the board. Still, this power is in real-
ity often quite illusory due to the highly dispersed ownership 
structures typical of jurisdictions where this model is mainly 
used. With no shareholder owning more than a small frac-
tion of the stock of the company, and particularly if most of 
the shareholder body is made up of institutional investors, it 
is often difficult to find any shareholder willing to invest the 
time and money necessary to exert ownership powers in a com-
prehensive, well-founded and efficient way. Such shareholders 
tend rather to act as more or less temporary investors, in effect 
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largely abdicating any real ownership role. This, in turn, typi-
cally leads to a situation where most governance power is del-
egated to the unitary board with only weak shareholder power 
to control and discipline it. This is symbolised in Figure iii.1 
by a dotted line connecting the general meeting and the board. 
The role of disciplining the executive management, and keep-
ing it »on its toes«, is instead assumed to be performed through 
a well-functioning market for corporate control, where under-
performing companies are constantly subject to takeover 
threats. 
The Nordic solution is distinctly different from both these 
models. It is neither, as may be inferred by a superficial glance 
at the figure, a mixture of, nor a compromise between, the two 
other models. Instead it differs from both in at least three fun-
damental ways:
 (i) It allocates the ultimate power to the majority of the gen-
eral meeting by placing this body on top of a hierarchical 
chain of command in which each company organ is strict-
ly subordinate to the next higher level in the chain. Hence 
the solid lines in Figure iii.1.
 (ii) It vests the board, which is always appointed in listed 
companies by the general meeting, with far-reaching pow-
ers to run the company during its mandate period. None-
theless the board may be dismissed by the shareholders 
at any time during this period without stated cause, thus 
ensuring subordination to the will of the general meeting 
majority and a clear accountability to the shareholders.
 (iii) It makes a clear distinction between the non-executive 
board and the executive management function, appoint-
ed and dismissed at any time at the sole discretion of 
the board, again entailing a strict hierarchy that ensures 
accountability.
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This structure grants a controlling shareholder far-reaching 
powers to control the board and management and to have the 
company run at his/her discretion.9 The rationale of this is a 
widely held view that the presence of a strong, active owner 
who has incentives and resources to invest time, money and 
competence into the management of his or her investment 
often turns out to be a good prerequisite for successful, long-
term value creation to the benefit of all shareholders.
On the other hand, as already pointed out, the model works 
well also for companies with more widely held stock. In this 
case, the governance structure will resemble the uk system, but 
with a more clear-cut division of powers and responsibilities 
between the non-executive and executive functions. In fact, 
although the Nordic stock markets are dominated by compa-
nies with relatively concentrated ownership structures there 
are, as already mentioned, also many significant and successful 
companies with as widely held stock as in other jurisdictions. 
In fact, the clear division of powers, the strong recognition of 
shareholder rights and the strict accountability of the board 
and management to the shareholders of the Nordic model offer 
significant advantages also for this type of companies. 
Some country-specific variations
Although the simple and clear-cut structure shown in Figure 
iii.1 represents the core of the governance models across the 
Nordic region, there are some country-specific variations that 
need to be mentioned. As already noted, the executive function 
in Denmark often consists of a group of executive officers as 
opposed to the single-person function of the other countries. 
This may create the illusion that the Danish model does in fact 
9. How these powers are balanced by extensive minority-protection meas-
ures is the topic of the subsequent main section of this chapter.
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have a two-tier structure of the German type. However, this is 
not an adequate interpretation. The Danish executive board 
(which is referred to in Danish as a »direktion«, i.e. a collegiate 
of executive officers) is a body fully subordinate to the board in 
the same way as the single-person ceo of the other countries. 
In Finland, there is an optional model involving a supervisory 
board between the general meeting and the board. This is a tradi-
tional model that is today largely being abandoned and current-
ly used by only five listed companies. It is generally considered 
unsuited for listed companies in view of modern developments of 
the Securities Markets Regulation, and the Finnish code advises 
against the use of it. Hence, the core Nordic structure illustrated 
in Figure iii.1 is presently the overwhelmingly dominant govern-
ance model among listed companies in Finland.
In Norway, unless the company and the employees agree 
otherwise, companies with more than 200 employees are 
required to establish a specific company organ called the Cor-
porate Assembly (bedriftsforsamling). Two thirds of the mem-
bers of this body are to be elected by the general meeting and 
the remaining third by and among the company’s employees.10 
Its main function is to channel employee co-determination on 
board appointment and certain other decisions of particular 
significance to the company’s workforce. Still, as the general 
meeting appoints two thirds of the corporate assembly mem-
bers and those members in turn appoint two thirds of the 
board, in practice a shareholder majority has essentially the 
same control of the board majority as in the other countries. 
10. If it is agreed not to establish a corporate assembly, the employees are 
instead entitled to appoint a certain number of directors to the board.
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The general meeting
Annual general meetings (agms) of large, Nordic listed com-
panies are often major events with several hundred attendants 
and extensive media coverage. Company directors and execu-
tives sometimes refer to it as their annual »graduation day«, 
where they are to account for their stewardship of the share-
holders’ assets during the past mandate period. It is also an 
appreciated opportunity for individual shareholders to see the 
people who manage their company in live action.
Participation
Major private shareholders normally participate in person, 
as do representatives of most domestic institutional investors 
with an ownership interest in the company along with large 
numbers of small private shareholders. Foreign sharehold-
ers, who today make up more than 40 % of the ownership of 
companies listed on Nordic regulated markets, have gradually 
increased their participation in agms, and today a significant 
portion of the foreign ownership is usually represented, most 
often by proxy. The full board, the executive management and 
the statutory auditor normally also participate. 
In the past, proxies of foreign shareholders have occasion-
ally caused some controversy because their clients, who are 
mostly large American and British institutional investors, and 
their advisors have not always fully understood the rules and 
procedures of Nordic general meetings, a problem that has 
occasionally led to seemingly irrational voting behaviour. In 
recent years, this problem has decreased as proxy advisors and 
their principals have learnt to recognise and understand the 
specifics of Nordic corporate governance, and companies in 
turn have learnt to know the voting policies of such sharehold-
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ers better than before. To an increasing extent companies have 
also become more open to communication with shareholders 
and their proxies prior to general meetings in order to clarify 
outstanding issues.
It has long been a basic aim of the Nordic corporate law-
maker to make it easy for individual shareholders to take part 
in, and make well-informed voting decisions at, general meet-
ings. In fact, large parts of the individual shareholder rights 
introduced by the eu Shareholders’ Rights Directive (2007/36/
ec) were already in place in the Nordic countries. Thus, a sin-
gle shareholder who holds a single share is entitled to have an 
item included in the agm agenda (provided it is filed in due 
time before the meeting), to participate at the meeting and 
make use of all ownership rights adherent to this share, to file 
counter-proposals at the meeting, to require vote counting on 
any resolution made, and to pose questions to the board and 
management and have these duly answered to the extent that 
the information is available and can be given without compro-
mising the interests of the company. The corporate governance 
codes of all four countries have further extended these rights, 
e.g. by underlining the importance of making the notice and 
supporting documents of general meetings available in such 
time and form that they facilitate the exercise of ownership 
rights in an active and well-informed manner, and of facilitat-
ing shareholder participation at the meeting by proxy or with 
the help of modern communications technology.
Duties and liabilities
The general meeting is the company’s highest decision-making 
body and the main forum for the shareholders to exercise their 
ownership rights. As already mentioned, the Nordic general 
meeting has far-reaching powers to govern the company in that 
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it is formally sovereign to decide on any matters that do not 
expressly fall within the exclusive competence of another com-
pany organ (which is the case for very few items). 
In principle, this includes the possibility to issue instructions 
to the board about the management of the company. Howev-
er, in practice such micro-management makes little sense and 
never occurs in listed companies,11 whose shareholders prefer 
to apply their powers indirectly through the appointment of 
the board. If the shareholder majority mistrusts the board, the 
general meeting can immediately replace it. The powers thus 
available to the general meeting majority ensure strict account-
ability of the board to the shareholders and give cause for a 
recurrent dialogue between shareholders and the board. 
Furthermore, the fact that legislation requires board mem-
bers (except those representing the employees) to be appointed 
by the general meeting provides also minority shareholder with 
considerable powers to influence the board composition, e.g. 
by openly challenging the proposal put forth by a controlling 
shareholder, a mechanism which contributes to making the 
general meeting relevant even in tightly controlled companies.
This is further strengthened by the extensive media coverage of 
general meetings of major, listed companies, which often leads 
to costly negative publicity for any attempts to discriminate 
against minority shareholders.
In practice Nordic general meetings focus primarily on their 
exclusive duties according to law and/or the company’s articles 
of association, i.e. to adopt the annual accounts, to decide on 
the allocation of profits or loss and to appoint the board and 
the statutory auditor. As applicable, such duties also include 
e.g. to resolve on matters affecting the equity structure of the 
11. It occasionally happens, though, in unlisted companies, especially 
those controlled by the State or a local government, which often have more 
complex goal structures than listed companies.
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company, such as an increase or a decrease of the share capi-
tal, mergers and de-mergers, acquisition of own shares, etc. A 
specific Nordic phenomenon is the resolution by the agm on 
discharge from liability of the board and the executive man-
agement to the effect that, in brief, the company refrains from 
legal action for damages against these parties on grounds of 
their management of the company during the past financial 
year. This used to be a tradition in all Nordic countries, but is 
currently only mandatory in Finland and Sweden whereas vol-
untary and seldom used in Denmark and Norway. 
Procedures
To an external observer, procedures at Nordic general meet-
ings may appear somewhat informal. Many resolutions are 
adopted without a formal vote, and the entire board is often 
elected through a single decision. However, this is largely an 
illusory impression. It only takes an individual shareholder 
who holds a single share to file counterproposals and to require 
vote counting on any item, and the seemingly »bundled« board 
election is formally a set of individual elections made in one 
decision. 
Decisions are generally made by simple majority vote, i.e. 
a resolution is adopted if supported by a majority of the votes 
cast. The majority required is generally more votes in favour 
than against, but there is a number of decisions on particu-
larly intrusive effects on shareholder rights with higher major-
ity requirements. These range from 2/3 of the votes cast and 
shares represented at the meeting up to 9/10 of the votes cast 
and, in some cases, unanimity. These requirements are part of 
the shareholder minority protection framework of Nordic cor-
porate governance to be further discussed in Section 3 of this 
chapter. 
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In contrast to ordinary resolutions, appointments of board 
directors and auditors are made by relative simple majority, i.e. 
the candidate supported by the most votes is elected. Hence, if 
there are no votes against, it only takes a single affirmative vote 
to appoint the board. The rationale of this is that the company 
must never be left without a board. 
Although not required by law or code, an important fea-
ture of many Nordic agms, especially in larger listed compa-
nies, is an address by the chair and/or the ceo, where he or she 
comments on the company’s strategy and performance during 
the past year and discusses its prospects and challenges for the 
future, often followed by a q&a session. This is a highly appre-
ciated part of the proceedings, not least by retail sharehold-
ers, and as pointed out above any shareholder has the right to 
pose any relevant question to the management and have it duly 
answered as long as this can be done without compromising 
the interests of the company. 
The board
Although the Nordic board is subordinate to the general meet-
ing in formal terms, it has wide-ranging authority in practice to 
manage the company’s affairs as it considers appropriate. This 
authority is only limited by the exclusive decision competence 
assigned to the general meeting by law regarding certain mat-
ters as just explained. 
Duties and liabilities
The duties of the board are defined in the Nordic companies 
acts in rather general terms so as to avoid the risk of leaving 
loopholes in more detailed enumerations of its obligations. In 
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practice, its duties can be divided into three main categories: 
(i) to manage the company in the interest of all shareholders, 
(ii) to appoint, supervise and assess the executive management, 
and (iii) to inform the shareholders, the capital market and the 
society at large about the performance of the company. The 
first category specifically includes determining the company’s 
overall goals and strategy and ensuring that the organisation 
involves satisfactory monitoring of the accounting and finan-
cial management, that the internal control and risk-manage-
ment function is adequate for the company’s needs and that the 
financial reports are prepared in accordance with legal require-
ments and applicable accounting standards.
The second category pertains to the board’s duty to ensure 
that the company does at all times have an efficient executive 
management function in charge of the day-to-day management. 
In Denmark, this amounts to appointing and, whenever neces-
sary, dismissing the ceo and other members of the management 
board, whereas in the other Nordic countries these duties apply 
solely to the single-person ceo function. The board should 
further ensure that the division of duties and responsibilities 
between the board and the executive management is clearly 
defined. It is generally considered good practice to define this 
in written rules of procedure, subject to at least annual review 
by the board. This is required in some of the countries by law or 
prescribed by the corporate governance code.
Formally the board adopts its resolutions by simple major-
ity. However, voting is rare in practice since boards generally 
aim for unanimity. The underlying philosophy is the notion 
of the board as a collective decision-making body, where all 
members will be bound by the decisions made and obliged to 
promote their efficient execution, even though they are typi-
cally preceded by an open and often lively debate among the 
board members. There is a general right to have a dissenting 
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opinion recorded in the minutes of the meeting, but it is gener-
ally not considered good board practice to make use of this 
option other than in exceptional cases. Rather, a director who 
strongly disagrees with a board decision on a matter of signifi-
cant importance is expected to resign, which can be done at any 
time and without notice. 
Although the board’s decisions are made collectively, the 
fiduciary liability of its members is individual. This liability 
includes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty to the effect that, 
in essence, directors are obliged to act in the best interest of the 
company as agents of all its shareholders. In principle, the lia-
bility is shared jointly and severally among the directors. How-
ever, the increased use of board subcommittees in recent years 
may entail risks of blurring this clear-cut division of liabilities. 
The reason is that it may lead to some directors being more 
deeply involved in the preparation of certain board resolu-
tions than others, which in the Nordic judicial system normally 
means that they will carry a heavier legal liability. As board 
committees are a relatively new phenomenon, there is as yet a 
general lack of case law to shed further light on this issue.
Nomination and appointment
The great majority of large, Nordic listed companies today use 
some form of nomination committee for the selection of can-
didates for board assignments. However, the composition and, 
to some extent, duties of such committees differ between the 
countries: 
•	 The	Danish	code	recommends	a	board	subcommittee	com-
prised entirely of board members – the majority of whom 
are to be independent – which is to be chaired by the board 
chair, essentially in line with the standard uk /international 
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model. This is also the procedure chosen by most Danish 
listed companies. 
•	 In	Norway	and	Sweden,	the	nomination	committee	(some-
times referred to as »nomination board«) is instead a body 
appointed by the shareholders in general meeting and 
entirely (in Norway) or predominantly (in Sweden) com-
prised of shareholder representatives and with duties not 
only to nominate board directors but also to propose their 
remuneration. In the Swedish version, up to half of the com-
mittee may be comprised of board directors, including the 
board chair, but none of these may chair the committee.12 
•	 In	Finland,	the	corporate	governance	code	has	tradition-
ally recommended a nomination committee of essentially 
the uk model, and most Finnish listed companies today use 
a committee of this type. However, in the latest version of 
the Finnish code, »nomination boards« of essentially the 
Swedish type were introduced as an optional solution. 
This model is currently used by 37 % of companies that 
have established a nomination committee, primarily those 
with one or a few dominant owners.13 Companies with a 
more fragmented ownership structure still generally prefer 
board-appointed committees of the uk type, although there 
is a growing trend towards the shareholder-led model. 
Irrespective of how the nomination work is organised, it is 
important to keep in mind that the decisions on all propos-
als presented are made by the general meeting and that no 
shareholders are in any way bound by the recommendations 
12. Dent (2012) discusses the wider international applicability of this con-
cept. See Dent Jr., G. W.: Corporate Governance: The Swedish Solution. Case 
Research Paper Series in Legal Studies, Working Paper 2012–3, Case Western 
Reserve University, Feb. 2012.
13. Information compiled by pwc Finland for this study. 
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set forth by the nomination committee, whether having been 
represented in the committee or not. It should also be pointed 
out that the differences in nomination procedures between the 
countries are often not as significant as may be assumed based 
on the differences outlined above. Especially in companies 
with highly concentrated ownership structures, it is general 
practice also for board-appointed nomination committees to 
consult with major owners in the course of their work. 
Unless appointed by the general meeting, the chair of the 
board is to be elected by the board among its members.14 It is 
becoming increasingly common in practice for the chair to be 
appointed by the shareholders in general meeting. In Norway 
and Sweden, this is a code recommendation that is broadly fol-
lowed by the companies, and it is also a growing practice in 
Denmark and Finland. By law or code, the positions of chair 
of the board and ceo are always separated in Nordic listed 
companies. 
Except for employee representatives, where applicable (see 
below), boards of directors in Nordic listed companies are 
always appointed by the general meeting. Hence, each director 
has a personal liability towards the company as a whole and 
its entire shareholder constituency irrespective of how or by 
whom he or she may have been nominated. In other words, no 
director may regard himself or herself as representing the inter-
ests of a particular shareholder or shareholder group, however 
dominant. A controlling owner may have decisive influence on 
the nomination and election of the board but, once appoint-
ed, all board directors must regard themselves as agents of the 
company as a whole and all its shareholders. 
The standard mandate period for Nordic boards is one 
year except for Norway where two-year periods are the rule 
14. This body appoints the board chair in Norwegian companies with a 
corporate assembly.
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by tradition. However, there is a growing trend towards one-
year periods also in Norwegian listed companies. Naturally 
the actual service time of directors is not limited to these man-
date periods; they only mean that the shareholders are given 
the opportunity to reconsider the entire board each year (or, in 
Norway, every second year). The total service time is normally 
much longer. Also, as has already been mentioned, irrespective 
of mandate periods, the board may be dismissed by an extraor-
dinary general meeting at any time without stated cause. 
Hence, there can be no staggered boards in Nordic corporate 
governance, which means, among other things, that a new con-
trolling owner can immediately replace the entire board. 
Board composition and organisation
There are no legal requirements for the composition of listed 
company boards except for the Norwegian provision of at 
least 40 % representation of each gender. In Denmark, a softer 
model has been advanced by legislation, whereby larger com-
panies are required to set targets for a balanced gender dis-
tribution and explain their policies to reach that target, but 
which leaves the target to be decided freely by the company and 
without sanctions if it is not met. The corporate governance 
codes of the other countries contain varying degrees of recom-
mendation regarding gender balance as well as on diversity in 
a broader sense, pertaining to, for example, education, profes-
sional background and work experience. 
Except for employee representatives, where applicable, 
the boards of Nordic listed companies are usually comprised 
exclusively of non-executive directors. Such is the case for all 
Danish and Norwegian and most Finnish and Swedish com-
panies, although in the latter two countries the ceo is a board 
member in about 15 and 40 %, respectively, of the compa-
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nies. Still this is of limited practical consequence since the ceo 
has the right in all countries to participate in the board meet-
ings, whether or not a formal board member, unless the board 
decides otherwise on a case-by-case basis. Hence, boards of 
Nordic listed companies are for all practical purposes func-
tionally non-executive but work in close co-operation with the 
ceo (in Denmark the management board). This is a reflection 
of the broadly embraced principle of a clear division of duties 
and responsibilities between the non-executive board and the 
executive management while simultaneously allowing for the 
two functions to work closely together. 
The non-executive character of Nordic boards has impor-
tant implications for the relevance of such key elements of mod-
ern corporate governance as directors’ independence and board 
committees. The notion of independence of board directors, as 
it is generally defined in the international discourse of the field, 
does not, in fact, fit well into the Nordic governance framework. 
To see this it is necessary to make a distinction between inde-
pendence in relation to the company and the company manage-
ment and independence in relation to major owners of the com-
pany. The first aspect is rarely an issue in Nordic boards since 
few directors normally have ties to the company that might lead 
to dependence according to generally applied criteria. 
The other aspect – independence in relation to major own-
ers – entails a degree of contradiction in kind in Nordic corpo-
rate governance. As explained earlier in this chapter, the right 
of a controlling shareholder to effectively control the composi-
tion of the board, including taking seat in person on the board 
and/or filling its majority with closely related trustees, is funda-
mental in Nordic corporate governance. 
As a consequence of this, the code-developing commit-
tees of Finland, Norway and Sweden introduced a distinc-
tion between independence in relation to the company and its 
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management and in relation to major owners, and required a 
majority of the board to be independent in the first sense but 
only two directors to be independent in the second sense. The 
Danish committee, on the other hand, chose to implement the 
provision as stated in the uk code, prescribing that at least half 
of the directors must be independent not only of the company 
and the company management but also of major shareholders. 
Another consequence of the Nordic non-executive boards 
is that the rationale of setting up sub-committees of the board is 
different from that of their Anglo-American origin. In the latter 
context, the concept of board committees was originally con-
ceived as a means to deal with the inherent integrity problem 
of the board vis-à-vis the executive management in the one-tier 
board structure. Typically, this gave rise to the audit, nomina-
tion and remuneration committees, all of which were intended 
to handle issues where this conflict is particularly evident by 
ensuring that they are handled by non-executive directors. 
However, the Nordic board has no such inherent integrity 
problem vis-à-vis the executive management. On the contrary, 
the line of demarcation of duties and responsibilities between 
these governance bodies is generally strict and well-defined. 
Under such circumstances the question of setting up subcom-
mittees to deal with certain issues within the board’s scope of 
duties is essentially reduced to a matter of efficient organisa-
tion of the board’s work which, in turn, is hardly a matter in 
need of societal regulation. This is even more so as there are 
also significant drawbacks associated with the breaking up 
of a board into subgroups, e.g. the risks of creating »A and B 
teams« on the board and of disrupting the joint-and-several 
liability structure among its members. It is furthermore impor-
tant to note that a subcommittee of a Nordic board can only be 
comprised of board members, that it can only deal with issues 
within the board’s scope of decision competence, and that the 
77A Consolidated Nordic  Governance Model 
whole board will be accountable for any action taken by a com-
mittee. For these reasons, committees of Nordic boards are 
generally assigned mainly preparatory tasks, leaving all deci-
sions of major importance to be made by the board as a whole.
This is why Nordic legislators and corporate governance 
code regulators have generally been reluctant to make board 
committees mandatory, leaving this instead to the discretion 
of the individual board or allowing the entire board to carry 
out the corresponding duties, provided that it fulfils all condi-
tions pertaining to this particular committee. Notwithstanding 
these special circumstances, all three »standard« committees 
of modern corporate governance are today extensively used by 
boards of Nordic listed companies,15 however, rather as means 
to enhance work efficiency than to preserve the integrity of the 
board vis-à-vis the executive management. In particular, this is 
the case for audit committees which are generally seen as indis-
pensable tools for handling the extensive and complex work of 
financial reporting, internal control and risk management of 
particularly larger listed companies in an efficient way.
Employee board representation
Employee representation16 is long-established practice in many 
Nordic company boards. The exact regulation varies between 
the countries. However, the employees of companies above 
certain size limits in Denmark, Norway and Sweden have 
a statutory right to elect a certain number of directors to the 
board, although the majority powers always remain with the 
shareholder-elected directors. In Finland, employee co-deter-
15. Except for nomination committees in Norway and Sweden, which are 
bodies appointed and controlled by the shareholder (see p. 72).
16. For details about the relevant regulation in each country, see the respec-
tive country report.
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mination is instead based on agreement between the employees 
and the company, where board representation is but one of sev-
eral options available and rarely used in practice. 
Where employee board representation is practiced, it usu-
ally means that employee-elected directors make up about one 
third of the board. It is important to note that those directors 
have the same legal duties and responsibilities as any director 
on the board, i.e. they are all obliged to act in the best interest 
of the company.
In Denmark and Sweden, board representation is a right 
of the employees but not an obligation. In more than half of 
the listed companies of these countries the employees have 
chosen not to exercise this right in exchange of other benefits, 
e.g. in the form of special co-determination procedures and/
or information-sharing committees. In Norway, virtually all 
listed companies have employee board representation, either 
channelled through a corporate assembly (see p. 64) or directly 
appointed by the employees.
An important common feature of employee representation 
on Nordic boards is that those directors are elected exclusively 
from the company’s employees. Hence, they are not board pro-
fessionals or politicians appointed by external parties, e.g. cen-
tral trade unions, who may bring more or less political agendas 
into the boardroom. On the contrary, Nordic employee-elect-
ed directors often bring valuable hands-on knowledge of the 
company operations into the board work. 
The executive management
All Nordic public companies must have an executive manage-
ment function as a separate company organ with its own legal 
duties and liabilities. As already mentioned, this is in fact the 
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innovation of the Danish Companies Act of 1930 that may 
be said to have largely formed the Nordic corporate govern-
ance model. In the Danish version it is normally17 a collective 
body, usually comprised of 3–5 members headed by a ceo and 
generally referred to as the Management Board. In the other 
countries, it is typically a single-person ceo function, although 
in these countries as well it is possible to form an executive 
management function made up of more than one individual.18 
The ceo, like all members of the Danish management 
board, is appointed by the board19, usually on an until-further-
notice contract.20 Still, any member of the executive manage-
ment may be dismissed without notice solely on the basis of 
lack of confidence by the board. Therefore, according to code 
provisions, Nordic ceos and other members of the execu-
tive management are usually entitled to severance pay or a 
notice period upon dismissal by the board, at present typically 
amounting to at most two years’ fixed salary (in Norway, gen-
erally one year).21 
The primary duty of the executive management is to 
account for the day-to-day management of the company 
17. But not necessarily; it may also be comprised of a single-person ceo 
function as in the other Nordic countries.
18. In Norway, this is explicitly stated in the Companies’ Act, and in Fin-
land and Sweden it is the implicit consequence if the board chooses also to 
appoint one or more deputy ceos.
19. The Norwegian Companies Act leaves the possibility open to have the 
general meeting or the corporate assembly appointing the ceo. However, the 
latter option is rarely used in listed companies.
20. A note on terminology may be warranted here: In Nordic parlance, the 
term »direktør«, obviously closely related to the English »director«, does not 
denote a member of the board but of the executive management as well as 
to rather loosely defined circles of other top-ranking, executive officers in the 
company. This sometimes leads to confusion in communication between peo-
ple with Nordic and non-Nordic professional backgrounds.
21. In Norway, the presence of a severance-pay agreement is required for 
the board to be able to dismiss the ceo without stated grounds.
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under the strategic leadership and supervision of the board. 
The function is formally subordinate to the board and can-
not independently decide on matters that are extraordinary or 
far-reaching in view of the nature of the company’s operation, 
unless the matter cannot be delayed without serious detriment 
to the company, in which case the board must be informed of 
the action taken as soon as possible. As mentioned, what this 
means in terms of a more precise division of duties between the 
board and the executive management is often defined in writ-
ing within the board’s Rules of Procedure. 
Within these generally broad bounds, the Nordic execu-
tive management, and particularly the ceo, has far-reaching 
authority to manage the business as it considers to be in the best 
interest of the company. This includes the right to represent 
and sign on behalf of the company, to organise its operations 
and to appoint and dismiss all subordinate executive officers. 
In fact, the role of the Nordic ceo goes well beyond what is 
generally understood in daily language as day-to-day man-
agement and includes, for example, outlining the company’s 
overall mission, goals and strategy for approval by the board, 
actively working with its financial structure to optimise capi-
tal costs and initiating structural changes within the company 
and/or in relation to the outside world. Therefore, a top-class 
executive management is generally seen as the most decisive 
prerequisite for the success of a company, and ensuring that it 
at all times has a highly competent, entrepreneurial, dynamic 
and independent-minded ceo is generally seen as the board’s 
most crucial duty. 
As also mentioned in a previous section, the ceo has the 
right to participate in the board meetings, whether or not he or 
she is a formal board member, unless the board decides other-
wise on a case-by-case basis. An example of the latter situation 
is when the board feels the need to discuss the performance 
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of the ceo in his or her absence. It has become increasingly 
customary in recent years to have a session in the absence of 
the ceo or other executives as a standing point on the meeting 
agenda.
The chief role of the ceo in the board work is to prepare 
the board’s resolutions, to ensure that the decided actions are 
effectively executed, and to keep the board informed about the 
operations and performance of the company. Not least the last 
point is crucial for the functioning of the Nordic board, and it 
is of utmost importance that the ceo is both willing and able 
to furnish the board with timely, relevant and reliable infor-
mation to underpin its work. For this reason, many boards 
define their expectations in these respects in a written »report-
ing instruction« for the ceo. In addition to this, a board can 
always require whatever additional information from outside 
sources that it considers necessary for its work at the cost of the 
company. 
Another way of mitigating the dependence of Nordic 
boards on the ceo as their main source of information about 
the company is to invite a broader circle of senior-management 
staff to attend board meetings, primarily as listeners but also to 
be available for questions and answers upon request by board 
members. The use of this practice varies among companies 
but has become less customary in recent years, particularly in 
Finland and Sweden. Instead, the relevant managers may be 
individually invited to the board to present and discuss matters 
within their respective areas of responsibility, whenever the 
board so sees fit. 
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The statutory auditor
All listed Nordic companies must have at least one statutory 
auditor who must be an authorised public accountant. For-
merly, major companies occasionally practiced joint audit. 
Today, this practice is all but abandoned, both due to higher 
costs without perceived corresponding benefits and because 
it tended to blur the accountability of the respective auditors. 
However, as will be further discussed within the context of 
minority protection, with the exception of Finland, a share-
holder minority of at least 10 % of the shares can require the 
appointment of a special »minority auditor«.
The auditor is appointed by the general meeting. The 
appointment is based on a proposal by the board or its audit 
committee, as applicable, except in Sweden where the proposal 
is formally made by the nomination committee.22 Even so, the 
main preparation work of the proposal is normally carried out 
by the board, usually through its audit committee. In either 
case, the general meeting is never bound by the proposal pre-
sented but is fully sovereign to make a different decision if it so 
sees fit, although this is rarely done in practice. 
In the Nordic context, the auditor is primarily seen as the 
shareholders’ instrument for reviewing the work of the board 
and management. However, in order to effectively perform this 
function, the auditor must develop and maintain an in-depth 
understanding of the nature of the company’s business as well 
as of its accounting, internal control and risk-management sys-
tems. Therefore it is customary for the auditor to work closely 
together with the board, especially its audit committee as the 
case may be, including to participate on a recurrent basis in 
board and/or audit committee meetings. While this is an effi-
22.  I.e. the Swedish version of shareholder-led nomination committee (see 
p. 72).
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cient modus operandi for both parties, it puts great demands 
on the ability of the auditor to maintain full integrity vis-à-vis 
not only the executive management but also the board and its 
audit committee. 
As in most European jurisdictions, the main duty of the 
auditor is to review the accounts of the company and the finan-
cial reports in the form of annual accounts and, generally to a 
more limited extent, quarterly reports. However, in Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, the auditor has the additional duty to 
review the administration of the company by the board and the 
executive management. The exact meaning of this is subject 
to debate to some extent, but the general interpretation is that 
it involves no assessment of the management of the company 
from a business point of view but is confined to ensuring that 
the company is run in compliance with its articles of associa-
tion and applicable law and other statutory regulation. 
In addition to the duties vis-à-vis the shareholders, the audi-
tor is also seen as a protector of the interests of the creditors 
of the company and, to an increasing extent as a consequence 
of recent regulation initiatives of the European Commission, 
of a broader circle of stakeholders such as the employees, the 
customers and society at large. The auditor is also obliged to 
report on certain types of crimes committed by members of the 
board or the executive management, typically crimes of an eco-
nomic nature that might cause damage to the company. 
Although not universally required, the statutory auditor 
of Nordic companies is in practice normally present at gen-
eral meetings, particularly at agms. The auditor’s role there 
differs among the countries. In Norway and Sweden, it often 
includes an oral presentation of the audit report to the share-
holders, concluding in the auditor’s recommendation as to the 
meeting’s resolutions on the adoption of the annual accounts 
and the appropriation of the result of the past financial year. In 
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Denmark and Finland, the audit report is normally only issued 
in writing within the framework of the Annual Report. In Swe-
den, the auditor is also required to give a recommendation to 
the general meeting as to the discharge from liability of the 
board and ceo (see above, p. 64). 
Remuneration of board and management
The philosophy underlying the design of remuneration systems 
in Nordic listed companies is typically that the compensation 
should be sufficient to attract and retain the necessary com-
petence to ensure the long-term success of the company, and 
structured in a way that aligns the interest of the recipient with 
that of the shareholders, all at the lowest possible cost to the 
company. Exact formulations, e.g. as expressed in remunera-
tion policies submitted for voting at general meetings, differ 
between companies but the underlying spirit is largely the same. 
Procedures
The key principle for pay decisions in Nordic corporate gov-
ernance is that all remuneration is to be determined by the 
company organ which is immediately superior to the body to 
which it applies. Hence: 
•	 remuneration of (non-executive) board directors is deter-
mined on an individual basis by the shareholders in general 
meeting with fees for committee work usually separately 
assigned;
•	 remuneration of the ceo, including all members of the man-
agement board in Denmark, is determined by the board; 
and
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•	 remuneration of managers subordinate to the executive 
management is determined by the ceo – although it is cus-
tomary that such decisions are submitted for approval by 
the board before being executed.
This clear-cut structure has become somewhat blurred in recent 
years through so-called Say-on-Pay schemes, involving annual 
resolutions of the agm on a written policy for the remunera-
tion of the board and management, proposed by the board. 
Such schemes of slightly varying designs have been introduced 
in all Nordic countries except Finland. 
Forms and levels of remuneration
There are no requirements regarding the levels or forms of 
remuneration of the board or the executive management in 
Nordic companies acts. However, the corporate governance 
codes of all countries have adopted the provisions of the 2009 
eu recommendation on directors’ remuneration (2009/385/
ec), although adapted to national circumstances to the extent 
deemed necessary. 
Board fees are generally paid as a fixed amount per year, 
adjusted with regard to committee assignments as applicable. 
It has become increasingly common in recent years to pay part 
of the fee in the form of shares in the company. Furthermore, 
stock options, which have been advised against by some of 
the Nordic corporate governance codes, seem to be enjoying 
a renaissance, particularly among smaller listed companies in 
which they are often seen as a cost-effective way to compete for 
top-class board competence. 
In an international perspective, levels of remuneration of 
boards and executive management are relatively modest in the 
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Nordic countries. According to a 2009 study,23 covering 57 
major Nordic companies, the average total ceo compensation 
in these companies for the years 2006–2008, excluding pen-
sion costs, was less than half of that of a European sample of 
44 companies from eight different countries. The results held 
true even after allowing for different company sizes between 
the samples. The variable share of the total remuneration was 
also significantly lower in the Nordic companies, about 45 % 
compared to slightly over 70 % in the European sample. 
Although these results are not entirely up to date and remu-
neration levels have undoubtedly risen significantly in the last 
5–10 years, there is little reason to believe that the relative lev-
els have changed dramatically. This assumption is supported 
by a more recent study24 comparing total ceo remuneration 
among the 27 largest Swedish listed companies with that of a 
sample of 44 European companies of about equal average mar-
ket capitalisation value as those of Swedish sample. The aver-
age 2012 remuneration of Swedish ceos amounted to 57 % of 
that of their European counterparts, and their share of fixed 
out of total remuneration was 63 % versus 33 % in the Euro-
pean sample.
23. Svenska vd-ersättningar i ett internationellt perspektiv 2006–2008 
(Swedish ceo remuneration in an international perspective 2006–2008). 
Unpublished report of the communications consultancy Hallvarsson & Halva-
rsson, Stockholm 2009. Available only in Swedish.
24. Svenska vd-ersättningar i ett europeiskt perspektiv 2011–2012. 
(Swedish ceo remuneration in a European perspective 2011–2012). Er sätt-
ningsakademien, Stockholm 2013. Available only in Swedish: www.ersattning-
sakademien.se.
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shareholder minority protection 
As should be evident from the foregoing presentation, Nordic 
corporate governance vests the shareholder majority with far-
reaching powers to ensure that the company is run in accord-
ance with its interests and preferences. Needless to say, such 
powers may be abused to provide undue advantages to a con-
trolling owner at the expense of the smaller shareholders. To 
counteract this, and as an overall counterweight to the strong 
powers bestowed upon the shareholder majority, Nordic cor-
porate governance provides a comprehensive system of minor-
ity protection against abuse of power by a controlling share-
holder, which is aimed at protecting the economic rights of 
minority shareholders. As shown in the introductory section 
of this chapter, empirical evidence suggests that the system has 
been largely successful in keeping the scope for control-owners 
to extract private benefits from »their« companies within quite 
narrow bounds (see p. 56).
The system rests mainly on six mutually complementary 
pillars as further outlined below.
The principle of equal treatment of shareholders
In the Nordic countries, as in most other European jurisdic-
tions, there is a fundamental principle of equal treatment of 
all shareholders within a particular class of shares as well as 
between shareholders of different classes, if any. This finds 
its most apparent expression in the general clauses prohibit-
ing any company organ from taking any action likely to give 
any shareholder an undue advantage at the expense of the 
company or any other shareholder. The companies acts of all 
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four Nordic countries contain such clauses of almost identical 
wording, pertaining to each of the three main company organs: 
the general meeting, the board and the executive management. 
Indeed, corporate laws of many countries today contain pro-
visions of a similar meaning. What is particularly Nordic is, 
perhaps, the strong moral norm to observe these provisions in 
everyday governance practice and the fervour with which this 
is generally supervised by fellow shareholders, media and the 
general public. To be caught off guard in breach of these norms 
is highly dishonourable in Nordic business communities.
These principles are further underscored by a number of 
provisions in the securities trading acts, the corporate gov-
ernance codes and the rules of the major stock exchanges in 
all four countries. Also, the general obligation of the board 
and executive management to follow instructions from their 
respective superior company organs, embedded in Nordic cor-
porate governance, is explicitly annulled for any instruction 
that is in breach of statutory law or the company’s articles of 
association. In Norway this provision applies also to the cor-
porate assembly. 
Individual shareholder rights
As mentioned, shareholders of Nordic companies enjoyed far-
reaching individual rights long before the 2007 Shareholders’ 
Rights Directive disseminated some of these rights through-
out the eu. The most fundamental layer of such rights is every 
shareholder’s economic right to a pro rata share of the divi-
dends and other forms of distribution of the company’s capital 
to the shareholders. The second layer is the procedural rights 
at general meetings according to which a single share suffices 
to have an item included in the meeting agenda (provided that 
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the request has been filed in due time before the meeting) to 
participate, speak and vote for one’s shares at the meeting and 
to file instant counter-proposals to any item on the agenda. The 
third layer is the right of information, including not only the 
right to receive all relevant decision material pertaining to the 
general meeting but also to pose questions at the meeting and 
have them duly answered as long as this can be done without 
detriment to the company. 
Furthermore, any shareholder – as any member of the board 
or the executive management – may challenge a resolution by 
the general meeting in court on the grounds that it is illegal or 
in breach with the articles of association of the company, in 
which case the court may declare the resolution null and void. 
Qualified majority requirements
In addition to individual rights, minority groups of sharehold-
ers of various sizes are given the right to block certain reso-
lutions at the general meeting that may be particularly detri-
mental to their interests. This is achieved by setting majority 
requirements above 50 % of the votes for such resolutions to 
be adopted. As a further precaution, some resolutions of this 
kind require the support of the prescribed majority of not only 
the votes cast but also of the number of shares represented at 
the meeting, thus in effect disregarding any differential vot-
ing rights between share classes and ensuring equal treatment 
of shareholders irrespective of share classes. In some cases, 
majority requirements do not apply only to votes or shares rep-
resented at the meeting but to the entire share capital of the 
company.
The first level above simple majority is 2/3 of the votes as 
well as the shares represented at the meeting. This typically 
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applies to decisions such as amendments of the articles of asso-
ciation, increase and decrease of the share capital, mergers and 
demergers, and waivers of shareholders’ pre-emptive rights to 
pro rata subscription for shares in share issues. 
There are also higher levels of qualified majority require-
ments, amounting to 9/10 of votes and/or capital represented 
and full consent, respectively, pertaining to resolutions that 
are even more intrusive upon individual shareholders’ rights. 
Examples of resolutions that require full consent, either by 
all shareholders or those affected by the intended action, are 
changes of the shareholders’ obligations towards the company, 
forced redemption of shares, or amendments of the articles of 
association to the effect that the purpose of the company shall 
no longer be to provide for economic profit for the sharehold-
ers. The underlying philosophy is that the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders requires full consent to any changes 
that may directly afflict their economic rights. 
Minority rights to force certain decisions
The fourth pillar of minority protection is the right to force cer-
tain actions to be taken. Thus, shareholder minorities of 5 % 
(Denmark and Norway) or 10 % (Finland and Sweden) can 
require an extraordinary general meeting to be held. Except for 
Denmark, a minority of 10 % (5 % in Norway) of the share-
holders can also require a minimum dividend to be paid out. 
In Denmark and Sweden a minority of 10 %, and in Nor-
way 5 %, of the shareholders can, under certain circumstances, 
request that the district court or a public authority appoint a 
second auditor, generally referred to as a »minority auditor«, 
whose duty it is to carry out the audit work during the coming 
year alongside the main auditor. 
91A Consolidated Nordic  Governance Model 
If a shareholder minority of typically 10 % (25 % in Den-
mark) considers that certain circumstances in the company 
should be subject to an in-depth investigation, it has the addi-
tional right to demand that the district court or a public author-
ity appoint a »special investigator«, to be paid for by the com-
pany, with the duty of specifically examine such circumstances 
and report their findings to the general meeting.  
Finally, in all countries a shareholder minority of at least 
10 % has the right to sue members of the board and executive 
management for damages on behalf of the company. However, 
since the award in the event of successful litigation will fall to 
the company, while the cost will be borne by the shareholders 
in the event of failure, this is in practice a rather blunt weapon 
and hence rarely used. 
Related-party transactions
Business dealings between the company and its shareholders, 
board members or executives pose a potential threat of undue 
extraction of private benefits from the company, i.e. ultimately 
from its (other) shareholders. In particular, such transactions 
may raise questions about the equal treatment of shareholders 
and the protection of the interests of minority shareholders. 
Therefore, measures to ensure that related-party transactions 
cannot be used to extract private benefits have long been a hall-
mark of Nordic corporate governance. 
The basic principle is that related-party transactions are 
permitted as long as they are carried out on market terms. 
The problem is to make sure that this is the case. To do so, 
the Nordic countries have chosen somewhat different judicial 
approaches. In Denmark, Norway and Finland, the relevant 
provisions are to be found in statutory regulation. In Sweden, 
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the main corresponding provisions are currently part of the 
self-regulation system on the Swedish securities market (see the 
Swedish country report in Appendix d). 
Transparency
The Nordic countries are renowned for a generally high degree 
of transparency in most aspects of societal life, including cor-
porate governance of listed companies. The exact rules and 
practices of disclosure differ between the countries, but the 
overall standard is high to the benefit of, not least, minority 
shareholders.
Corporate-control structures are usually fully transpar-
ent, making control-owners of listed companies typically well 
known. This is partly due to the flagging rules of the European 
market securities regulation, but also to the fact that the princi-
pal control-enhancing mechanism of use in Nordic companies 
is dual-class shares, the existence and structure of which are 
easily available through open sources (e.g. company websites, 
their articles of association, and companies registers). 
Except for minor holdings in some of the countries, domes-
tic share registers are public in the Nordic countries. Hence, for 
all practical purposes, and disregarding shares deposited with 
a foreign custodian agent, anyone can at any time have full 
insight into the structure of ownership of any listed company.
The governance structure of listed companies is highly 
transparent with names and credentials of board directors as 
well as ceos and other senior executives to be found on the 
companies’ websites and/or annual corporate governance 
reports along with information on the independence status of 
all board directors. Also, the composition and terms of refer-
ence of any standing board subcommittees is generally dis-
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closed. Furthermore, minutes of general meetings for the last 
few years are generally to be found on company websites. 
The Nordic countries were generally early to adopt a high 
degree of openness on board and management remuneration. 
Today, the remuneration of board directors as well as the ceo 
is disclosed in detail on an individual level. For a defined group 
of senior management staff directly subordinate to the ceo, 
the corresponding information is supplied collectively.
( 94 )
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A comment by Ronald J. Gilson* 
It is commonplace to credit the invention of the public corpora-
tion as an important engine of economic growth. The creation 
of a long-lived vehicle that gave investors both tradable shares 
and limited liability allowed talented managers to raise capital 
to fund enterprise. Writing in 1926, the Economist magazine 
heralded this role:
The economic historian of the future may assign to the nameless 
inventor of the principle of limited liability, as applied to trading 
corporations, a place of honor with Watt and Stephenson, and 
other pioneers of the Industrial Revolution. The genius of these 
men produced the means by which man’s command of natural 
resources has multiplied many times over; the limited liabil-
* Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School, Stern Pro-
fessor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School and Fellow, European Cor-
porate Governance Institute.
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ity company the means by which huge aggregations of capital 
required to give effect to their discoveries were collected, organ-
ized and efficiently administered.1
During both the industrial revolution of the 19th century and 
the digital revolution of the 21st, innovation had to be organ-
ized to succeed. The innovation represented by the corporate 
form was the vehicle for the industrial and technological inno-
vations that define these periods. Nonetheless, this gem of an 
organizational form had two deep flaws that were apparent 
from the outset, one of which goes to the misaligned incentives 
between management and shareholders, and the other goes to 
the difficulty of aligning them. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of 
Nations, identified the first flaw in the late 18th century – what 
we now call the agency problem:
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being 
the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, 
it cannot well be expected that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own … Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the 
management of the affairs of such a company.2
So someone has to watch management to make sure that man-
agers work diligently for the shareholders. But this is hard 
to do. Two hundred years later, Dr. Seuss – the pen name of 
Theodor Geisel, who is the most beloved American children’s 
author – captured the second flaw as well as any economist and 
in a much more amusing manner:
1. Economist, Dec. 18, 1926.
2. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations: An Inquiry into Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776).
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Oh, the jobs people work at! Out west near Hawtch-Hawtch 
there’s a Hawtch-Hawtcher bee watcher, his job is to watch. Is to 
keep both his eyes on the lazy town bee, a bee that is watched will 
work harder you see. So he watched and he watched, but in spite 
of his watch that bee didn’t work any harder not mawtch. So then 
somebody said »Our old bee-watching man just isn’t bee watch-
ing as hard as he can, he ought to be watched by another Hawtch-
Hawtcher! The thing that we need is a bee-watcher-watcher!«. 
Well, the bee-watcher-watcher watched the bee-watcher. He 
didn’t watch well so another Hawtch-Hawtcher had to come in 
as a watch-watcher-watcher! And now all the Hawtchers who 
live in Hawtch-Hawtch are watching on watch watcher watcher-
ing watch, watch watching the watcher who’s watching that bee. 
You’re not a Hawtch-Watcher you’re lucky you see!3
To date, much of corporate governance scholarship and prac-
tice has been, in effect, a search for organizational cold fusion. 
Can we design a cost-effective monitoring technique, whether 
internal to the corporation like independent directors or exter-
nal to the corporation though markets like the market for cor-
porate control, that will cause management to work only in the 
shareholders’ interests and so reduce the divergence between 
interests to levels low enough that it will not operate as a drag 
on performance? The difficulty is that incentive-compatible 
governance techniques are both difficult to design and expen-
sive. For example, paying directors enough to get their full 
attention may be inconsistent with their independence, a prob-
lem that gets worse the more complex the business becomes. 
Takeovers, in turn, are blunt instruments, and the large premi-
ums associated with them imply a significant level of poor per-
3. Dr. Seuss (T. Geisel), Did I Ever Tell You How Lucky You Are? (1973).
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formance before they are triggered.4 Indeed, there is evidence 
that those banks whose corporate governance most closely 
aligned the interests of shareholders and managers fared worst 
in the recent financial crisis.5
But there is another approach to the agency problem that 
has received less attention in the corporate governance debate 
– an active owner, in contrast to passive shareholders, has the 
right incentives to either run the corporation well herself, or to 
monitor carefully the performance of the managers she hires. 
This brings us to the subject of this volume: Nordic corporate 
governance, or what I will call an ownership model of corpo-
rate governance.
an ownership model  
 of corporate governance
An ownership model of corporate governance takes as its 
premise the simple intuition that an active owner will be a more 
effective and less costly monitor of management than the tech-
niques associated with the governance of public corporations 
having widely dispersed shareholdings.6 But the analysis gets 
more complicated when the owner needs to raise equity capi-
tal. Once you add public shareholders to the mix, a different 
4. R. J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: 
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harvard Law Review 1641 
(2006).
5. A. Beltratti and R. M. Stulz, The Credit Crisis Around the Globe: Why 
did some Banks Perform Better?, 105 Journal of Financial Economics. 1 
(2012).
6. R. J. Gilson and A. Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control: 
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms versus Ex Post Transaction Review, 169 Journal 
of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 160 (2013).
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form of agency cost arises: the owner’s incentive to secure pri-
vate benefits of control. An owner that holds less than all of the 
company’s equity has an incentive to divert profits to herself, 
for example through related-party transactions, rather than 
sharing them with public shareholders either by keeping the 
profits in the corporation or paying them out in dividends. The 
potential for diversion of private benefits of control also has 
allocative and not just distributional consequences. Different 
kinds of businesses are differentially susceptible to divergence 
of private benefits; for example, vertical integration creates the 
potential for large numbers of related transactions that can dis-
proportionately favor the controlling shareholder. Therefore, 
the optimal form of organization from the perspective of the 
controlling shareholder may no longer be the most efficient 
but, instead, the form that maximizes the combination of effi-
cient production and the capacity to divert private benefits.
At this point, the agency problem posed by owners gets 
complicated. First, if the company must sell equity to finance 
its growth (because the owner lacks the resources herself), the 
control that gives the owner the ability to act as an effective, 
low-cost monitor is diluted, and the combination of success 
and growth opportunities becomes self-defeating. The ob vious 
solution, common to the Nordic countries as shown in the 
country reports in this volume, is for the owner to retain con-
trol by having the company sell to the public shares with lower 
voting rights than the stocks held by the owner – the control-
ling shareholder levers control through dual-class common 
stock.7 But the use of leveraged control to solve the first owner-
agency problem presented by the addition of public sharehold-
ers exacerbates the second. The larger the difference between 
7. The Nordic countries differ somewhat along this dimension. The Nor-
way Report states that although Norwegian law does allow two classes of com-
mon stock with different voting rights, it is rarely used.
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the owner’s share of the vote and her share of the equity, the 
stronger her incentive to extract private benefits of control.8 
And so one confronts a vicious circle: the more successful the 
business and the greater its growth opportunities, the more 
capital that must be raised through a dual stock structure, the 
bigger the divergence between the controlling shareholder’s 
voting rights and her equity stake, and so the greater her incen-
tive to divert private benefits of control. This leads to the third 
and potentially most significant owner-agency problem. Since 
public shareholders will expect that an owner will divert pri-
vate benefits of control unless the owner can credibly commit 
not to do so (or can set a credible cap on the amount of diver-
sion), the cost of equity capital will be driven up, with negative 
consequences for the company’s success in its business and its 
capacity to grow.9
how the Nordic ownership model  
 of corporate governance responds to the 
 agency problems of ownership
The overview study and the country studies of Denmark, Fin-
land, Norway, and Sweden in this volume tell a single, coher-
ent story. First, active owners dominate publicly held Nordic 
companies. As shown in Figure ii.1 on page 50, 62 % of com-
panies in the region have at least one shareholder that holds 
more than 20 % of the votes and 21 % have a shareholder that 
8. See, for example, S. Classens, S. Djankov and L.H.P. Lang, The Sepa-
ration of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 Journal of 
Financial Economics 81 (2000).
9. R. J. Gilson and A. Schwartz, Contracting Over Private Benefits of Con-
trol,	available	at	www.ssrn.com/abstract=2182781 (July, 2013).
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holds more than 50 % of the votes. Characterizing Nordic cor-
porate governance as an ownership model is plainly correct: 
public companies are dominated by active owners.10 Thus, the 
first governance problem that confronts an ownership model 
– how the active owner maintains a controlling position while 
the company grows – seems to have been solved in the Nordic 
region. 
Second, these companies are successful. As shown in Table 
i.1 on page 28 the number of Nordic companies among the 
Forbes 2000 largest global companies exceeds that of Germa-
ny, despite the fact that Germany’s gdp is twice that of the Nor-
dic region. Thus, the second and third problems that confront 
an ownership model of corporate governance also seem to have 
been solved – the divergence of private benefits of control has 
not risen to levels that affect Nordic companies’ cost of equity 
capital or success – as can be inferred by the fact that large-cap 
listed companies represent some 88 % of the market value of 
shares listed on the Nordic exchanges (Table ii.3, p. 46).
This section reviews the legal structure that supports the 
Nordic ownership model. The next section then considers the 
Nordic ownership model from a comparative perspective, with 
particular attention to an issue that has figured prominently in 
the corporate governance literature: whether different national 
and regional corporate governance systems are converging. 
10. For present purposes, I will ignore a different corporate governance 
model found in the Nordic region: the »no owner« governance model repre-
sented by the Danish industrial foundations. In the foundations, no individual 
or for-profit company bears the residual risk of the company’s performance; 
voting control is lodged in a non-profit foundation. Here the puzzle is that, 
despite a governance model that has neither an active owner nor dispersed 
shareholders, these businesses are on average as profitable as public corpora-
tions with more familiar governance models. See H. Hansmann and S. Thom-
sen, Firms without Owners: The Governance of Industrial Foundations, work-
ing paper, Feb. 2014.
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legal rules
The legal rules that support the Nordic ownership model of 
corporate governance in each of the countries are straightfor-
ward. Consider first the initial problem that must be solved in 
an ownership model: companies must be able to raise addition-
al equity capital without so diluting the controlling sharehold-
ers’ ownership of voting stock that they lose control. This is 
accomplished in Denmark, Finland and Sweden by the use of 
dual-class common stock, where the controlling shareholder 
owns shares with multiple voting rights (typically 10 votes 
per share) and the public shareholders own shares with only 
a single vote. Thus, companies can raise substantial amounts 
of equity without the controlling shareholder losing control.11 
While the use of dual-class control to maintain control 
despite equity sales is straightforward, it is not the only way to 
accomplish that goal. For example, complex webs of circular 
ownership and related but non-transparent ownership can also 
allow a controlling shareholder to leverage her voting control. 
A recent comparison of the ownership structure of the Korean 
Samsung group and that of the Wallenberg group in Sweden, 
which is anchored through the family’s dual class-based con-
11. Interestingly, Norway differs in this important respect. As described in 
the country report for Norway, company law allows the use of different classes 
of common stock with different voting rights, but only three listed companies 
have other than a single class of stock: ownership and voting rights coincide 
rather than diverge. This is something of a puzzle in that the percentage of 
Norwegian companies with a 20 % and 50 % shareholder is higher than the 
average for the Nordic region. No explanation for this different pattern is 
offered; however, one may speculate that it may be related to the fact that the 
Norwegian government is the largest investor in listed Norwegian companies, 
holding approximately 35 % of the outstanding stock (spread across only 8 
large companies). In that circumstance, the government may be the ultimate 
arbiter of control.
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trol of Investor ab, highlights the differences between circular 
ownership and dual-class common stock as a means to lever-
age control.12 As discussed above, the risk posed by leveraged 
control is the controlling shareholder’s increased incentive to 
divert private benefits of control. While the Wallenberg group’s 
control relationship based on dual class common stock is 
transparent, Professor Kim argues that the complex circular 
ownership linking the units of the Korean Samsung chaebol is 
opaque and therefore facilitates diversion of private benefits 
of control. If the solution to the problem of allowing an active 
owner to maintain control of a growing company is leveraged 
control, then ownership relationships must be transparent so 
that related transactions that may serve as vehicles for divert-
ing private benefits of control can be tracked. Professor Kim 
notes that Korean corporate law prohibits dual-class common 
stock but allows complex circular ownership, and argues that 
monitoring private benefits would be improved were the legal 
status of the two techniques reversed.
That brings us to the second problem that must be addressed 
in an ownership model of corporate governance: a control-
ling shareholder’s incentive to take private benefits of control 
increases as her equity stake decreases. An ownership model’s 
success thus depends on limiting private benefits of control. 
While the details differ somewhat across the four countries, 
the basic structures of the four Nordic countries’ corporate law 
regimes set out in this volume reveal a common strategy to con-
strain private benefits of control. Put most simply, the annual 
general meeting is given plenary power, approval by quali-
fied majorities based on equity ownership rather than voting 
rights is required for sensitive actions like directed issuances of 
12. Hwa-Jin Kim, Concentrated Ownership and Corporate  Control: Wal-
lenberg Sphere and Samsung Group,	 available	 at	 htto://ssrn.com/abstract=	
2463272 (2014).
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shares, and the board or agm is prohibited from taking actions 
that advantage a controlling shareholder at the expense of the 
minority. 
While these protections are clear enough, their effective-
ness depends importantly on the extent to which they can be 
effectively enforced: do the courts and the four corporate-law 
regimes give minority shareholders an economically and sub-
stantively feasible means to challenge actions they deem undu-
ly favorable to the controlling shareholder? Professors Guido 
Ferrarini and Paolo Guidici highlight this point with respect to 
the Italian Parmalat scandal, which involved the diversion of 
large amounts of private benefits of control through related-
party transactions:
[I]talian substantive rules cannot be blamed for what happened. 
Indeed, we argue … that the existing Italian substantive rules that 
were in place during Parmalat’s last decade were sufficient and, 
somewhat surprisingly, were even more severe than those in the 
us. If Italian gatekeepers were undeterred, do not blame Italian 
substantive rules, blame enforcement.13
Here the concern is not just with substantive legal rules that 
identify what actions will be found to unduly favor a control-
ling shareholder, but as well with the civil procedure rules that 
identify who can challenge those actions and the economics of 
that process, especially with respect to the ability to share the 
costs of the litigation across all minority shareholders.
13. G. Ferrarini and P. Guidici, Financial Scandals and the Role of Private 
Enforcement: The Parmalat Case, in After Enron 159 (J. Armour and J. McCa-
hery, eds. 2006).
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Non-legal constraints on private benefits of control
It is obvious that non-legal arrangements are important con-
straints on the consumption of private benefits of control. Con-
trolling shareholders are commonplace in developing coun-
tries where courts cannot be expected to operate effectively 
to constrain private benefits of control; publicly held minority 
shares nonetheless sell at a positive if still discounted price.14 
Thus, controlling shareholders must adopt observable strate-
gies that operate to credibly cap the extent of private benefits. 
These strategies can be grouped in two general categories: rep-
utation-based commitment and structural commitment.15
The first category builds on the premise that if a controlling 
shareholder can be expected to return to the capital market, the 
company’s anticipated cost of capital will reflect the observed 
level of private benefits. Thus, controlling shareholders with 
a penchant for self-dealing will face a higher cost of capital 
and so will bear the cost of self-dealing. Family-controlled 
conglomerates and broad, state-controlling ownership, both 
common in countries without effective legal systems, operate 
to expand the effectiveness of reputation-based enforcement 
through repeated transactions by extending the number of 
companies that may come back to the capital market to raise 
equity.
The second category is comprised of techniques where the 
structure of the controlled company’s business itself impedes 
a controlling shareholder’s diversion of private benefits. For 
example, a familiar means of private-benefit transactions is 
through related-party transactions between companies in a 
14. R. J. Gilson, Controlling Family Shareholders in Developing Coun-
tries: Anchoring Relational Exchange, Stanford Law Review 60, 633 634–35 
(2007).
15. Gilson and Schwartz, supra note 9.
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vertically integrated controlled pyramid. If the controlling 
shareholder has a larger equity stake in the upstream input 
supplier, transfer prices favorable to the supplier will trans-
fer private benefits of control. The absence of vertical supply 
arrangements in a controlled conglomerate may then serve as a 
credible commitment – through industrial organization rather 
than reputation or the legal system – that private bene fits will 
be limited.
an ownership-based governance  
 model in a comparative perspective
Comparative corporate governance for some time had a tele-
ological perspective: Anglo-American, widely dispersed share-
holdings and the related market-based governance model 
allowed for specialization of management and of risk-bearing, 
and so was seen as the most efficient corporate structure; other 
systems, including those characterized by controlling share-
holders, were just less advanced on the development path. 
The expectation was that, in the end, we would observe con-
vergence on the market-based model. This analysis suffered 
from serious shortcomings. First, it ignored significant over-
laps among the systems. The United States, for example, has a 
significant number of both public companies with controlling 
shareholders16 and companies whose controlling sharehold-
16. In the United States, approximately 15 % of the s&p 500 companies 
are family-controlled. R.C. Anderson and D.M. Reeb, Founding Family Own-
ership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the s&p 500, 58 Journal of 
Finance. 1301 (2003),
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ers leverage their control through dual-class common stock.17 
At the same time, countries that are characterized as having 
controlling shareholders systems also had significant numbers 
of public corporations without a controlling shareholder. As 
Figure ii.1 in the overview chapter shows, on average almost 
40 % of the companies listed on the primary Nordic stock mar-
kets do not have a 20 % shareholder. 
Second, the convergence analysis ignored the fact that in 
some countries characterized by dispersed shareholders and 
those characterized by controlling shareholders, minority 
shares traded at quite small discounts; there seemed to be lit-
tle difference among governance systems so long as controlling 
shareholders had the capacity to credibly commit to limit pri-
vate benefits of control. One is left with the conclusion that in 
countries where there can be a credible commitment to limiting 
private benefits of control, we will observe both dispersed and 
concentrated ownership. If there is no convergence within a 
single system, why should we expect it across systems?
The convergence question thus needs to be reformulated. 
Properly framed, the issue is not whether we will see a conver-
gence of governance systems, but rather whether we will see 
a convergence of shareholder distribution. Here we observe 
some indication of a kind of regression to the mean. On the one 
hand, concentrated shareholdings are becoming more com-
mon in the United States, especially in the technology sector. 
For example, from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 
March 2011, 20 companies went public with dual-class com-
mon stock and other structural features that allowed control-
ling shareholders to retain control with a less-than-equivalent 
17. As of the early 2000’s, approximately 6 % (by number, not value) of us 
publicly traded corporations had dual-class common stock. P. A. Gompers, J. 
Ishii and A. Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in 
the United States, Review of Financial Studies 23 1051 (2010).
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equity stake.18 Facebook and Google are obvious examples.
Moreover, there is good reason to expect the pattern of 
some controlling shareholders going public but keeping control 
through leveraged structures – an ownership-based govern-
ance system – to persist. From the perspective of a controlling 
shareholder going public in a country with a low discount for 
expected private benefits of control, retaining control through 
dual-class stock can usefully be thought of as an option. The 
controlling shareholder buys the right to retain control indefi-
nitely, paying an option price equal to the discount (assumed to 
be small in a low-discount country) on the stock the controlling 
shareholder sells plus her pro rata share (based on her equity 
stake) of stock sold by the company. If the discount grows in 
the future, the controlling shareholder can exercise her option 
by causing the unification of the two classes of common stock. 
At the same time, one might also expect the number of older 
controlling share companies in countries with an ownership 
governance model to decrease over time. Some companies will 
be the subject of a takeover; in Sweden, for example, Rolf Skog 
reports that Swedish companies with dual-class common stock 
are no less likely to be a target of a takeover than companies 
with dispersed shareholders.19 Others will be subject to what 
I have called the »gravity of generations,« which can lead to 
breaking up large family-controlled businesses as the number 
of family members, and the divergence of their interests, grow 
over time and a correspondingly smaller number have direct 
involvement in the business.20
18. irrc Institute, Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor´s 1500: 
A Ten Year Performance and Risk Review (2012).
19. R. Skog, The Takeover Directive, the »Breakthrough« Rule and 
the Swedish System of Dual Class Common Stock, European Business Law 
Review, 15, 6 (2004).
20. Gilson, supra note 4, at 1668. The percentage of companies dual class 
shares listed in the Stockholm Stock Exchange declined from 87 % (202 com-
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The overall result is unpredictable – the initial distribution 
of controlling shareholders among countries that can support 
both concentrated and dispersed shareholder distributions 
appears to be based on historical conditions with the future 
likely to be based on the business dynamic in the country. As 
such, is there any prediction about the distribution of share-
holdings that can be made with some confidence?
In fact, there is one quite clear prediction that applies both 
to the United States and to the Nordic region: the increasing 
importance of institutional shareholders. Take the United 
States first. In 1950, the shares of publicly traded corporations 
were largely held by households; institutional investors, includ-
ing pension funds, held only some 6.1 % of us equities. By 
1980, however, shareholdings had begun to shift from house-
holds to institutions. At that time, institutions held 28.4 % of 
us equities. By 2009, institutional investors held 50.6 % of all 
us public equities and 73 % of the equity of the 1,000 largest 
us corporations.21 Table iv.1 sets out the institutional owner-
ship of different size cohorts of us public corporations in 2009.
Moreover, the institutional holdings were quite concentrat-
ed. Table iv.2 sets out the percentage of the outstanding stock 
held in 2009 by the 25 largest institutions in the 10 largest us 
corporations in which there was not a controlling owner. One 
could presumably put around a large boardroom table repre-
sentatives of institutions that together control some of the larg-
est companies in the United States.
Thus, us shareholdings are hardly widely distributed. At 
panies in 1992) to 49 % (255 companies in 2010). This also suggests that 
the bulk of new listings did not have dual class shares. M. Henrekson and U. 
Jakobsson, The Swedish Corporate Control Model: Convergence, Persistance 
or Decline? ifn working paper # 857, Research Institute of Industrial Econom-
ics (2011).
21. The Conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends 
in Asset Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 10 (2011) .
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TABlE IV.1 institutional ownership of largest us corporations in 2009.
Corporation Rank by Size Institutional ownership (%)
Top 50 63.7 
Top 100 66.9
Top 250 69.3
Top 500 72.8 
Top 750 73.9 
Top 1,000 73.0 
SouRCE: The conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset 
Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 13 (2011).
TABlE IV.2 percentage of outstanding stock in 10 largest us corporations 
without a controlling shareholder held by 25 largest institutions in 2009.
 Percentage of Stock Held  
Corporation (in order of size) by 25 largest Institutions(%)
exxon-Mobil 25.0 
Microsoft 31.9 
apple 37.0 
Ge 24.8 
procter & Gamble 29.1 
Bank of america 28.9 
Jp Morgan chase 35.8 
Johnson & Johnson 29.6 
iBM 30.6 
Wells fargo 44.3 
SouRCE: The conference Board, 2010 Institutional Investment Report: Trends in Asset 
Allocation and Portfolio Composition, Table 13 (2011).
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the level of the record owner institution, as opposed to the 
institution’s beneficiaries, us shareholdings have dramatically 
reconcentrated. The result is a governance structure that Jef-
frey Gordon and I have called »agency capitalism«,22 with its 
own distinctive form of agency costs. Here, the institutions’ 
business model comes between the record (institutional) and 
beneficial owners. The evidence is that with only occasional 
exceptions, institutional investors exhibit a peculiar form of 
passivity: not »apathy« but »reticence«. They are unlikely 
to be proactive in taking advantage of the governance rights 
associated with their shareholdings, but will vote thoughtfully 
if the issue is clearly framed for them.  
The same shift in shareholdings, from individual to insti-
tutional ownership, is also evident in the Nordic region. As 
described in the chapter on Sweden in this volume, in the early 
1950’s, individuals held nearly 75 % of the market capitali-
zation (but not necessarily the vote) of the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange. Family-controlled foundations, closed-end invest-
ment companies and holding companies owned the remainder. 
As Skog and Sjöman put it: »Institutional investors were prac-
tically non-existent at the time.« 
As in the United States, institutional investor holdings then 
grew dramatically. By the mid-1980’s, individuals owned only 
25 % of the market capitalization, and by 2014, individual 
equity ownership had dropped to 15 %, with institutional 
investors holding 85 %.
We have thus observed the same shift in ownership pat-
tern in both the United States – widely treated as the quintes-
sential dispersed-shareholder market – and in Sweden, widely 
viewed as the quintessential controlling-shareholder system. 
22. R. J. Gilson and J. N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 Columbia 
Law Review. 883 (2013).
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What has been the result of this common shift in shareholder 
distribution in the two different systems? 
In the United States, the reconcentration of ownership 
in institutional investors has given rise to activist investors 
whose strategy is symbiotic with that of the intermediary insti-
tutional investors. The activists identify companies whose 
performance they believe can be significantly improved, buy 
a toe-hold stake, and then seek to convince the institutional 
shareholders of the wisdom of the activist’s strategic proposal. 
If intermediary institutional owners agree, they vote for the 
activist’s position by voting for the activist’s board nominees 
in a proxy contest; if institutions do not think the proposal is 
sound, it is likewise voted down. The institutions determine the 
outcome. The activist investor does not itself control sufficient 
stock to control the election; its pre-disclosure holdings seem 
to be around 8 %.23 Thus, in the us agency capitalism world, 
the activist investor proposes, and the institutional investors 
dispose, a division of labor that takes advantage of each of the 
participants’ competencies.24 
But what is the impact in Sweden (and presumably the rest 
of the Nordic region) of the reconcentration of individual hold-
ings into institutional holdings? For those companies that do 
not have at least a 20 % block, the potential is for the us pat-
tern to appear, and perhaps even more powerfully because of 
shareholders’ greater access to the annual general meeting and 
the greater power of the meeting than in the us. For compa-
nies with 20 % or more blockholders, a different issue arises: 
what is the impact of minority institutional blockholders in a 
corporation with a controlling shareholder? Here, the experi-
23. L. Bebchuk, A. Brav, R. Jackson and W. Jiang, Pre-Disclosure Accumu-
lation by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 Journal of Corporation 
Law (2013).
24. Gilson and Gordon, supra note 23.
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ence of Chile may be relevant. On the one hand, Chilean public 
corporations typically have a controlling shareholder. On the 
other hand, the five Chilean private pension funds that arose 
out of the 1981 pension reform are major shareholders with, 
collectively, sufficient shares to elect a director in many corpo-
rations.25 Here, the issue is one of strategy. Where exit is limited 
because of the limited market liquidity in the Chilean market 
and the size of the pension funds’ holdings, can voice have an 
impact even in the face of a controlling shareholder? What 
is the impact in Sweden, for example, of the fact that foreign 
institutional investors hold 40 % of the market capitalization? 
conclusion
The Nordic ownership model of corporate governance is built 
on facilitating an active owner’s retention of control as the 
company grows through the leverage of dual-class stock, and 
aggressively protecting minority shareholders from private 
benefits of control so that the company’s cost of equity is not 
adversely affected by the characteristic control structure. So 
long as non-control shareholdings were largely held by individ-
uals, a smaller equity stake could support control. The combi-
nation of an active owner and protected minority shareholders 
was a successful alternative to the intellectual hegemony of the 
Anglo-Saxon, market-based governance model.
Thus, it may be that the character of the shareholding 
distribution at the heart of the Nordic ownership model has 
25. oecd, The Role of Institutional Investors in Promoting Good Corpo-
rate Governance 90 (2011). The funds’ ability to elect a director is facilitated 
by cumulative voting and statutory authority to cooperate in the election of 
directors.
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two dimensions, not just one. In addition to the presence of 
an activist owner, the model may also depend to some extent 
on the absence of concentrated minority block holders. What 
happens when minority ownership reconcentrates in institu-
tional investors? What role can institutional investors play? 
Corporate governance is shaped by the evolution of the capital 
market and the resulting ownership patterns. Ownership pat-
terns have now changed dramatically. We are then left with 
the question of how the Nordic ownership model of corporate 
governance adapts. 
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Jesper Lau Hansen & Carsten Lønfeldt*
The context
At the end of 2013, the total number of limited liability com-
panies in Denmark was 237,302. The Danish Companies Act 
(Selskabsloven) divides limited companies into two categories: 
private companies (anpartsselskaber or »ApS«) and public 
companies (aktieselskaber or »a/s«). There are 197,161 pri-
vate companies and 40,141 public companies. Public compa-
nies, but not private companies, may turn to the general public 
to raise capital and thus only public companies may have their 
securities admitted to trading on a regulated market.
By the end of 2013, a total of 154 public companies were 
traded on Nasdaq Copenhagen Stock Exchange, not includ-
* Jesper Lau Hansen, Professor of Financial Markets Law, Uni-
versity of Copenhagen, and Carsten Lønfeldt, business professional 
with extensive experience as cfo, board director and chair in listed 
and non-listed Danish companies and member of the Nasdaq Copen-
hagen Advisory Board.
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ing 17 companies traded on First North. Nasdaq Copenhagen 
operates the main regulated market in Denmark as well as the 
First North, which is not a regulated market. In addition, some 
25 Danish companies are traded on the independent gxg Mar-
kets (formerly Dansk otc), which also owns the »otc-listen« 
which has been a market place for »over-the-counter trading« 
in unquoted Danish companies since 1987.
Only companies quoted on Nasdaq Copenhagen are the 
subject of this report and will be referred to as listed compa-
nies. 
Of the 154 companies traded on Nasdaq Copenhagen, 22 
were defined as large cap, i.e. companies with a market capital-
ization of more than €1 billion. The total value of all large-cap 
companies was 1,467 billion dkk or 89 % of the total value of 
the listed companies in Denmark.
Mid-cap companies have a market capitalization between 
€1 billion and €150 million and, finally, small-cap companies 
are below €150 million in market capitalization. The sizes of 
the three categories – large-cap, mid-cap and small-cap – have 
been fairly stable over the past few years.
TABlE A .1 Nasdaq  copenhagen stock exchange, 30 december 2013.  
dkk million.
  Market capitalisation Share (%) Number
large cap 1.467.479  89 22
Mid cap 141.582  9 29
small cap 39.788  2 103
Total 1.648.849 100 154
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In a historical perspective, private founders of companies 
and their heirs have dominated the ownership of Danish listed 
companies either by direct ownership or by setting up com-
mercial foundations. In the early 1950’s, a major share of the 
market capitalization of the Copenhagen Stock Exchange was 
directly held by individual investors or foundations established 
by founders. During the post-war period, the ownership struc-
ture has to some extent changed: Institutional investors, both 
foreign and Danish, including public pension funds have taken 
a significant share of ownership.
Numbers from the Danish Central Securities Depository 
(Værdipapircentralen) covering all registered shares in listed 
companies indicate that private investors hold approximately 
15 % of the registered shares of listed companies. This number 
has been significantly higher historically, but quite stable dur-
ing the period 2010–2014. Danish institutional investors hold 
35 % of the registered shares. This number has declined from 
43 % at year-end 2009. Foreign investors have increased their 
shareholdings from 42 % to 51 % over the last 4 years.
The numbers only reflect the allocation of registered shares 
where the owner has actively decided to register his ownership. 
It is estimated that approximately 10 % of all Danish shares 
are not registered by name. These shares may either have for-
eign or Danish ownership.
The establishment of public pension funds as atp and ld 
(quasi-public institutional investors set up as part of industrial-
sector agreements on pensions and regulated by acts of Parlia-
ment), and other changes in savings, pension and tax legisla-
tion have meant that accumulation has been collectivized and 
increasingly channelled through institutional investors. These 
institutions, in turn, have invested more of their assets in the 
stock market. Over a number of years, pension funds, insur-
ance companies, mutual funds and other institutional portfolio 
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investors have been buying shares on the market and partici-
pated in new share issues. 
Despite this institutionalisation of ownership in Denmark, 
many of the listed Danish companies have one major share-
holder – very often a strategic shareholder with permanent 
interests in the company. 
Table a.2 shows the 50 largest (by market capitalisation) 
listed Danish companies. The total value of these companies 
is 1,605 billion dkk and constitutes 97 % of the listed market 
capitalisation on Nasdaq Copenhagen Stock Exchange. The 
remaining 3 % is shared by 121 companies.
Of the 50 largest companies, 31 (i.e. 62 %) have a control-
ling shareholder which holds at least 20 % of the shares in the 
company. In all of these companies, the shareholding is higher 
than 20 % and often supported by differentiated voting rules.
By market capitalisation, controlling shareholders are rep-
TABlE A .2 Nasdaq  Copenhagen Stock Exchange. ownership structure in listed 
companies. 50 largest by market capitalization.
   Market 
 Number of capitalisation 
 companies mDKK
danish companies with a controlling shareholder1 31 1.361.919
danish companies without a controlling shareholder 16 208.880
foreign companies quoted on Nasdaq  cse 3 34.386
  50 1.605.185
1. Danish companies having a major shareholder who holds more 
than 20 % of the votes.
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resented in companies with an accumulated value of 1,362 
billion dkk or 82 % of the total market capitalisation of the 
Danish stock exchange. Of the 12 largest companies by mar-
ket capitalisation on Nasdaq Copenhagen Stock Exchange, 11 
companies have a controlling shareholder.
The controlling shareholder normally plays an active own-
ership role, has particular responsibility for the governance of 
the company and will be represented on the board. 
The data for Table a.2 is collected from the annual reports 
and websites of the relevant companies. Companies are obliged 
to disclose major shareholders (i.e. shareholders holding more 
than 5 % of the shares or votes), but most companies are trans-
parent in their reporting of shareholder structures. 
The regulatory framework
The regulation of corporate governance in Danish listed com-
panies derives from various sources, with some being found in 
legislation, while others are of a soft-law nature, notably the 
national Corporate Governance Code issued by the private 
institution, the Danish Corporate Governance Committee 
(dcgc). The latter reflects to some extent best practise. How-
ever, some practises are not reflected in this way and are sim-
ply observed by practitioners. This survey of Danish corporate 
governance includes these practises as well.
The main source is the 2009 Companies Act, which applies 
to both public and private companies. Before the 2009 Reform, 
Denmark had two separate acts on public and private com-
panies, respectively. This dichotomy was introduced in 1973, 
when Denmark entered the then eec as the first Nordic coun-
try and introduced the German-inspired distinction between 
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public and private limited liability companies. At the beginning 
of 2014, there were 40,141 public companies (aktieselskaber 
or »a/s«) and 197,161 private companies (anpartsselskaber or 
»ApS«).2 Note that a public company is deemed public by its 
choice of company form and should not be confused with com-
panies that have securities admitted to trading on a regulated 
market. The latter are referred to in this report as listed compa-
nies. Only public companies may solicit investments from the 
public and, consequently, only public companies may become 
listed. 
As the regulation of public and private companies was 
increasingly similar and the distinction itself was losing rel-
evance in comparison to the distinction between listed com-
panies and other companies, the 2009 Reform opted to reg-
ulate both types of company by the same act. The governing 
principle of the Reform was to subject both public and private 
companies to the same regime and to opt for the most flexible 
regulation allowing the shareholders to settle their affairs in 
the articles of the company where this could be done without 
detriment to other stakeholders, notably creditors, but also 
taking due account of minority protection. In some areas, such 
as capital maintenance, flexibility was not possible due to the 
strict regime of the 2nd Company Law Directive on Capital 
which applies to public companies. In these areas, flexibility 
was available for private companies only. Finally, some regula-
tion was promulgated specifically in respect of listed compa-
nies, mostly because of eu legal requirements such as the 2005 
Shareholders’ Rights Directive. Although most of these provi-
sions were already part of Danish law, which offers extensive 
rights for shareholders and protection of minorities, it was 
found necessary to incorporate some provisions specifically 
2. The Danish Business Authority, which also operates the national busi-
ness register. 
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dealing with listed companies directly into the Act in order to 
ensure a correct implementation of the Directive. Consequent-
ly, while the Companies Act to a great extent treats all limited 
liability companies alike, it is possible to observe a division into 
three categories of listed companies, public companies and pri-
vate companies, where the regulation is stricter for the former 
and more flexible and enabling for the latter categories.
Another important source of law is the Accounting Act, 
which contains some provisions in respect of corporate gov-
ernance, although it is mainly concerned with the preparation 
of financial accounts. The Accounting Act should be viewed 
together with the Auditors Act, which deals specifically with 
auditors and the audit of financial accounts.
The Danish Business Authority is the national, competent 
authority on company law and supervises compliance with 
the Companies Act and the Accounting Act in respect of non-
financial enterprises. In addition, it maintains the national 
business register and other registers required by company law, 
e.g. the open register of all shareholders in companies covered 
by the Companies Act.3 It is customary for Danish legisla-
tion to operate on two levels, whereby the legislation passed 
by Parliament on level 1 authorises the competent authority 
to issue executive orders to specify various provisions of the 
legislation on level 2 and, consequently, the Companies Act is 
supplemented by a number of executive orders issued by the 
Business Authority.
Corporate governance was formerly governed solely by 
the company legislation and the main governance structure, 
and some of the most fundamental rules on governance are 
still found in the 2009 Companies Act. However, in 2001, 
3. The Ownership Register was introduced as part of the 2009 Reform 
and is mandated by the Companies Act. However, its introduction has been 
delayed due to technical problems.
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Denmark followed the uk-inspired trend of promulgating a 
national code on corporate governance issued by a non-elected 
committee and based on a soft-law approach in the form of 
a national Corporate Governance Code (hereinafter the »cg 
Code«) with recommendations applying the »comply-or-
explain principle«.4 
The cg Code is issued by the dcgc and is available in Eng-
lish.5 The dcgc is independent and its members are appoint-
ed by the Minister of Business and Growth upon recommenda-
tion by the dcgc itself. The Business Authority serves as the 
secretariat for the dcgc which, together with the appointment 
of its members by a government minister, provides it with a 
quasi-official character. 
A listed company is obliged by the Accounting Act to 
explain in its annual accounts whether it is subject to the cg 
Code. As the stock exchange in Copenhagen strongly sup-
ported the 2001 initiative, it made observance of the cg Code 
part of its listing conditions, whereby they effectively became 
mandatory although the principle of comply or explain pro-
vides some flexibility. A survey conducted by the dcgc in 2012 
of all the largest listed companies together with ten companies 
picked at random from the mid-cap segment and ten from the 
small-cap segment showed that the cg Code was observed by 
92 %, with a distribution of 86 % compliance and 6 % giving 
explanations.6 Non-observance occurred mainly among small-
er listed companies.
Another, more special source of corporate governance reg-
4. Regarding the introduction of cg Codes in the Nordic countries in the 
first decade of the millenium, see J.L. Hansen, Catching up with the Crowd, 
But Going Where? 3 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 213 
(2006).
5. The home page of the dcgc is www.corporategovernance.dk. 
6. Available on the website (see above).
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ulation is found in the law particularly applicable to takeovers. 
Takeovers are governed by Chapter 8 of the Danish Securities 
Trading Act. Denmark does not have a very active takeover 
market (see the table below). The regulation of takeovers in 
Danish law is mostly comprised of provisions implemented 
from the Takeover Directive, and there is no soft-law regime to 
supplement the legislation except in a recommendation in the 
cg Code according to which management should not attempt 
to frustrate a bid that has been announced. Furthermore, there 
is no private committee to oversee takeovers, which instead 
falls within the Danish Financial Supervisory Authority’s 
ordinary responsibilities under the Securities Trading Act. As 
mentioned above, the Act authorises the Danish fsa to issue 
executive orders in specified areas, and a notable part of the 
provisions implementing the Directive is found in the executive 
order issued pursuant to Chapter 8 of the Act and in a separate 
guidance to the order issued by the Danish fsa. The Danish 
fsa’s main responsibility is to supervise financial enterprises 
and, in this capacity, it supervises issues of corporate govern-
ance and accounting as well. However, as this report is focused 
on non-financial listed companies, this will not be explored 
further.
TABlE A .3 danish takeover bids.
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Mandatory bid offers 3 6 5 3 3 2
voluntary takeover bids 6 2 3 5 2 2
Total 9 8 8 8 5 4
SouRCE: danish fsa, 2014. 
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Basic structure of the governance system
The original governance structure in Danish company law 
was a single administrative board of directors, similar to that 
known from uk law. However, in the work leading up to the 
1930 Companies Act, it was successfully argued that govern-
ance in major companies was effectively divided between the 
board of directors and daily executive management, and that 
the latter ought to be covered by company law legislation in 
order to establish its responsibility for day-to-day manage-
ment. Consequently, the 1930 Act obliged large companies 
with a share capital above a certain high level to have a board 
of directors (bestyrelse) and an executive management (direk-
tion), whereas smaller companies could continue with a single 
administrative board. This governance system was adopted by 
Sweden in its 1944 Companies Act and later by the remain-
ing three Nordic countries and is thus now a common Nordic 
governance structure. When Denmark introduced a distinc-
tion between public and private limited companies in the 1973 
Companies Act upon its accession to the then eec, the dual-
executive system became mandatory for all limited companies 
of the public type and optional for the private type. 
This dual-executive system may at first glance look like the 
two-tier governance system known in German company law, 
yet it is distinctly different. It is closer to the uk one-tier sys-
tem, especially as it appears post-Cadbury with its distinction 
between non-executive directors and executive directors. The 
differences from the uk system are not insubstantial. Notably, 
it embodies a clear hierarchy between the two levels of man-
agement, and it is better viewed as a unique, Nordic govern-
ance system in its own right.
In order to fully comprehend the Nordic dual-executive 
system, it is important to focus on its hierarchical nature. The 
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shareholders are placed firmly on top of the two levels of man-
agement – the board of directors and the executive manage-
ment – and the three levels together form a strict hierarchy in 
which the upper level may instruct and, if necessary, remove 
members of the lower level. The obvious risk that sharehold-
ers may abuse the limited liability that they are afforded in the 
company is prevented by detailed legislation aimed at protect-
ing creditors and minority shareholders. Although based on 
a strict hierarchy, the dual-executive system relies on mutual 
cooperation among the two levels of management and involve-
ment of dominant shareholders, if any. The system is analysed 
in more detail in the following parts of the report.
This direct influence of shareholders over directors is inten-
tional and not coincidental. It is believed that shareholders 
should be the ultimate decision makers for the company and 
that directors should be accountable to them. Shareholders 
are allowed to engage with management and determine the 
governance of the company, which is approvingly known as 
fIGuRE A .1 The danish dual-executive system.
General meeting
Together, the two 
levels constitute 
the management
Hires and fires
executive managers
Appoints and
dismisses directors
Board of
directors
Executive
management
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»active ownership«. Shareholders are not, however, obliged to 
engage in this way and many listed companies have a dispersed 
and mostly passive circle of shareholders. The characteristic 
feature of Danish business life is nonetheless the prevalence of 
dominant shareholders who engage in active ownership, which 
is widespread even among listed companies.
The prevalence of dominant shareholders is probably a 
historic coincidence, but it is enabled by various features of 
Danish company law, notably the possibility to issue share 
classes with different voting rights, known as a- and b-shares 
(while, in rare cases, there may be more than two share classes). 
Another characteristic of Danish corporate governance is the 
prevalence of industrial foundations, which usually own mul-
tiple-vote shares bequeathed to them by the founders and their 
families and with a chartered obligation to remain dominant 
owners of the company. Examples include high-profile Dan-
ish companies such as the Carlsberg brewery and the pharma-
company, Novo Nordisk. 
fIGuRE A .2 comparison of the traditional dual-executive system (left) with the 
new two-tier system (right).
Supervision
Day-to-day tactical management all management
overall strategic management
Board of
directors
Executive
management
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Board of
directors
Executive
management
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Supervision
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By means of the 2009 Companies Act, a new two-tier gov-
ernance structure was introduced. Inspired by German law, the 
structure rests on two separate bodies: a supervisory board (til-
synsråd) and an executive management (direktion).
Although German inspired, the Danish model is quite dif-
ferent. This is mostly because the supervisory board in the new 
two-tier system is part of the same hierarchy that applies to 
the dual-executive system. Consequently, the shareholders 
in general meeting appoint and, notably, may dismiss at least 
the majority of the supervisory board and, where there is no 
employee representation for 1/3 of the seats, may dismiss all 
of the supervisors. Similarly, the supervisory board hires and 
may dismiss at will all members of the executive management. 
This effectively gives the supervisory board a much stronger 
role than its German counterpart and ensures that the will of 
the shareholders may permeate down to the level of executive 
management.
The new, two-tier system has only existed for a few years 
and has been adopted only by a few companies to date. It is not 
Executive management
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expected that it will overtake the traditional, dual-executive 
system, which is considered more efficient and is preferred by 
listed companies. The cg Code recommends the dual-executive 
system and, so far, no listed companies have adopted the two-
tier structure. In this paper, which focuses on listed companies, 
only the traditional, dual-executive system will be described.
The general meeting
While the Danish Companies Act is silent on many issues about 
the conduct of management and leaves this to be settled by the 
cg Code, the Act is quite detailed in its regulation of the gen-
eral meeting (»gm«). In most cases, the requirements of the 
Act are default rules that can be set aside by provisions in the 
articles of the company if they offer stronger protection for the 
shareholders. However, this possibility is highly unusual for 
listed companies and is mostly ignored in the following pres-
entation. In this presentation of the gm, all references follow 
from the Act, except when the cg Code is mentioned.
Powers of the GM
In Danish corporate governance, shareholders are viewed as 
the owners of the company and the ultimate decision makers, 
yet they are not individually empowered and must convene as 
a gm. The gm on the other hand is almost omnipotent and the 
few limitations on its powers follow from the doctrine of capi-
tal maintenance in order to protect the creditors of the limited 
liability company. Thus, except for certain decisions regarding 
dividends and reduction of the paid-in share capital, the share-
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holders may decide what they want, including amendments to 
the articles, and they may by resolution interfere with man-
agement and take decisions regarding the governance of the 
company at will. A typical classroom example illuminating this 
point is to observe that the gm may decide the colour of the 
pencils to be used by the company. It is not unusual in many 
jurisdictions to allow for a similarly powerful gm, but it should 
be kept in mind that, due to the prevalence of dominant share-
holders in many Danish companies, the powers of the gm are 
more likely to be used. Among large-cap companies, including 
listed companies comprised by the C-20 large-cap index, con-
trolling shareholders have traditionally abstained from exert-
ing their powers to micromanage, while the mere possession of 
their formal powers ensures that the board remains account-
able to them and keeps them sufficiently informed.
An ordinary gm must be held annually (»agm«) and is usu-
ally convened by the board of directors. However, an extraordi-
nary gm may be convened by the company’s auditor or by any 
shareholders holding more than 5 % of the share capital. The 
extraordinary gm must be convened no later than two weeks 
after it has been requested. Where all shareholders agree, an 
extraordinary gm can be held immediately or the shareholders 
can decide to waive any defects in the notice to attend the gm. 
Similarly, many other features intended to protect the share-
holders may be waived by them, although this is not practical 
in listed companies and is not dealt with here.
The powers of the gm are confined to the issues put for-
ward on the agenda of the meeting. Certain items must appear 
on the agenda. At the agm, the accounts of the company must 
be approved and decisions must be taken regarding the dis-
position of results. Furthermore, the election of directors will 
normally also be on the agenda, and most directors are nor-
mally appointed for a one-year team, which is recommended 
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by the cg Code although the Act allows for mandates of up to 
four years. Other items may be included on the agenda by the 
board of directors in their discretion, and every shareholder 
has a similar right to submit his or her proposals for inclusion 
on the agenda, if the submission of the proposal is made to 
the board within six weeks. If it is made later, the board may 
include it on the agenda in its discretion. The Act does not con-
tain restrictions on the shareholders’ right to have proposals 
included on the agenda, even though the Shareholder Rights 
Directive allows for a threshold of up to 5 % of the share capi-
tal as a prerequisite for exercising such right. Listed companies 
are required to announce the date of the agm in the financial 
calendar that is published according to the rules of the Nasdaq, 
and the latest day on which to receive proposals for the agenda, 
which must be no later than eight weeks before the agm.
Preparation of the GM
Notice of the gm must be given by a listed company no earlier 
than five weeks and no later than three weeks before the gm. 
Communication may be electronic, e.g. by e-mail, if the indi-
vidual shareholders have agreed to this. The notice must state 
the time and place for the gm and the agenda and, if the agenda 
includes proposals for amendment of the articles of the com-
pany, the main content of the amendment must be stated and 
important amendments must be reproduced in full.
Since 2003, Danish companies have been allowed to con-
duct gms by use of electronic communication, either as a fully 
electronic gm at which all shareholders use electronic means to 
participate, or as a partially electronic gm at which only some 
shareholders use electronic means to participate while the rest 
attend in person. A growing number of large-cap companies 
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make use of electronic means to conduct a gm, notably to enable 
electronic voting and calculation of votes. While it remains unu-
sual to allow for on-line participation, it is customary for larger 
listed companies to transmit a gm as a webcast. By law, the press 
has the right to participate in the gm of a listed company.
Every public company must have a shareholders’ register in 
which they record the identity of their shareholders. It is pos-
sible to register under the name of a nominee and in this way 
preserve anonymity. The register is available only to the board 
of directors, public authorities and, where the employees are 
entitled to codetermination but have not exercised such right, 
to their representatives. Most listed companies use an inde-
pendent service provider to maintain their shareholder register. 
Currently, only two major players offer this service: vp Secu-
rities and Computershare. These providers also provide the 
electronic equipment necessary to conduct the gm, whereby 
shareholders are able to vote electronically. So far, however, 
most voting is done by paper ballot, and the widespread use of 
proxies often allows the gm to make decisions without a for-
mal vote. On voting, see further below.
The shareholders’ register is supplemented by a register of 
major shareholders, which records shareholders who directly 
or indirectly own a substantial amount of the votes or capital 
issued. Major shareholders are required to inform the compa-
ny of their shareholdings above thresholds of 5 %, 10 %, 15 %, 
20 %, 25 %, 1/3, 50 %, 2/3, 90 % and 100 %. Shares that are 
de facto controlled by a shareholder but not registered in the 
shareholder’s name are included when calculating these thresh-
olds. It is not possible to use a nominee for registration. The 
public has access to this register and it is also reproduced in 
the financial accounts of the company. Where the company is 
listed, the information must also be filed with the Danish fsa. 
The register of major shareholders is publicly available, nor-
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mally via the company’s website. Together, the two registers 
provide public information about all shareholdings above a 
mere minimum.
At the GM
The gm is normally conducted in Danish. However, the gm 
may decide by a simple majority of votes that it shall be con-
ducted in English, Norwegian or Swedish.7 So far, this is unu-
sual in listed companies, but a more frequent use of English is 
not inconceivable due to the growing number of foreign inves-
tors and foreign directors on Danish boards in listed companies 
and the generally high proficiency of English among Danes. A 
company may decide to produce its financial reports only in 
English and most large-cap companies have opted to do so, but 
continue to publish a condensed version of the financial reports 
in Danish. Companies may adopt English as the management 
language and, consequently, it is likely that one or more listed 
companies at some point may conduct their gm in English in 
order to attract a more international circle of investors.
Every shareholder has a right to attend the gm and may 
address the gm. A person is regarded as a shareholder to the 
extent that his or her shares are registered by name in the com-
pany’s shareholder register on the registration date, which 
is one week before the gm. The company may own its own 
shares, but such share ownership is ignored for the purposes 
of the gm given that the company cannot act as a shareholder 
7. The same provision enables the company to conduct its gm in any lan-
guage other than Danish by simple majority if it provides simultaneous transla-
tion. Furthermore, the company may opt to use such other language without 
translation if this is included in the articles, which requires a qualified majority. 
Neither of these options are relevant for listed companies with a large, mainly 
Western investor base.
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at the gm, cannot vote its own shares and the shares are not 
counted as being present at the gm.
Furthermore, every shareholder may present questions to 
the management about items on the agenda, which includes 
both items that may have been included on the agenda by the 
shareholder and other items. However, management is only 
obliged to respond to the extent possible without compromis-
ing the interests of the company and to the extent that informa-
tion is available to them and, where information must first be 
retrieved, has a two-week period after the gm to respond to the 
shareholders. It is very rare that management refuses to answer 
a question from its shareholders. If this occurs, the sharehold-
ers may challenge the decision to do so in court.
Shareholders may appoint a proxy to represent them at the 
meeting by means of a power of attorney, and a single proxy 
may represent different shareholders. A shareholder must be 
able to withdraw any such appointment, which is also done in 
writing. It is customary for the board of directors to represent 
shareholders who are unable to participate. It is considered 
best practise in the cg Code to specify the items on the agenda 
in the proxy form used by the company and thus avoid a single 
general power to act discretionarily. There are no limitations 
on the board’s ability to canvas proxies from its shareholders 
and it is normal that institutional investors provide their prox-
ies to the board, which is always present at the gm.
A shareholder also has a right to vote by letter. A proxy that 
clearly indicates how the shareholder wants to vote on each 
issue on the agenda is very similar to a vote by letter. However, 
a vote by letter can be made at any time before the gm but can-
not be revoked once handed over to the company.
The board of directors is expected to be present at the gm, 
although all members need not be present on the stage. The 
ceo is normally present, as is the auditor, who has a direct right 
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and obligation to attend. However, it is highly unusual for the 
auditor to address the gm unless specific questions regarding 
the accounts are raised. The chair of the board of directors will 
open the gm before handing over the floor to the appointed 
chair of the gm.
The chair of the gm may be appointed by the shareholders 
at the gm or by the board if this is mandated by the articles. The 
chair conducts the meeting and possesses sufficiently strong 
powers under the Act to ensure smooth and fair proceedings, 
including the power to determine the extent of voting rights, 
how to proceed with the agenda and to conduct voting on reso-
lutions and elections of directors, the manner in which to struc-
ture the debate and when to end it, and the chair may even dis-
miss a shareholder from the gm if necessary to maintain order. 
The intended chair is usually an experienced lawyer and is con-
tacted by the board well in advance of the gm and is involved in 
its planning. Nevertheless, once appointed, the chair of the gm 
owes his or her loyalty to the company and must act fairly with 
respect to all participants, and the chair is personally liable for 
exercising these duties correctly. After the gm, the chair will 
sign the minutes of the gm, which are filed with the Business 
Authority and published on the company’s website and, where 
authorised by the gm, the chair may sign documents necessary 
to implement resolutions adopted by the gm.
At an ordinary agm, it is customary in listed companies to 
combine the first items on the agenda, which cover the board’s 
statement on how the company has performed during the last 
year, adoption of the accounts and the manner of dealing with 
the result. The three items on the agenda are usually presented 
by the chair of the board but, in some cases, may be supple-
mented by the ceo. To the extent that there are comments or 
questions from the shareholders, these are addressed as part 
of this combined presentation. This flexibility in the presen-
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tation of the company’s affairs illustrates the close coopera-
tion among the board of directors and the executive manage-
ment. Generally, the chair of the board represents the company 
throughout the agm, which illustrates the hierarchical differ-
ence between the two levels of management, each represented 
by the chair and the ceo, respectively.
It used to be customary for the articles to include a provi-
sion on discharge (decharge), whereby the shareholders adopt 
a resolution not to hold the management liable for accounts 
adopted by the agm to the extent that nothing has been con-
cealed. However, this is becoming rare as the discharge is of 
limited use and is increasingly viewed as unnecessary and 
increasingly even inappropriate. If the articles still contain such 
a provision, the resolution regarding discharge is made in com-
bination with the presentation of the accounts.
Directors are normally appointed for one year and must 
be reappointed. The Act requires a candidate to disclose other 
directorships, and the chair of the board will normally provide 
a short presentation of new candidates as part of the presenta-
tion of the company’s affairs. 
Voting at the GM
Resolutions are adopted by the gm by voting. Shareholders 
must vote their entire holdings and cannot split their votes. A 
proxy representing different shareholders may vote differently 
to reflect the positions of the shareholders. Where shareholders 
own shares together, they must agree in order to vote.
Ordinary resolutions are adopted by a simple majority of 
votes, i.e. more votes in favour than against, and a draw is not 
sufficient. If the resolution is not binary (yes/no) but involves a 
choice among three or more options, e.g. different proposals, a 
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relative simple majority will be enough, i.e. the option with the 
most votes is adopted. The chair of the gm will usually use his/
her authority to arrange voting in such a way that the available 
options appear as binary votes.
More important resolutions will require different forms of 
qualified majority, which may include counting votes and capi-
tal separately, because the company may have different classes 
of shares with different voting rights for the same nominal 
value (a class and b class shares). For example, if one a-share 
carries 10 votes for 10 dkk and one b-share carries 1 vote for 
10 dkk, the two shares can together count as 11 votes and 
20 dkk. The different classes of shares must be stated in the 
articles, which are publicly available at the Business Authority 
on-line service and thus the distribution of votes and capital is 
fully transparent.
The need to count capital and not just votes is considered 
an important protection for minority shareholders, who often 
hold low-voting or non-voting classes of shares and are thus put 
on an even footing with owners of multiple-vote shares when 
capital is concerned. Equally, the use of a qualified majority 
to adopt more important or onerous decisions is an important 
way to protect the minority. Shares without votes were legal 
until the 1973 Companies Act, which then required a mini-
mum of at least one vote in new issues and limiting any vote 
differentiation to a ratio of 1–10. However, non-voting shares 
were again permitted in the 2009 Act, which also revoked the 
ratio on vote differentiation. A non-voting share will usually 
not participate in voting at the gm, unless the articles deter-
mine that the non-voting share can be counted as capital, in 
which case the shares are counted if a qualified majority involv-
ing capital is called for (see below regarding qualified majority 
and super majority).
The most important resolutions, such as a change of the 
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articles, decisions to raise or reduce the share capital, and 
mergers, require a qualified majority of 2/3 of the votes cast and 
2/3 of the capital represented at the gm. There are no quorum 
requirements for the gm. Accordingly, if the gm is legally con-
vened, but only one shareholder attends, that shareholder will 
control 100 % of the votes cast and the capital represented. 
Certain highly onerous resolutions, e.g. changes to the 
articles that will reduce the shareholders’ right to dividends, 
require a super majority of 90 % of votes cast and capital pre-
sent. Minority shareholders who have voted against such a 
super majority resolution may demand a sale of their shares to 
the company at a fair value after the gm.
If the onerous resolution concerns a change to the articles 
that diminishes the rights of a special class of shares, the reso-
lution will require the qualified majority necessary to adopt a 
change to the articles and must furthermore be supported by 2/3 
of the class in question, which is counted as the capital of the 
class concerned without regard to its voting rights, if any.
If a resolution is detrimental to individual shareholders who 
do not constitute a particular class of shares, the resolution 
will require their consent in addition to the ordinary majority 
required to adopt it. Certain resolutions may be detrimental 
in a way that requires full consent, even if the resolution may 
appear to concern a particular class of shares, which would 
otherwise only require consent from 2/3 of the class (see the 
paragraph above). The distinction depends on whether the det-
rimental resolution is a mere readjustment of rights between 
classes of shares or constitutes a severe disadvantage to par-
ticular shareholders who happen to form a distinct class.
If a resolution obliges the shareholders to make additional 
financial contributions to the company contrary to the basic 
concept of limited liability, the resolution will require unani-
mous support.
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Appointments of directors are considered different from 
resolutions and are made by a relative simple majority, i.e. 
the candidate with most votes is elected, and the decision is 
made by counting only votes and not capital. Only counting 
votes and not capital ensures that shareholders with multiple-
vote shares can effectively dominate the appointment and are 
offered decisive influence as regards the composition of the 
board. The gm votes for one candidate at a time and, although 
cumulative voting is legal if adopted in the articles, this is never 
used. Consequently, a major shareholder who dominates the 
gm will be able to fill all vacancies on the board. This is a delib-
erate policy choice by the Danish legislature to ensure that the 
board reflects the undiluted will of a controlling shareholder, 
where such a shareholder is present in the company.
Unlike resolutions in respect of which the reliance on 
majority may lead to the rejection of a resolution, the appoint-
ment of directors must occur given that the company cannot 
be without directors. Where two candidates have received the 
same number of votes, the chair of the gm may order a new 
vote to resolve the problem and, if the tie is not broken, the 
appointment is made by drawing lots. Where the number of 
candidates corresponds to the number of vacancies, which is 
frequently the case in listed companies, no voting is carried out, 
but appointment is simply recognised.
As mentioned above, the company may not vote its own 
shares, nor may its subsidiaries vote shares in the parent com-
pany. A shareholder may not vote on issues concerning litiga-
tion against such shareholder, nor may the shareholder vote on 
issues concerning the shareholders’ liability to the company. 
This provision regarding a conflict of interest is narrower than 
the provision applicable to directors and managers because 
shareholders do not owe a duty of loyalty to the company as 
do members of management. The prohibition on voting when 
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faced with a conflict of interest also applies to proxies, both 
where the shareholder is in a conflict of interest and where the 
proxy is conflicted. 
While most provisions of the Shareholders’ Rights Directive 
were familiar to Danish company law, one provision was new 
and has caused considerable problems in practise. The provi-
sion allows any shareholder to require a full count of any vote 
taken in respect of a resolution, whereas the provision does not 
apply to voting in respect of appointments. Traditionally, vot-
ing in listed companies has been done by establishing broadly 
whether there is sufficient support, often relying on proxies 
from dominant shareholders or major institutional investors. 
However, a shareholder may now require a full account of all 
votes cast and, where voting is done by paper ballot among the 
many hundreds of shareholders present which is still the nor-
mal procedure, this can seriously delay the proceedings. Natu-
rally, this does not pose a problem in companies that use elec-
tronic voting, where the full account can be computed quickly. 
In other companies, the chair of the gm may expedite matters 
by establishing a majority by relying on proxies and then ask 
the attending shareholders to deliver their paper votes as they 
leave the gm, in which case the full account will be conducted 
later and disclosed after the gm. 
Dividends and remuneration
The gm adopts the annual accounts of the company, which 
includes remuneration of management (see page 164). The gm 
also has the power to decide on the distribution of any prof-
its available in the accounts. However, in order to secure the 
financial viability of the company, the gm can only vote on a 
proposal by management. Members of management owe a 
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duty of loyalty to the company and must safeguard its financial 
viability. They are personally liable for not abusing the limited 
liability and, consequently, their proposal for dividends must 
be expected to be prudent and safe and cannot be exceeded by 
the shareholders. A similar mechanism is relied upon if the gm 
is to decide on a reduction of the paid in share capital where the 
proceeds are to be paid out to the shareholders.
According to Danish company law, there is no right to a 
minimum dividend as is the case in other Nordic countries. 
It is acknowledged that a controlling shareholder may with-
hold dividends to starve out minority shareholders and, if 
this is proved, it will constitute an abuse of power and may be 
attacked in court, although it is typically very difficult to prove. 
However, it is believed to be too dangerous to the financial via-
bility of limited liability companies to mandate in legislation 
such a compulsory right to dividends which is opposed by a 
majority of shareholders. It is equally noteworthy that the Dan-
ish Companies Act does not presume that the purpose of the 
company is to pursue a profit, but leaves it to the company to 
state its purpose in the articles. Such provisions on the purpose 
of the company in the articles are usually quite open, mostly 
stating that the company is engaged in enterprise, although it 
may sometimes be more detailed. However, this is unusual as 
a more detailed description of the company’s purpose can pre-
vent it from pursuing other kinds of enterprise.
Matters to be addressed by the GM
A possible avenue of abuse is to siphon off funds from the com-
pany by related-party transactions whereby dominant share-
holders may transfer possessions of the company at a discount 
to themselves. According to the Accounting Act, which imple-
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ments the international accounting standards on related-party 
transactions, the company must disclose in its annual accounts 
all related-party transactions that are not deemed to consti-
tute normal market transactions. The disclosure must include 
the costs and the relationship with the related party in order 
to clarify the financial position of the company. No voting is 
required to approve the related-party transactions in question, 
as the transparency will enable a legal challenge in court if it 
constitutes abuse.
A recent development has been to require certain issues of 
governance to be put before the gm by legislation making it a 
mandatory part of the annual accounts. Thus, listed companies 
are required to explain in their annual accounts their policy on 
corporate social responsibility or, if they have no policy, this 
must be so stated. 
Further, if the company has a board of directors on which 
one gender is underrepresented, i.e. such gender is represented 
by less than 40 % of the total number of gm-appointed direc-
tors, the company is obliged to state its policy to improve that 
gender’s part of the total number of executive officers and to set 
a target for that gender’s part of the board. Note, however, that 
the company is free to decide its policy and the target, and that 
there are no sanctions for failure.
Minority protection
Shareholders are offered substantial rights and protection 
against abuse from dominant shareholders and management. 
The right of every shareholder to put items on the agenda, to 
meet and to speak at a gm has already been discussed. While 
the rules applicable to appointment of directors tend to favour 
dominant shareholders holding multiple-vote shares, ordinary 
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shareholders with low-vote shares are protected against wide-
ranging decisions by the reliance on capital alongside votes in 
all non-ordinary resolutions, as described above.
A string of other provisions also aims to protect the share-
holders. Most importantly, the Act prohibits resolutions by the 
gm if they obviously serve to offer unfair advantage to certain 
shareholders or others to the detriment of the other sharehold-
ers or the company. This legislative provision is known as a gen-
eral clause against abuse of power. A similar provision applies 
to decisions made by management. These general clauses offer 
the primary protection of minority shareholders. Other pro-
tective measures include a right to require the appointment by 
court of an auditor (known as a minority auditor) in addition to 
the auditor appointed by the gm if the measure is supported by 
shareholders with at least 10 % of the capital. Any shareholder 
may demand at the gm that an investigator be appointed and, if 
the proposal is supported by a simple majority, the shareholders 
will appoint one or more investigators to investigate the finan-
cial affairs of the company and the conduct of the management. 
If the proposal is not adopted by the majority, but is support-
ed by at least 25 % of the capital, a shareholder may request 
that a court appoint an investigator. The different thresholds, 
10 % and 25 % respectively, probably reflect the fact that the 
appointment of a minority investigator is more intrusive to the 
company than the appointment of a minority auditor.
A shareholder or any member of management may chal-
lenge a decision of the gm in court on the grounds that the deci-
sion was made illegally. The case must normally be brought 
within three months. However, in certain cases, a delay may 
be justifiable. The court may nullify the decision, but only if 
the court can determine what the proper outcome would have 
been. A court decision is binding on all shareholders, not only 
the shareholder who brought the action.
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The gm may decide that the company shall sue members of 
management for wrongdoings while in service of the company. 
If the gm cannot muster a majority in this respect, sharehold-
ers representing at least 10 % of the capital may sue on behalf 
of the company. Any award will fall to the company, whereas 
the shareholders are personally liable for the litigation costs, 
although they can be refunded out of an award to the com-
pany if the litigation proves successful. Not surprisingly, cases 
of shareholder-initiated litigation are rare. Equally, it is unu-
sual for the company to sue its directors but, if the company is 
placed into bankruptcy, the court-appointed receiver may sue 
on behalf of the estate, and most cases concerning directors’ 
liability come about in this way.
The board of directors
Appointment of directors
Danish corporate governance is strictly hierarchical with 
shareholders on top and a very powerful gm as described 
above. As the gm ordinarily only meets once a year and is dif-
ficult to convene where there are many shareholders, the nor-
mal route for shareholders to exercise their influence is by the 
appointment of directors to the board. It is important to note 
here three distinctive features of Danish company law.
First, the majority of directors on the board must be 
appointed by the shareholders in general meeting (gm). Direc-
tors may be appointed by anyone empowered to do so by a spe-
cial provision in the articles. However, as this is highly un usual, 
all vacancies on the board are effectively filled by the gm, 
except where employee representation applies, in which case 
1/3 of the seats are appointed by the employees. Consequently, 
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either the full board or at least a 2/3 majority will be appointed 
by the shareholders in general meeting. As elections require a 
simple majority of the votes cast, any shareholder controlling 
a majority of the votes present at the gm will be able to fill all 
the vacancies.
Second, the board of directors makes decisions by simple 
majority, which means that shareholder-appointed directors 
effectively control the board.
Third and probably most important, directors may at any 
time, irrespectively of the period for which they were appoint-
ed, be removed by whoever appointed them, which removes 
the possibility of a staggered board or continued opposition 
from the board to major shareholders. Consequently, the gm 
or any dominant shareholder at the gm, as the case may be, 
may at any time and at its own discretion remove the majority 
of directors.
Taken together, these three features ensure that effective 
and direct control of the board of directors is exercised by the 
shareholders in general meeting, or a shareholder who domi-
nates the general meeting. The threat of removal is usually the 
best safeguard to ensure that the directors remain accountable 
to the shareholders and are motivated to safeguard the inter-
ests of the company’s shareholders.
As mentioned above, it is generally accepted that the direc-
tors pay special attention to the interests of the shareholders. 
In fact, the cg Code on directors’ duties opens by observing 
that directors should take care of the shareholders’ interest 
and merely mentions other stakeholders as incidental to that 
obligation. It may be politically unpopular to publicly empha-
sise the importance of shareholders compared to other stake-
holders of the company, but the reality is that shareholders do 
take a special position in the Danish corporate-governance 
 system, especially where one or more dominant shareholders 
145Corporate Governance in Denmark 
are  present to hold management accountable.
As a consequence of this, it is recognised in Danish corpo-
rate governance that the board may relate confidential infor-
mation to dominant shareholders where this is necessary for 
them in their role as the ultimate decision makers in respect of 
the company’s governance. This applies even where the confi-
dential information qualifies as inside information according 
to the 2003 Market Abuse Directive as indicated by the case 
law of the Supreme Court in the Vase case.8 In this case, the 
board decided to inform several major shareholders, but not 
its other shareholders, of a merger offer to obtain guidance 
on whether they should take up negotiations with the offeror. 
This was found to be legitimate. In a related Danish case, the 
European Court of Justice was asked whether it was legitimate 
for directors to pass on inside information and, although the 
ecj contended that such a possibility should be narrowly con-
strued, it did accept that it might be legitimate according to 
the national corporate governance system.9 In its subsequent 
decision in the same case, the Danish Supreme Court acquit-
ted the defendants given that their behaviour was found to be 
legitimate according to Danish corporate governance.10
It should be noted that directors are mainly drawn from 
two different groups: independent individuals who are chosen 
because of their personal expertise and business acumen and 
individuals who are chosen because they are to represent the 
shareholder or shareholders who appoint them. The former 
group will normally not feel a need to consult with sharehold-
ers except where it is necessary for the boards’ work, e.g. as in 
the Vase case whether to go ahead with a merger, whereas the 
8. Reported in Danish in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen 2006.3359.
9. Judgment of 22 November 2005 in case c-384/02, Grøngaard & Bang, 
ecr [2005] i-9939. 
10. The case is reported in Danish in Ugeskrift for Retsvæsen, 2009.2142.
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latter may see their function on the board more as representa-
tives. It is clear from the law that all directors owe their duty to 
the company and not to particular shareholders, irrespective of 
whom they represent. However, it is equally clear that the law 
allows shareholders to exercise considerable influence directly 
over management by their power to appoint and, if necessary, 
remove directors and that the right of directors to provide 
shareholders with the necessary information was upheld by the 
two Supreme Court decisions mentioned above.
Danish boards are tasked with management, although 
on a superior level to the executive management, which may 
explain why they are generally smaller than boards of foreign 
jurisdictions that are charged with supervision. The board of 
directors must comprise at least three persons, and the average 
number of directors appointed by the gm in listed companies 
is only 5.3.
The cg Code is heavily inspired by the 2005 Commission 
Recommendation on the role of directors which, in turn, is 
inspired by the uk approach to corporate governance. The 
Recommendation calls for some directors to be ‘independent’ 
in respect of the company and of major shareholders. In tra-
ditional Danish corporate governance, there was no require-
ment of independence, but the same purpose of ensuring the 
necessary independence was provided by the division of man-
agement between the upper level of the board of directors and 
the lower level of executive management, effectively a dis-
tinction similar to the uk distinction between non-executive 
directors and executive directors. Although it could be argued 
that all directors are thus non-executives because they are not 
part of the lower level of management, the Danish cg Code 
instead recommends that at least half of the directors must be 
independent of both the company and major shareholders, 
which goes beyond the requirement of the Recommendation 
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but reflects the uk approach. As traditional Danish corporate 
governance seeks to ensure active ownership from dominant 
shareholders and ensures a direct influence over the composi-
tion of the board, the requirement of independence from major 
shareholders has been construed pragmatically, and only a very 
narrow relationship with the dominant shareholder will be 
seen as preventing the director from being regarded as inde-
pendent. Thus, a majority of listed companies will claim com-
pliance with the cg Code’s recommendation on independence 
even though dominant shareholders may exercise considerable 
influence.
In recent years, the issue of diversity, especially with respect 
to gender representation, has become a point of contention. 
Very few women are appointed as directors in large and listed 
companies and, in a country such as Denmark with a tradition 
of gender equality and a very high percentage of women being 
educated and part of the work force, this is a cause for politi-
cal concern. Only 15.1 % of gm-appointed directors in listed 
large-cap companies were women in 2012,11 although this pic-
ture appears to be changing. However, the board is an active 
part of management according to the Danish dual-executive 
system, which makes them smaller and more executive than 
boards vested primarily with supervision. Consequently, Dan-
ish directors are to a high degree recruited from among current 
or former executives of other companies who have executive 
experience. It is not evident that the low ratio of female direc-
tors is different from the level of high-ranking female execu-
tives, which would suggest that the problem of a gender imbal-
ance is not necessarily due to sex discrimination but, rather, 
may reflect a lack of women executives. Thus, legislators have 
thus far refrained from introducing quotas for women direc-
11. Information provided by the Gorrissen Federspiel law firm.
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tors, but have instead introduced an obligation for listed com-
panies to set a target for the underrepresented gender in respect 
of gm-appointed directors on their boards and to explain in 
their annual accounts their policy for enhancing the under-
represented gender on the executive levels of the company, 
which should help later recruitment. It should be noted that 
this amounts to an obligation on the part of a listed company 
in which a gender is underrepresented on the board, i.e. below 
40 %, to have a policy and set a target for gender representa-
tion and to publish these in its financial accounts. However, it is 
voluntary in so far as the company may determine which policy 
to pursue and which target to set. Thus, there is no obligation 
to reach balanced gender representation or to target such a bal-
ance within a certain time.
The cg Code also refrains from quotas, but recommends 
that the board consider the benefits of diversity in respect of a 
broader spectre of gender, nationality and qualifications, and 
that the board should ensure that the recruitment by the com-
pany allows diversity in this respect. 
Co-determination and appointment of directors
If a company has employed on average 35 persons in the last 
three years, the employees are entitled to appoint represent-
atives to the board of directors. If the company has a parent 
company, the employees are entitled to appoint representatives 
to the parent company’s board as well. An employee represent-
ative is a director on par with directors appointed by the gm 
and shares the same rights and duties as other directors.
The employees must decide by ballot if they want to appoint 
such representatives and at least half of them must vote in 
favour. If the ballot is affirmative, the employees will appoint 
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their representatives by direct election among the employees of 
the company. The unions are not directly involved as the pro-
cedure is based on the employees of the company, but they may 
act as facilitators. The number of employee-appointed direc-
tors is half of the remainder of the board, i.e. one third of the 
total board, though no less than two directors and at least three 
directors in a parent company.
The gm may decide that employees in subsidiaries in  other 
countries shall also be entitled to employee representation 
in the same way as Danish employees. However, the Danish 
employees have a right to appoint at least one of the directors 
and, if the Danish employees constitute more than 10 % of the 
total workforce, they can appoint at least two directors.
The Danish workforce is highly unionised and, by virtue 
of collective agreements, most companies have a separate sys-
tem of union representation, notably in the form of informa-
tion and cooperation committees established by unions and the 
company. These committees operate outside the company-law 
system and do not influence the composition of the board. This 
widespread presence of information and cooperation commit-
tees may explain why very few companies have employee rep-
resentation as stipulated by the Companies Act notwithstand-
ing that the employees are entitled to it. The latest survey that 
was published in 1999 indicated that only 20 % of companies 
that could have employee representation did in fact have such 
representation.12 The number is believed to be even smaller 
today, although the proportion with representation is substan-
tially higher among listed companies with many employees. 
Some 73 listed companies (47 %) have employee-appointed 
12. The Danish Ministry of Business and Industry, et al., Rapport om aktivt 
ejerskab, Maj 1999.
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directors, whereas 82 (53 %) do not and thus have only share-
holder-appointed directors.13
The average number of employee-appointed directors in 
listed companies was 3.89.14 As this figure should represent 
one half of the directors appointed by the shareholders, and 
since this number is only 5.3 on average in all listed compa-
nies, it would suggest that, where co-determination is applied, 
boards tend to be bigger than average, probably to offset the 
presence of employee-appointed directors.
Employee-appointed directors are considered directors on 
par with the shareholder-appointed directors with the same 
duties and responsibilities. Like the other directors, they owe 
a duty of loyalty to the company and, if prevented by a conflict 
of interest, they cannot participate in decisions that directly 
concern their own or their co-workers’ interests. Further-
more, the directors must be chosen among the employees in 
the company and cannot be union-appointed professionals or 
from outside the company. However, in most financial insti-
tutions the majority of employee representatives is comprised 
of union representatives or even professionals who are techni-
cally employees but have no work obligation towards the com-
pany. This distinct feature carries an enhanced risk of conflicts 
of interest and is unknown outside the financial industry.
Separation of the two levels of management
In the dual-executive system, the board of directors is vested 
with two powers, i.e. to act as the upper-management level and 
to supervise the executive board. Double mandates are permit-
ted, so a person may serve both as a director and as an execu-
13. Information provided by Nasdaq Copenhagen.
14. Information provided by Nasdaq Copenhagen.
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tive. The Act enforces a certain separation of the two levels of 
management as it prevents an executive from being appointed 
chair of the board and further requires that at least the majority 
of directors cannot be executives.
In practise, it is highly unusual to have double mandates, 
especially in listed companies. The cg Code of 2001 recom-
mended against it and, although that recommendation was 
removed after the 2009 company law reform, the general view 
is still against double mandates. This is no doubt supported 
by the fact that executive managers have a right by law to par-
ticipate in the meetings of the board in their own right, which 
makes double mandates unnecessary and likely to confuse the 
separation of powers intended by the dual-executive system.
Chair, board meetings and decision making
The board of directors appoints its own chair. The chair is the 
primus inter pares, or »first among equals«, among directors 
and in practice holds a very important position on the board, 
although the Companies Act does not specify these tasks as 
closely as the Swedish Act. In respect of the responsibilities of 
the chair, the Act only states that the chair convenes the meet-
ings of the board and that the articles may provide the chair 
with the decisive vote in case of a draw. To ensure the divi-
sion of powers between the board of directors and the execu-
tive management, the chair in a listed company is not allowed 
by the Act to engage in daily management except for special 
assignments authorised by the board, which reflects the ban on 
appointing as chair someone who is also an executive manager. 
The chair is often perceived as the public face of the company 
and also fulfils the important function of liaising between the 
board and major shareholders.
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This limited regulation of the chair is probably due to the 
more recent belief in Danish company law that governance 
is better regulated by the soft-law cg Code for listed compa-
nies. However, even the cg Code is not very elaborate. It is 
recommended that a chair and vice-chair be appointed and 
that their responsibilities are stated in the rules of procedure of 
the board. More specifically, it is recommended that the chair 
be engaged in securing good relations with the shareholders 
and more generally that it is the responsibility of the chair to 
organise and conduct the affairs of the board in an efficient and 
just manner, and that the chair should ensure that the directors 
remain qualified by engaging in self-evaluations and continu-
ous consideration of the necessary qualifications.
In practice, the chair is very important for the functioning 
of the board, notably by determining the issues of its agenda 
and its meeting schedule. Among the important duties, the 
chair should see to:
· clear lines of communication with the executive level;
· the utilisation of each director’s capabilities;
· a proper tone and atmosphere;
· sufficient training and coaching of directors to develop 
their skills;
· engagement of the directors in the work of the board and 
their understanding of the company;
· the necessary debate before decisions are made;
· dialogue with major shareholders and important stake-
holders;
· feedback from investor relations and an adequate level of 
information to shareholders; and
· a reliable and useful self-evaluation of the board.
The chair also serves as the connection to the executive board, 
and the relationship between the chair and the ceo is of the 
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utmost importance to the effective cooperation envisaged by 
the dual-executive system. The hierarchy entailed in the system 
ensures that the chair is senior to the ceo and it is important 
that their relationship maintains a professional distance.
It is the responsibility of the chair that board meetings are 
held in such a way that all directors are able to participate, and 
a board meeting may be annulled if this is not observed. It is 
permissible to hold a board meeting even if some directors are 
unable to attend, but the board must have a quorum of at least 
half its members present to adopt decisions. Alternate direc-
tors, who step in when a director is unable to attend, may be 
appointed but are not usual in listed companies, where direc-
tors are normally expected to be available as necessary to par-
ticipate actively in the meetings. The number of meetings may 
vary from company to company and depend on the situation 
of the company, e.g. financial distress will normally give rise 
to more meetings. In most companies, meetings are held some 
5–8 times a year.
Members of the executive board have a right by law to par-
ticipate in the meetings of the board of directors, unless the 
board decides differently ad hoc. Thus, it is customary for the 
ceo to attend all board meetings and, depending on the items 
on the agenda, other executives may attend as well. In many 
large-cap companies the entire executive management board 
participates in all board meetings. However, part of the meet-
ing is usually reserved for board members only.
This practice involving a joint meeting of the directors and 
the executives is a very important feature of the dual-execu-
tive system because it ensures that, although management is 
formally divided into two different levels within a hierarchy, 
both levels cooperate and the Act ensures that communication 
between the two levels is direct and uncomplicated by provid-
ing for common meetings. The existence of a hierarchy, nota-
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bly the capacity of the board to fire any executive manager at 
will, and the availability of face-to-face interaction at the meet-
ings also ensure that the board has access to the information 
from the executive level which, in systems with a more formal 
division between supervision and executives, is known to be 
problematic. 
The board adopts its decisions by simple majority. Howev-
er, it is very unusual for the board to vote. Rather, it is custom-
ary for the directors to debate all issues, sometimes intensely, 
but to make decisions unanimously where possible, whereby a 
minority view among directors is not necessarily reflected. This 
preference for unanimity is probably due to the perception 
of the board as a collective in which all directors feel obliged 
by the decisions made even where they personally disagree. 
However, in cases of strong dissent, the Act makes it possible 
to record a dissenting position in the minutes, although this is 
highly unusual.
According to the Act, directors are liable in their personal 
capacity for their actions, and the normal standards of Danish 
tort law are applied. Thus, every director is assessed in his or her 
personal capacity for their actions and capabilities even though 
the board makes decisions as a collective. Thus, it may influence 
the liability of a director whether the director recorded his or 
her dissent in the minutes, though in most cases it will not have 
any effect as it is generally believed that a director must resign 
from the board to avoid liability for decisions of the board and 
cannot simply record a personal dissent and then condone the 
decision of the majority by continuing on the board.
The board meetings may be held in English, Norwegian or 
Swedish if such a language is adopted in the articles as the com-
pany’s management language. This also includes papers pre-
pared for the board and also applies where co-determination 
applies and employee-represented directors are on the board. 
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Equally, since 2014, an amendment to the Accounting Act 
makes it possible to draw up the financial accounts in Eng-
lish. These possibilities are increasingly used by Danish listed 
companies as it becomes more usual to have foreign directors 
that do not speak Danish. In listed large-cap companies, where 
directors are usually appointed each year, a third of all gm-
appointed directors in 2012 were foreign.15
The concept of »independence« in respect of directors has 
traditionally not been known in Danish company law, but has 
been introduced by way of the cg Code as inspired by uk law 
in this area as a way to reduce conflicts of interest. In tradition-
al Danish law, conflicts of interest have not been avoided by 
requiring the directors to be independent of the company or its 
major shareholders but, rather, by prohibiting a director ad hoc 
from making a decision concerning an agreement between the 
company and themselves or persons close to them, and equally 
in respect of litigation where such may compromise the interest 
of the company. If such a conflict of interest arises, directors 
cannot participate in the decision, but are not otherwise inca-
pacitated and may resume their duties when the decision has 
been made. It is thus a more flexible approach than trying to 
ensure beforehand that no potential conflict can arise by estab-
lishing criteria for independence. This more inflexible solution 
is probably better suited to governance systems where supervi-
sion is lax. I n the Danish system where dominant sharehold-
ers most often monitor management, the more flexible ad hoc 
solution has worked well.
Furthermore, the Act has a general clause to prevent abuse 
of power according to which no director may participate in a 
decision which obviously serves to enrich certain shareholders 
15. Information provided by the Gorrissen Federspiel law firm.
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or others to the detriment of other shareholders or the com-
pany. A director who contravenes this prohibition will be per-
sonally liable.
Committees
As Danish boards traditionally are small, it has not been cus-
tomary to use committees. The first cg Code from 2001 was 
sceptical of committees. The scepticism is probably founded 
upon the fact that boards are normally small and decisions are 
made collectively. If a decision has been prepared by a commit-
tee, it is not clear according to Danish law whether the mem-
bers of the committee will be liable to a greater extent than the 
other directors who act on the basis of the committee’s prepa-
ration. They probably are, because they will be liable for the 
preparation, whereas the other directors will only be liable to 
the extent that they should have acquired a similar understand-
ing themselves without the benefit of participating in the prep-
aration undertaken by the committee, which would probably 
apply only to cases where the problem is clearly apparent from 
the material presented to the full board, but it is not clear how 
this will play out.
In recent years, this scepticism has subsided due to influ-
ence from uk law and especially from the 2005 Commission 
Recommendation on the role of directors. Committees have 
become more common and the cg Code of 2013 now gener-
ally recommends committees as a way to prepare work for the 
whole board and recommends the use of at least an audit com-
mittee, a nomination committee, and a remuneration commit-
tee. Committees are regarded by the cg Code as an organisa-
tion of the work of the board, and committees are therefore 
only comprised of directors serving on the board. It is generally 
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recommended that the majority of directors on a committee be 
independent of the company and of major shareholders and 
that the company lists its committees and the scope of their 
mandate to ensure transparency.
The audit committee is now mandated by the Auditors Act, 
which also requires that at least one person be independent of 
the company and has the necessary accounting expertise, as a 
consequence of which all listed companies have an audit com-
mittee. The cg Code recommends that the audit committee be 
comprised of directors of whom at least the majority are inde-
pendent of the company and of major shareholders and who 
jointly possess the necessary qualifications, and that the chair 
of the committee should not be the chair of the board.
The nomination committee is charged with preparing the 
nomination of candidates for the board and to examine the 
performance of the board in order to evaluate whether new 
qualifications are required. In most large-cap companies, the 
nomination committee also proposes candidates for appoint-
ment to the executive management board and is charged with 
the task of preparing and facilitating executive assessments. 
The committee is made up of directors of whom a majority 
should be independent according to the cg Code, and is usu-
ally chaired by the chair of the board. Although major share-
holders cannot participate in the nomination committee, the 
committee will normally consider proposals from sharehold-
ers. In practise, it is customary for the nomination committee 
to engage directly with dominant shareholders, if there are any, 
who usually have considerable influence on the nominations 
made by the committee in light of the fact that they will eventu-
ally have the decisive vote at the gm. Half of all listed large-cap 
companies have a nomination committee.16
16. Information provided by the Gorrissen Federspiel law firm.
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The cg Code recommends that the board of directors evalu-
ate themselves yearly and that external expertise is brought 
into the process from time to time. Evaluation is conducted by 
the board and, as such, is one of the issues that the chair will 
have the responsibility of organising. The yearly evaluation 
should include the board and its function, including its num-
ber, its use of committees and its documents, and the evalua-
tion should entail an anonymous evaluation of the individual 
directors followed by a discussion between the chair and each 
director. Obviously, the chair should not evaluate him- or her-
self. The evaluation should also cover the qualifications of the 
present board and the need to attract new talent or to provide 
education for existing directors. Also, the board should evalu-
ate its cooperation with the board and, to the extent that any 
executive managers are also serving as directors, they should 
not participate due to their conflict of interest. If material find-
ings are made during the evaluation, they should be reported 
to the gm in the annual accounts of the company or the web-
site. The cg Code does not say it expressly, but it is custom-
ary for the evaluation to be made available for the nomination 
committee, which is tasked with preparing recruitment of new 
directors, or the full board. The chair should also provide indi-
vidual feedback to the board members.
The remuneration committee is charged with deciding the 
remuneration policy, practices and incentive schemes. As part 
hereof, the committee considers and submits recommenda-
tions on directors’ fees and the remuneration of the executive 
management board. The cg Code recommends that the com-
mittee be comprised of directors of which a majority are inde-
pendent of the company and major shareholders, but it does 
not recommend who should serve as chair. Of listed large-cap 
companies, some 72.7 % had a remuneration committee.17
17. Ibid.
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Listed companies may have other committees. Some 
18.2 % of listed large-cap companies have a risk committee 
and 22.7 % have other committees as well.18
Powers and responsibilities
In the Danish dual-executive system, the board of directors 
is considered to be the central management board (centrale 
ledelsesorgan) and is vested with two functions: to decide on 
the »overall and strategic« governance of the company and to 
supervise the executive management which carries out »daily 
management«, that is, day-to-day tactical governance imple-
menting the strategy decided by the board and taking instruc-
tions from them. However, in order to fully comprehend the 
system, it should be kept in mind that the two levels of man-
agement are supposed to work together and the exercise of 
actual powers is, in practice, less clear cut than black-letter law 
appears to suggest.
The stating point is of course the internal hierarchy under-
scored by the capacity of the board of directors to hire and fire 
at will any member of the executive management. This is cru-
cial to the understanding of the hierarchy intended by the legis-
lation, which is designed to ensure that influence may emanate 
from the shareholders in general meeting, often from one or 
a few dominant shareholders, down to the level of executive 
management.
The Companies Act specifies that it is the responsibility of 
the board of directors to ensure a satisfactory system of book-
keeping, that sufficient procedures for risk management and 
control are in place, that they receive the necessary reporting 
18. Ibid.
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from the executive management regarding its daily manage-
ment, supervision of the executive management, and to ensure 
that the funding of the company is responsible and adequate 
for the business that it conducts including the availability of 
necessary liquidity.
The board represents the company, e.g. it can accept legal 
notice on its behalf. In respect of how the company is perceived 
by the public, the picture is slightly different. In more formal 
affairs, the company is usually represented by the chair of the 
board of directors, e.g. it will be the chair who opens the gm 
and usually also the chair who will address the shareholders 
on behalf of the company, whereas the day-to-day contact, e.g. 
with the media, may be handled by the ceo.
The board of directors can commit the company by signing 
or entering into contracts on its behalf and thus possesses exec-
utive powers. These executive powers apply to each director, 
unless the articles prescribe that signing on behalf of the com-
pany can only be carried out by more directors acting together. 
However, the power of the board of directors as a collective 
cannot be limited.
The board of directors is responsible for the »overall and 
strategic« management of the company. It is, however, not 
unusual that the strategy is drafted by the executive manage-
ment. As a minimum, the board will indicate the general direc-
tion that it would prefer and, in most large-cap companies, the 
board of directors is heavily involved in setting the strategic 
direction, in some cases dictating concrete strategic initiatives. 
But the formulation of the strategy is often left to executive 
management. The strategy will then be decided by the direc-
tors, and the board of directors should engage and challenge 
the ceo and his team. Thus, strategy is effectively often a joint 
effort, however, with the board as the decision makers. When 
the company is in crisis, the board will usually move closer and 
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increase its involvement in the affairs of the company and may 
even engage in daily management. Thus, one of the primary 
benefits of the dual-executive system is its flexibility in arrang-
ing the powers among the two levels of management that may 
vary among different companies and may even vary within a 
single company at different times.
Directors are personally liable for their exercise of powers 
and owe a duty of loyalty to the company, not to any particu-
lar shareholder or shareholders, irrespective of who appointed 
them. Consequently, while a director is expected to be account-
able to the shareholders and consider their interests, the indi-
vidual director must put the interest of the company first in the 
event of a conflict of interest, even if that provokes the risk of 
dismissal.
The liability of directors will apply to anyone who effective-
ly (de facto) acts as a director, which may include persons who 
are not formally registered with the Business Authority, e.g. a 
dominant shareholder. This is known in Danish company law 
as shadow-director liability.19 As shareholders are expected 
to engage with the board of directors and may influence them 
directly, shadow-director liability will only arise in extreme 
cases where the shareholder either substitutes the appointed 
directors or directly instructs them to act in a manner that the 
shareholder ought to realise would constitute an abuse. 
The acceptance of shareholder engagement with manage-
ment as ‘active ownership’ should be seen against the back-
ground of the personal liability of directors and the doctrine of 
shadow-director liability given that the corresponding strong 
19. The leading precedent is the judgement in the Satair case by the Danish 
Supreme Court, reported in Danish in Ugeskrift for Retvæsen 1997.364. In 
this case, a parent company was held liable according to the legislative provi-
sion on director liability in respect of its wholly owned subsidiary because the 
parent company had effectively managed the subsidiary.
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position offered to shareholders to determine the governance 
of the company is paired with a matching liability. This is prob-
ably also the reason why Danish company law does not have 
a special regime with respect to groups of companies except to 
the extent necessary to ensure capital maintenance and group 
accounts. There is no special regime in respect of the gov-
ernance of groups in Danish company law because a parent 
company is regarded as any other shareholder with a right to 
influence the governance and a corresponding liability if it acts 
irresponsibly. 
The executive management
The executive management is hired by the board of directors 
and may be fired by them at will. They will usually have an 
employment contract that entitles them to severance pay, etc., 
but their tenure as members of the executive management can 
be immediately terminated irrespective thereof. Only physical 
persons can serve as members of the executive management.20
According to the Companies Act, the executive manage-
ment is in charge of »daily management« and must follow 
the instructions of the board of directors. Extraordinary or 
far-reaching decisions cannot be made by them but must be 
brought before the board of directors unless the matter can-
not be delayed, in which case the board of directors must be 
informed as soon as possible. The Act specifies that the respon-
sibilities include ensuring that bookkeeping is carried out 
according to law and that the finances of the company are 
handled responsibly. Furthermore, the executive management 
20. There is an old exemption to this requirement for companies engaged 
in shipping.
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must also ensure that the funding of the company is responsible 
and adequate and that the necessary liquidity is available so 
the company may honour its obligations. This overlaps with 
the responsibility of the board of directors (see above), but is 
understood as being part of the executive management’s daily 
routines. 
Other than this provision in the Act, there are almost no 
other provisions regarding the executive management, which 
is true also of the cg Code. This is probably because the focus 
is on the board of directors as the upper level of management 
and the cooperation between the two levels of management is 
described in greater detail. This is also because the tasks of an 
executive manager are very closely related to the specific com-
pany and are difficult to generalise. However, some of the legis-
lative provisions applicable to directors are drafted so they also 
apply to executive managers, notably in respect of their duties 
and liabilities, their right to represent and sign on behalf of the 
company, conflicts of interest, and the general clause prohibit-
ing favouring some shareholders or others to the detriment of 
others or the company. Reference to these issues is made in the 
section »The board of directors« above.
The Act mandates that the executive management as a com-
pany organ should consist of one or more members, and tradi-
tionally the executive management is a collective body head-
ed by the ceo (administrerende direktør or adm. direktør). 
It should be noted that the Danish title for executive officer 
used in the Act (direktør) may also be used for any other high-
ranking executive officer of the company even if they are not 
members of the executive company organ. Thus, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between officers who are members of the 
executive management and registered as such by the Business 
Authority and other company officers who may be part of the 
management team headed by the ceo. The main difference is 
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that members of the executive management can only be hired 
by the board of directors, whereas the other executive officers 
are usually hired by the ceo. In is not unusual for the manage-
ment team to include executives from both categories. 
remuneration
According to the Accounting Act, listed companies must dis-
close in their financial accounts the combined remuneration 
and pensions for present and former members of management 
divided on the two boards and disclose any incentive pro-
grammes in operation, including the identity of those persons 
who are covered by the programmes and the principles.
The cg Code recommends a remuneration committee to 
prepare the remuneration policy of the company. It is recom-
mended that the remuneration policy adopted by the board 
disclose in detail the principles and criteria used and that the 
policy should be submitted to the gm for approval. This is sup-
ported by the Act, which makes it mandatory to ensure that 
incentive programmes are in line with guidelines adopted at 
the agm.
As mentioned above, the financial accounts are adopted 
by the agm and the remuneration policy is usually presented 
by the chair of the board. Where share-based remuneration is 
used, the cg Code recommends a revolving programme which 
provides a periodic distribution and applies for at least three 
years after distribution, and that severance payments do not 
exceed the salary for the preceding two years. It is also recom-
mended that the agm be informed of the total remuneration 
paid to each member of the management in respect of both lev-
els of management.
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The auditor 
The auditor of a listed company must be appointed by the gm, 
which is done in the same way as the appointment of directors. 
Like directors, most auditors are appointed for one year and 
thus the appointment or reappointment of the auditor is a typi-
cal item on the agenda. The gm may dismiss the auditor even 
when appointed for a term exceeding one year, but dismissal 
may only take place outside the annual gm if it is supported by 
qualified circumstances, e.g. a failure to perform by the stand-
ards of good behaviour required by law. The subsidiaries of a 
listed company shall, as far as possible, choose the same audi-
tor as its parent.
The auditor is seen as a representative of the public to ensure 
trust in the financial accounts of a company and, although they 
are engaged in a private profession, auditors enjoy a semi-
authoritative position which is secured by the special regula-
tion of auditors in the Auditor Act. The fact that the auditor is 
appointed by the gm signifies that the auditor is its representa-
tive as a controller of the accounts drawn up by the two levels 
of management in unison. In practise, however, the auditor is 
closely related to the management and works with it on a daily 
basis, especially the audit committee, and it is usually the board 
of directors which nominates the auditor for approval by the 
gm. Where the company has one or more dominant sharehold-
ers, their influence over management will usually also extend 
to the choice of auditor and, for this reason, it is a minority 
right to request the appointment of an independent auditor 
to work alongside the gm-appointed auditor if supported by 
shareholders holding more than 10 % of the capital.
Listed companies must publish their annual accounts no 
later than four months after the end of their financial year and 
at least eight days before the gm. However, once approved 
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by the agm, the annual accounts must be submitted without 
undue delay to the Business Authority for publication. Half-
year reports must be published within two months after the end 
of the first six months of the company’s accounting year. Listed 
companies may choose to either publish quarterly reports or a 
financial statement for the same period, however, the cg Code 
recommends quarterly accounts. 
Minority protection
Due to the prevalence of dominant shareholders, Danish 
company law has developed extensive protection of minority 
shareholders. Some additional protection is also afforded by 
the regime on capital maintenance, which prevents dominant 
shareholders from taking private benefits to the detriment 
of the other shareholders or the company, but that regime is 
mostly regarded as protection of creditors necessitated by the 
company’s status as a limited liability company. Thus, minority 
protection is usually associated with the following rights. 
Before the gm, every shareholder, including any shareholder 
holding non-voting shares, has a right to put items on the agen-
da and every shareholder has a right to attend the gm either in 
person or by a proxy, to speak, and to ask questions of manage-
ment. These are known as individual shareholder rights.
Some more intrusive rights are only available for share-
holders who hold a certain share of the capital and are known 
as minority rights, e.g. the right to call an extraordinary gm 
(5 %), to request appointment of an extra auditor (10 %), or to 
require an investigation of the company’s affairs (25 %). Also, 
a majority of shareholders may require the company to take 
legal action against members of its management, and share-
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holders holding more than 10 % may sue in the name of the 
company where a majority is not available.
Every shareholder with a vote, which may include non-vot-
ing shares when they can count as capital in a vote in which 
capital is counted, has a right to participate in the voting at 
the gm either in person, by proxy or by letter. Protection of 
minority shareholders is also afforded by requiring certain, 
more important or onerous decisions to be supported not just 
by votes, but also by capital, and by requiring a majority above 
50 %, e.g. 2/3 of votes and capital, 90 % of votes and capital, 
and 2/3 of the effected class of shares, or even unanimity which 
is required where shareholders are called upon to make addi-
tional contributions. Changes that affect certain individual 
shareholders require their consent due to the principle of equal-
ity. Note, however, that the principle of equality does not apply 
to governance which is determined by the principle of majority, 
as a consequence of which the appointment of directors by the 
gm is subject to majority rule without particular protection of 
minority interests. However, the gm cannot adopt resolutions, 
nor can management make decisions, that unfairly favour cer-
tain shareholders or others to the detriment of other sharehold-
ers or the company. 
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The finnish context  
 of corporate governance 
There are at present approximately 250,000 limited liability 
companies in Finland of which slightly more than 200 are pub-
lic limited liability companies (Source: Finnish Trade Register). 
The Finnish Companies Act (624/2006, as amended) applies 
to both types of companies, but there are certain provisions 
which are limited only to public limited liability companies. 
Only public limited liability companies may have their securi-
ties admitted to public trading in a regulated market. However, 
other than the aforementioned, concrete differences resulting 
* Manne Airaksinen is a partner at Roschier specialising in corporate advi-
sory, public m&a and equity capital markets. He has extensive experience in a 
broad range of corporate issues and has been a key person in the development 
of the Finnish Companies Act. Airaksinen regularly acts for listed companies 
in a high-end, boardroom advisory role. Tom Berglund is professor of Applied 
Microeconomics and Theory of the Firm, Hanken School of Economics, and 
director of the Hanken Centre for Corporate Governance, Helsinki.
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from the Companies Act between a private and a public lim-
ited liability company are rather small. Essentially, the purpose 
of the distinction has been to ease the administrative burden 
of smaller limited liability companies as there are certain eu 
requirements which apply solely to public limited liability 
companies. Securities market regulation naturally results in 
significant additional requirements for the companies that 
issue securities for public trading.
Of all the public limited liability companies in Finland, there 
are currently approximately 125 companies whose shares are 
traded on the main market of Nasdaq Helsinki (also referred 
to as the Helsinki Stock Exchange). In addition, there are a 
few Finnish companies listed on First North Finland which is 
a multilateral trading facility aimed at growth companies. For 
the sake of simplicity, however, the term ‘listed companies’ is 
used in this report generally to refer to the companies listed on 
the main market of Nasdaq Helsinki.
The ownership structure in Finnish listed companies var-
ies. In some companies the ownership structure is decentral-
ised, while other companies have shareholders with signifi-
TABlE B .1 Number of finnish listed companies (30 december 2013).
   Percentage of total 
list Number of companies market capitalisation ( %)
large-cap 26 87
Mid-cap 40 11
small-cap 54 2
Total 120 100
SouRCE: Nasdaq  Nordic.
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cant holdings. Dominant shareholders typically play an active 
ownership role in Finnish listed companies, most importantly 
through board representation. 
Even though there are currently roughly 800,000 retail 
investors in Finland, institutional investors own the majority 
of shares in Finnish listed companies. Most of these institu-
tional investors are foreign. In December 2013, approximately 
35 % of the total market value of listed companies on the main 
fIGuRE B.1 Market value of shares owned by different owner categories as 
a percentage of the total market value of shares listed on the helsinki stock 
exchange. please note that the figure also shows the division of domestic own-
ers into various subcategories while foreign owners are not included in these 
subcategories.
SouRCE: statistics finland.
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market of Nasdaq Helsinki was owned by foreign investors. As 
can be seen in Figure b.1 above, the percentage of the total mar-
ket value of listed shares owned by foreign investors over the 
last twenty years in Finland has largely reflected Nokia Cor-
poration’s dramatic share price development due to Nokia’s 
large size in total market capitalisation. Foreign ownership in 
Nokia peeked around 90 % around the turn of the millennium. 
The proportion of foreign ownership in other companies listed 
on the Helsinki Stock Exchange has been considerably smaller, 
with the largest listed companies having 30 %–60 % foreign 
ownership, and many of the smallest ones a negligible share of 
foreign owners.
The biggest Finnish institutional investors apart from the 
Finnish State are pension insurance companies and investment 
funds. Of these, investment funds investing in listed compa-
nies are often interested mainly in return on investment and 
generally do not actively participate in their target companies’ 
governance. Pension insurance companies, on the other hand, 
take part more actively and are often represented on, for exam-
ple, shareholders’ nomination boards. Their significant role 
as owners is mainly due to their relative size compared to the 
Finnish market. As can be seen in Figure b.1 above, the role 
of domestic institutional ownership has increased substantially 
since the turn of the millennium. 
The Finnish State is a significant owner in Finnish listed 
companies. The State has, however, systematically reduced and 
decentralised its direct and indirect shareholdings in Finnish 
listed companies since 2007. There are currently four listed 
companies in which the holdings of the State exceed the 30 % 
threshold. At the end of 2013, the public sector (State and 
municipalities) owned directly and indirectly approximate-
ly 23 % of the total market capitalisation in Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. The reason for the upward trend visible in Figure 
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b.1 above is mainly the better-than-average stock price perfor-
mance of some of the large holdings by the Finnish state.
As for domestic households, their share of the market value 
of shares listed on the Helsinki Stock Exchange has increased 
from a low of less than 10 % at the turn of the millennium to 
roughly 15 % at the end of 2013. This trend is also visible in the 
number of shares held by Finnish households (Source: Euro-
clear Finland Ltd).
The structure of ownership in listed and other companies 
is in principle fully transparent as all companies must have an 
up-to-date register of their shares and shareholders. Share reg-
isters for all listed companies (and some non-listed) companies 
are maintained by the central securities depository, Euroclear 
Finland Ltd. The share registers of both listed and non-listed 
companies are public, allowing anyone to gain access to own-
ership information. Registers maintained by Euroclear Finland 
are not available online, but need to be separately acquired 
from Euroclear Finland. The information available in the share 
registers does not include information concerning the ben-
eficial owners of nominee-registered shares. As approximately 
TABlE B .2 importance of stock market in relation to total country economy 
(January 2014).
  Annual    Market Market 
 turnover  GDP Turnover/ capitalisation capitalisation/ 
 (bEuR) (bEuR) GDP ( %) (bEuR) GDP ( %)
2013 95.3 193.4 49 162.2 84
2012 98.7 192.4 51 127.0 66
SouRCE: Nasdaq report »Total equity Trading, January 2014«.
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40 % of the total share ownership in Finland is nominee-reg-
istered, the information concerning ownership structures in 
listed companies is not fully transparent in practice.
Takeover activity has been relatively low on the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange during the most recent years. In 2010, Helsin-
ki Stock Exchange experienced two takeovers, followed by one 
in 2011, three in 2012, and one in 2013 based on information 
from Nasdaq Nordic. Over the same period of time, there have 
been altogether nine new listings in Finland with one in 2010, 
three in 2012 (one of which on First North Finland), and five in 
2013 (one of which on First North Finland) (Source: Nasdaq 
Nordic).
The regulatory framework 
The fundamental elements of corporate governance in Finn-
ish companies are regulated by the Companies Act. The 
Companies Act regulates the relationship between the board 
of directors, managing director and shareholders, as well as 
their respective rights and obligations, and strongly empha-
sises the importance of general principles including equal 
treatment of shareholders. The duties of the company and the 
board towards the market in listed companies are, in addition 
to the Companies Act, regulated by the Securities Market Act 
(746/2012, as amended) and relevant eu legislation. 
The articles of association of a limited liability company are 
binding and can, within certain legal limits, be freely negoti-
ated between the shareholders. Amending the articles of asso-
ciation is subject to a decision by a qualified majority of the 
general meeting of the company, but stricter requirements 
may apply if the amendment, for example, affects the rights 
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of minority shareholders. The legal minimum requirements for 
the content of the articles of association are few, but in practice 
the articles of association in Finnish companies include certain, 
usually fairly standard provisions regarding, for instance, the 
purpose of the company, election of directors, representation 
rights and annual general meetings.
 Further rules and regulations relating to corporate gov-
ernance (in a more narrow sense) in Finnish listed companies 
are issued by the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (the 
»ffsa«) and the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The ffsa issues 
binding rules and regulations and supervises the Finnish secu-
rities market. The rules of the Helsinki Stock Exchange apply 
to all companies that are listed, or are applying to be listed, on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The most important governance-
related self-regulation consists of the Finnish Corporate Gov-
ernance Code (the »Code«) issued by the Board of the Finnish 
Securities Market Association and governed by the Helsinki 
Stock Exchange. The latest edition of the Code was approved 
in June 2010. The revised Helsinki Takeover Code entered into 
force in January 2014.
The Code’s recommendations are not mandatory. If public 
companies do not comply with the Code they should, however, 
explain the reasons for not doing so (the ‘comply-or-explain’ 
principle). The Finnish Securities Market Association has pub-
lished application guidelines regarding sufficient reasons for 
deviation from the Code. 
The Code harmonises the practices of listed companies and 
information given to shareholders and other investors, and 
improves transparency. Compliance with the Code among 
Finnish listed companies can be considered high – the average 
number of notified deviations from the Code was less than one 
per listed company in 2013 (altogether the Code includes 55 
recommendations). Small-cap listed companies notify devia-
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tions the most. The Code applies only to listed companies, but 
in practice it has also been applied by a number of larger pri-
vate companies.
Enforcement of the regulations governing listed companies 
is carried out by the ffsa (administrative sanctions) or through 
the disciplinary procedures of the Helsinki Stock Exchange (for 
example disciplinary fines, warnings and delisting). In addition 
to market control, the enforcement of corporate law is carried 
out by individual shareholders, the companies themselves or 
third parties, through court proceedings or arbitration.
Basic structure of  
 the governance system
Under the Companies Act, the governing bodies of a Finnish 
limited liability company are the shareholders’ general meet-
ing and the board of directors and, if appointed, the managing 
director (also referred to as the »ceo«) and the supervisory 
board. It should be noted that it is always at the discretion of a 
company whether a managing director is elected. 
The general meeting is the highest corporate body in the 
hierarchy. The decisions allocated to the board typically 
include the election and dismissal of the company’s board of 
directors, decisions concerning the equity structure of the com-
pany and decisions concerning the distribution of profits, as 
well as adopting amendments to the articles of association of 
the company. Obtaining shareholders’ approval is in practice 
sometimes used as a way for the board of directors to diminish 
their potential liability towards the shareholders even in deci-
sions which would otherwise fall within the general compe-
tence of the board of directors.
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The board of directors is a mandatory corporate body elect-
ed by the general meeting of shareholders (or by the superviso-
ry board, whose position is described below, if so designated in 
the company’s articles of association). A minority of directors 
may also be elected by a third party if the articles of association 
of the company allow this. There is no mandatory employee 
participation in Finland. The board is responsible for the man-
agement and proper organisation of the company’s operations 
and has a central role in determining the strategy of the com-
pany and, among other things, how corporate governance is 
implemented in a company. The chair of the board does not 
have more extensive powers than the other directors but, in 
practice, the chair’s role is usually significant.
The supervisory board is a voluntary corporate body and 
will only be elected if required by the articles of association 
of the company. If elected, the duty of the supervisory board 
is to oversee the governance practices of the company. It does 
not have a right to represent the company. In practice, very 
few companies have supervisory boards, and their popular-
ity in listed companies has further declined in recent years. 
Thus, even though the Companies Act recognises the role of 
the supervisory board (and the so-called two-tier governance 
model), limited liability companies in Finland typically use the 
one-tier model which includes the general meeting, the board 
of directors and the managing director as the company’s deci-
sion-making bodies. 
The board often delegates responsibility for the prepara-
tion of certain matters, for example, to special committees set 
up by the board, most often audit, remuneration and nomi-
nation committees or the company’s executive management, 
but in general the liability for the decisions within the man-
date of the board remains with the whole board even if some 
tasks have been delegated. The directors thus have the ultimate 
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responsibility for the management of the company and are pri-
marily accountable to the shareholders.
A managing director is responsible for the day-to-day man-
agement of the company and for supervising the accounting 
and financial matters of the company. The managing director 
is responsible for the executive management of the company 
in accordance with the instructions and orders given by the 
board. Further, he or she must take the measures required to 
ensure that the company’s accounts are maintained in accord-
ance with the law and that the management of funds is con-
ducted in a reliable manner. The managing director is in a key 
position in providing the board with the necessary information 
for the performance of their duties. The board may, in specific 
cases or as prescribed in the articles of association of the com-
pany, also resolve matters that normally fall within the scope of 
the duties of the managing director. 
The duty to represent the company externally falls pri-
marily on the board and the managing director. The board of 
directors collectively has the general authority to represent the 
company. The articles of association of a company usually pro-
vide that individual directors or the managing director have the 
right to represent the company either alone or together with 
another director or that the board may grant general represen-
tation rights to individual persons.
As in many other countries the relations between the share-
holders and the board of directors has been extensively dis-
cussed in Finland. In this debate, the corporate governance 
movement has sought to emphasise transparency and to enable 
shareholders to fairly evaluate the work of the directors. 
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General meeting
The shareholders use their right to decide upon company mat-
ters at the general meetings to the extent such matters are with-
in their competence in accordance with the Companies Act and 
the articles of association. All other matters are the responsibil-
ity of the board or the managing director. The board may, how-
ever, raise a matter that is within its or the managing director’s 
general competence to be decided upon at the general meeting 
in a particular situation.
In practice large shareholders play a significant role in 
the decision-making of most listed companies. In most listed 
companies there are certain dominant shareholders who are 
able to steer the decision making by communicating with the 
company’s directors and with each other prior to the general 
meetings. As a counterbalance, and in order to facilitate invest-
ments in the companies, the Companies Act is to a large extent 
aimed at protecting minority shareholders. The current Act, 
however, seeks to find a balance between protecting minority 
shareholders and guaranteeing requisite flexibility for the com-
panies to operate efficiently. 
Convening the meeting and participation
The board convenes the general meeting. All companies must 
hold an annual general meeting (agm) within six months of the 
end of each financial period. Extraordinary general meetings 
are convened when the board so decides or when the auditor 
of the company or a minority of at least 10 % of the sharehold-
ers demand that a meeting be held. The Companies Act and 
the Securities Market Act require that relevant documentation 
relating to the agm and the annual and interim reports of the 
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company are kept available on the company’s website prior to 
the meeting. 
Pursuant to the Companies Act, directors of the board, 
members of the supervisory board and the managing director 
have the right to be present at a general meeting unless the gen-
eral meeting decides otherwise in an individual case. In prac-
tice, the presence of directors as well as the managing direc-
tor is necessary in order to guarantee the shareholders’ right to 
ask questions and overall interaction between the shareholders 
and the directors as well as the executive management. Fur-
ther, the Code recommends that a person nominated for the 
first time as a director should participate in the general meeting 
that decides on his or her election unless there are well-founded 
reasons for the absence. The general meeting may also permit 
other persons to participate in the meeting – at least the larger 
listed companies usually allow, for instance, the media to be 
present in the meetings. 
Decision making and voting rights
As referred to above, the decisions of a general meeting are 
made by a simple majority or a qualified majority in accord-
ance with the Companies Act and the articles of association. 
Majority requirements may not be eased in the articles of asso-
ciation with the exception of elections. In practice the articles of 
association of listed companies seldom include majority provi-
sions deviating from the Companies Act. In some instances, the 
Companies Act imposes more demanding qualified-majority 
requirements. For instance, a decision on the amendment of the 
articles of association to the effect that share classes are com-
bined or the rights of an entire share class are reduced in other 
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respects. Certain changes to the rights of shareholders require 
consent from all shareholders whose rights are affected. 
All shares carry equal rights in a company (one vote per 
share at the general meeting) unless otherwise provided in the 
articles of association. In practice, most listed companies fol-
low the one-share, one-vote principle, but some companies 
(especially those with concentrated ownership) have more 
than one share class with different share classes carrying dif-
ferent voting rights. It is also possible for different share classes 
to carry different financial rights (usually the right to receive 
dividends), but these rarely exist in listed companies. In many 
companies both or all share classes are listed, but there are also 
companies where not all classes are listed. Some companies 
have voting caps, i.e., limitations in their articles of association 
concerning the maximum share of votes any shareholder can 
have in a general meeting.
In practice, voting in general meetings is unusual. Share-
holders may want to record their opinion in the minutes rather 
than require a vote where the outcome is evident in advance. 
Decisions reserved for shareholders
Under the Companies Act, certain decisions must be made by 
the shareholders and are therefore excluded from the gener-
al competence of the board. The agm decides, among other 
things, on the adoption of the financial statements, the use of 
the profit shown on the balance sheet and the discharge from 
liability for the directors and the managing director, amend-
ments to the articles of association or dividend distribution, 
mergers and demergers, or entering into liquidation. Addition-
ally, certain other decisions such as share issuance and acqui-
sition of own shares are made by the general meeting, or the 
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general meeting may authorise the board to make the decision. 
All in all, the decisions reserved for shareholders can be seen 
as fundamental for the company and/or directly affecting the 
equity structure of the company. 
Proxy voting
Proxy voting is commonly used in Finland by foreign share-
holders. Such participation has increased since 2008 when the 
market reached a consensus regarding eased proxy require-
ments.
The role of international proxy advisors giving their views 
on matters raised at general meetings has become more visible 
in recent years. Currently, the voting practices of proxy advi-
sors do not generally cause problems in Finnish companies’ 
general meetings. On the other hand, the established policies 
issued by major proxy advisors such as Institutional Share-
holder Services (iss) have also to some extent acknowledged 
Finnish listed companies’ governance practice.
There are no proxy solicitation regulations in Finland that 
would directly correspond to the rules issued, for example, by 
the Sec. It is generally held that the board should not engage in 
soliciting proxies using the company’s funds if the proxy would 
be the board itself or a party related to the board. Proxy solici-
tation is not a common practice in Finland, but there are some 
recent examples in companies with a large foreign shareholder 
base where the board has engaged proxy solicitors abroad. 
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The board of directors
Duties and responsibilities of the board
All directors of the board are subject to the same duties and 
the board makes decisions as a collective. The main responsi-
bility of the board is the governance and seeing to the proper 
arrangements of the operations of the company as well as the 
supervision of the company’s accounting and financial matters. 
The actual content of the board’s duties is defined by the com-
pany’s operations and circumstances in which it operates. In 
practice, the duties of the board are essentially to define the 
company’s strategy and to make decisions in matters that do 
not fall within the scope of the day-to-day management of 
the company, such as acquisitions, significant agreements and 
major financing arrangements. 
The fiduciary duties of a director include a duty of care and 
a duty of loyalty, requiring the directors to act in the best inter-
est of the company. The board is also obliged to treat all share-
holders equally and act as agent of all, not just some, share-
holders in the governance of the company. A director may not, 
for example, disclose any information concerning the affairs 
of the company and obtained in his or her role as a director 
to the shareholders who »nominated« them or to other inter-
est groups, unless given a permission to do so by the board or 
unless the information is disclosed to all shareholders on an 
equal basis.
The board should ensure that the company’s organisation is 
structured in such manner that accounting and financial man-
agement are subject to satisfactory monitoring and control 
so that the board can constantly fulfil its duty to keep itself 
informed of the company’s financial position.
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Appointment and removal of directors
The general meeting appoints the directors of the board by 
election unless the articles of association provide otherwise. 
According to the Code, the articles of association may provide 
that the supervisory board elects the directors or that a minori-
ty of the directors is appointed by another procedure, but these 
alternatives require an explanation. As election of directors is 
one of the most important decisions of the general meeting, it 
is important that the shareholders have been informed of the 
candidates well in advance of the meeting. The Code therefore 
recommends that a proposal by any nomination committee for 
board composition should be included in the notice of a gener-
al meeting. The same applies to a proposal for the composition 
of the board made by shareholders with at least 10 % of the 
votes carried by the company shares, if such proposal is dis-
closed to the board in sufficient time to include it in the notice. 
Candidates proposed later by shareholders with at least 10 % 
of the votes should be disclosed separately.
According to the Code, the directors should be elected for a 
term of one year. This provides the shareholders with a possi-
bility to evaluate the performance of the directors on a regular 
basis. The Code further states that it is not necessary to limit 
the number of director’s successive terms of office as the share-
holders decide on their election and re-election. 
Directors of the board can be dismissed ahead of term by 
the corporate body which appointed them (usually the general 
meeting). 
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Size of the board
According to the Code, the number of directors and the com-
position of the board should make it possible for the board to 
carry out its duties in an efficient manner. The Companies Act 
does not limit the maximum number of directors to be set in the 
articles of association. The number of directors may thus be 
adjusted based on the circumstances of each company.
Composition of the board 
According to the Code, the composition of the board should 
take into account the requirements of the company’s opera-
tions and the development stage of the company. A person to 
be elected to the board must possess the qualifications required 
by his or her duties and the possibility to devote a sufficient 
amount of time to the work. All directors must be natural per-
sons.
Based on statistics compiled by the Finland Chamber of 
Commerce, it is not very common in Finland for one person 
to hold multiple board positions simultaneously (see Figure 
b.2). Further, the same survey did not find crossing supervi-
TABlE B .3 average size of the board in finnish listed companies (2013).
year large-cap Mid-cap Small-cap
2013 7.7 6.9 5.1
2012 7.7 6.8 5.6
SouRCE: The finland chamber of commerce.
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sory relations between directors and managing directors in 
Finnish listed companies (i.e. situations in which, for example, 
the managing directors of different companies would sit on the 
boards of each other’s respective companies and thus supervise 
each other).
Employee representatives
Employees’ participation rights in the administration of Finn-
ish companies are governed by a separate act. The act applies 
to companies employing more than 150 employees and com-
panies subject to the act are free to agree with their employees 
on the manner of representation. If the company elects not to 
fIGuRE B.2 Number of board positions held by one person in finnish listed 
companies (2013).
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enter into a specific agreement, the employees have a statu-
tory right to appoint representatives to the board of directors, 
supervisory board or management group of the company. The 
employees thus have no direct statutory right to appoint repre-
sentatives to the board of directors. However, it is allowed as a 
way to arrange employee representation. In the relatively few 
listed companies which have opted to arrange employee repre-
sentation via the board of directors, there is some variation in 
whether the employee representatives have full voting rights 
or participate as observers. Apart from employee representa-
tion in administrative bodies, Finnish companies have a legal 
obligation to consult their employees on various matters, espe-
cially in relation to major changes in the company. 
Independence of directors 
The Code states that a majority of directors should be inde-
pendent of the company and, additionally, that at least two of 
the directors representing this majority should be independent 
of significant shareholders of the company as well. A signifi-
cant shareholder is someone holding more than 10 % of the 
shares. An independent director is recognised in the Code as 
someone who, among other things, does not have (and has 
recently not had) an employment relationship or service con-
tract with the company and is free from any other relationships 
that could interfere with his or her independence. The boards 
of listed companies generally consist exclusively of non-execu-
tive directors, with the exception of the managing director who 
is appointed to the board in some listed companies. In 2013, 
nearly all of the deviations from the Code concerning require-
ments on the independence of directors were notified by small-
cap companies.
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Managing director on the board 
In 2013, 15 % of listed companies had their managing director 
appointed to the company’s board. This arrangement is most 
common in small-cap listed companies. If the managing direc-
tor is appointed to the board of his company, the Code requires 
that the managing director should not be elected as the chair of 
the board. 
With respect to managing directors serving in the boards of 
other listed companies, it may be noted that 23 % of large-cap 
managing directors were appointed to the board of another 
listed company. Managing directors of large-cap companies 
are generally viewed as possessing a great deal of relevant expe-
rience and skills from the perspective of other listed companies 
as well.
Gender balance
The Code states that both genders should be represented on 
the board. The Finland Chamber of Commerce has found, 
however, that an exception concerning the gender composi-
tion of boards is among the most common deviations made 
by listed companies. In 2013, all deviations from this recom-
TABlE B .4 proportion of ceos as directors in finnish listed companies (2013).
Director large-cap Mid-cap Small-cap
ceo on the board of its own company 15 % 8 % 20 %
ceo on the board of another company 52 % 14 % 15 %
SouRCE: The finland chamber of commerce.
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mendation were notified by small-cap companies. Overall, the 
women’s share of all board positions was 23 %, and 86 % of all 
listed companies had women as directors (Source: The Finland 
Chamber of Commerce).
working procedures 
According to the Code, the board shall draw up a written char-
ter for its work and disclose its essential contents. The charter is 
one way for the shareholders to evaluate the performance and 
organisation of the board. The board is fairly free to decide on 
appropriate working methods to correspond to the unique cir-
cumstances of the company. Further, neither the Companies Act 
nor the Code state how often the board should meet and, thus, 
the frequency depends on the operations of the company, its 
growth stage and other relevant circumstances. Based on cor-
porate governance statements published in the spring of 2013, 
the average number of board meetings held in listed companies 
was approximately 14 (ranging from minimum 7 to maximum 
49 meetings). The frequency varies significantly among compa-
nies due to which the average number presented here is likely 
TABlE B .5 average number of board meetings in finnish listed companies 
(2013).
year large-cap Mid-cap Small-cap
2013 12 13 15
2012 12 13 15
SouRCE: The finland chamber of commerce.
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somewhat higher than the median number of meetings would 
be. Exceptionally high meeting frequencies are usually associ-
ated with major transactions, crisis situations or other excep-
tional circumstances in the business of the company.
The average attendance of directors in Finnish listed com-
panies can be considered high (95 %) (Source: The Finland 
Chamber of Commerce). There is no notable variation between 
companies of different sizes in this regard. It is a fairly common 
practice to hold some of the meetings as wholly or partially 
remote sessions (via teleconferences, for instance).
Decision making
In order to make decisions, all directors must have been giv-
en the opportunity to participate and the board must form a 
quorum. The board has a quorum when more than half of the 
directors are present, unless a larger proportion is required in 
the articles of association of a company. The opinion of the 
majority constitutes the decision of the board, unless a quali-
fied majority is required in the articles of association. In the 
event of a tie, the chair of the board has the casting vote.
Board committees
Board committees are not regulated by law but, according to 
the Code, the effective discharge of the board’s duties may 
require that board committees be established for specific tasks. 
The purpose of committees is to assist the board by prepar-
ing matters belonging to the competence of the board. They 
have no autonomous decision-making power. Therefore, the 
board should make the decisions prepared in committees col-
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lectively. The board also remains responsible for the duties 
assigned to the committees. The importance of delegating the 
board’s duties and day-to-day administration to the commit-
tees is emphasized in large companies with extensive business 
operations. 
According to the Code, the board should confirm the cen-
tral duties and operating principles of a committee in a written 
charter and the essential contents of the charter should be dis-
closed to the shareholders. Committees should regularly report 
on their work to the board including at least a summary of the 
matters addressed and the measures taken by the committee. 
The company may internally determine the reporting details 
and schedule. The company should keep track of the number 
of committee meetings held during the financial period and the 
attendance of committee members at the meetings in order to 
report said information to the shareholders. Reporting allows 
the shareholders to evaluate how active the committee has 
been and consequently also the efficiency of board work. 
The Code addresses the roles of the audit, nomination and 
remuneration committees, but other committees may also be 
established where necessary. When a board committee is estab-
lished, its members are elected from among the directors. The 
Code includes certain requirements concerning the independ-
ence of committee members and recommends that the compa-
ny disclose the composition of committees to the shareholders.
Audit Committee
The Code states that, if the extent of the company’s business so 
requires, an audit committee of at least three members should 
be established. The audit committee has better possibilities 
than the board as a whole to review questions pertaining to 
company finances and control and manage contacts with the 
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auditors and the internal-audit function. Additionally, the 
appointment of a committee may improve communication 
and information exchange between the board and the financial 
executive management as well as between the board and the 
auditors. 
All members of the audit committee should have sufficient 
knowledge of accounting practices and preparation of finan-
cial statements. The members should be independent of the 
company and, additionally, at least one member of the com-
mittee should be independent of significant shareholders. Fur-
ther, at least one member should have expertise specifically in 
accounting or auditing. 
The committee’s duties are, for instance, to review ques-
tions connected with the financial administration and control 
of the company, ensure that contacts are maintained with the 
auditors and ensure that internal audits are carried out. In 
practice all larger listed companies have an audit committee.
Nomination Committee
The board may improve the efficiency of the preparation of 
proposals for the election of directors by establishing a nomi-
nation committee. The establishment of a nomination com-
mittee promotes the transparency and systematic function of 
the election process. According to the Code, the duties of the 
nomination committee may include, for instance, the prepara-
tion of a proposal for the appointment of directors, looking 
for prospective new candidates as well as the preparation of a 
proposal on the remuneration of directors. 
According to the Code, the nomination committee should 
consist of directors. However, it is further stated that it may be 
in the interest of the company and all its shareholders that the 
nomination committee is aware of the opinion of major share-
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holders regarding the planned appointments. In case the gen-
eral meeting has established a separate nomination committee 
consisting of shareholders or representatives of shareholders in 
order to prepare proposals concerning the election and remu-
neration of directors, the company should disclose the election 
process, composition and operations of the nomination board. 
In recent years such nomination boards have become 
increasingly popular in Finnish listed companies. Sharehold-
ers’ nomination boards are in use in practically all companies 
in which the Finnish State has a significant holding.
Remuneration Committee
The board may establish a remuneration committee to improve 
the efficient preparation of matters pertaining to the appoint-
ment and remuneration of the managing director and other 
executives of the company as well as the remuneration schemes 
of the personnel. The main function of the remuneration com-
mittee is thus to prepare and establish appropriate incentives 
and remuneration schemes that are in the company’s best inter-
ests considering its business operations and strategy. Addition-
ally, the committee should actively evaluate the remuneration 
schemes. 
According to the Code, the majority of the members of the 
remuneration committee should be independent from the com-
pany. Further, the managing director or other executives of the 
company should not be appointed to the remuneration com-
mittee.
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Conflicts of interest
Under the Companies Act, a director is disqualified from 
the consideration of a matter relating to a contract (or other 
legal act such as litigation) between himself and the company 
or between the company and a third party if the director is to 
derive an essential benefit in the matter and that benefit may 
be contrary to the interests of the company. The provisions 
regarding disqualification in the Companies Act are applied 
only if the director is expected to personally benefit from the 
decision. 
It is considered good governance and directors routinely 
abstain from decision making in situations where a director 
is not directly disqualified under the Companies Act, but the 
circumstances could in practice limit his or her possibilities to 
consider the matter free from outside influences.
Board evaluation
Under the Code, the board shall conduct an annual evalua-
tion of its operations and working methods. The evaluation 
may be done as internal self-evaluation or by using an exter-
nal evaluator. Although the Code does not require companies 
to disclose the evaluation results, many companies share some 
information on the topic. However, the descriptions typically 
entail more details about the evaluation processes than actual 
conclusions of the results. 
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The role of chair of the board
The chair of the board is elected by the board unless it has been 
otherwise decided when the board is appointed or it is oth-
erwise provided in the articles of association. In practice it is 
quite common to elect the chair at the annual general meeting. 
According to the Code, the managing director should not be 
elected chair of the board and there should be a clear division 
of responsibilities between the two roles. This recommenda-
tion is well followed in practice. 
The chair has a central role on the board. He or she is 
responsible for arranging the requisite number of meetings. 
The chair often acts as the managing director’s superior and 
usually is the first contact on the board for the managing direc-
tor.
Managing director and other executives 
Appointment and removal 
The board may appoint a managing director for the day-to-day 
management of the company and its business. All listed compa-
nies in Finland have a managing director. The directors super-
vise the performance of the managing director and, if needed, 
they also have the authority to discharge him or her at any time 
solely based on loss of confidence by the board. The managing 
director is not considered an employee of the company.
The Code recommends that the terms and conditions of the 
managing director’s service relationship should be specified in 
writing in a separate agreement approved by the board in order 
to ensure transparency and enable external control. All finan-
cial benefits included in the agreement should be disclosed to 
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the shareholders. The company should also disclose the bio-
graphical details and, for example, information on the hold-
ings of the managing director. 
Duties and responsibilities
The managing director has a significant role with regard to 
the operations and success of the company. He or she typi-
cally has, and should have, the most up-to-date and extensive 
view on the condition of the company. The managing direc-
tor is responsible for the business operations of the company 
and, in practice, is also responsible for preparation and pres-
entation of the matters which fall within the competence of 
the board by, for example, negotiating corporate transactions, 
major investments and important agreements based on board 
authorisation. Thus, the managing director acts as a crucial 
link between the board and the rest of the company, also pro-
viding the board with the necessary information required by 
the board to fulfil its duties. 
The independent decision-making competence of the man-
aging director in managing the company’s day-to-day opera-
tions is determined based on the scope and nature of the com-
pany’s business as well as the company’s established practise. In 
general, decisions which are unusual or of strategic importance 
for the company, taking into account, for example, the nature 
or value of the transaction, should be taken by the board of 
directors. The board often defines the managing director’s 
decision-making powers in more detail in a separate document 
or in the board charter.
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Minority protection
One of the most important principles in Finnish company law 
is the equal treatment of shareholders, which must be observed 
in all decision making. The general meeting, board and manag-
ing director do not have the right to make decisions that could 
give undue benefit to a shareholder or another person at the 
expense of the company or another shareholder. Shareholders 
do, however, have the right to advance their own interests in 
the general meeting and the rules regarding disqualification of 
a shareholder at a general meeting are very limited in scope. 
In addition to voting at a general meeting, each individual 
shareholder has the right to propose items for the agenda of the 
general meeting falling within the competence of the general 
meeting. At general meetings every shareholder has the right to 
ask questions and to table proposals relating to the matters on 
the agenda of the meeting. Further, minority shareholders rep-
resenting at least 10 % of the total number of shares can also 
demand an extraordinary general meeting be held to address a 
specific issue and demand a special audit of the administration 
and accounts of the company as well as demand that 50 % of 
the profit of the latest financial year be distributed as dividend 
(minority dividend). 
Shareholders have the right to challenge decisions made 
at the general meeting in case of a procedural error or if the 
decision itself is contrary to law. Shareholders can also bring a 
claim for damages on behalf of the company under certain con-
ditions. In essence, the rights attached to an individual share-
holder’s shares can usually not be reduced without the share-
holder’s consent.
The proxy-voting guidelines issued by the iss include spe-
cific recommendations regarding board independence for com-
panies with a controlling shareholder. The voting recommen-
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dations of the iss are in practice often recognised and observed 
in Finnish companies.
The statutory auditor 
The financial statements of all listed companies must be audit-
ed by a qualified auditor. The auditor can be an individual or 
an auditing firm. In practice, the statutory auditors of listed 
companies are auditing firms that name a principal auditor. 
In essence, the duty of the statutory auditor is to ensure that 
the financial information disclosed by the company is reliable 
(especially the financial statements). There has been some dis-
cussion in Finland regarding the position of the statutory audi-
tor and its role towards different stakeholders. Traditionally, 
the statutory auditor has been perceived as a representative of 
the shareholders. However, the current discussion emphasises 
that the statutory auditor should, within the scope of its duties, 
guarantee the appropriate management of a company also in 
relation to the creditors, employees and the state.
The appointment of auditors takes place at the general 
meeting by a simple majority of shareholders. The proposal is 
usually prepared by the audit committee. If several auditors are 
to be appointed, it may be provided in the articles of associa-
tion that an auditor or some of the auditors, but not all, shall be 
appointed in accordance with some other procedure. Pursuant 
to the Finnish Auditing Act (459/2007), the total duration of 
consecutive appointments of an auditor shall not exceed seven 
years in public companies. After reaching the maximum length 
of consecutive appointments, the auditor cannot be involved 
in the audit of the company for two years. If an audit firm has 
been appointed, these restrictions apply only to the individual 
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auditor with principal responsibility for the engagement. These 
rules aim at ensuring the independence of auditors.
Under the Code, the proposal concerning the auditor by the 
audit committee or board should be included in the notice of 
the general meeting. The same applies to a proposal made by 
shareholders with at least 10 % of the votes carried by the com-
pany shares. Candidates proposed later in corresponding order 
should be disclosed separately. 
Pursuant to the Auditing Act, the auditor shall audit the 
accounting records for the financial period, the financial state-
ments and the administration of a company. If a company is a 
parent company in a group, the audit shall also cover the con-
solidated accounts. 
internal control and risk management
Under the Companies Act, the directors are responsible for 
supervising the management and proper organisation of 
the operations of the company and ensuring the appropriate 
arrangement of the control of the company’s accounts and 
finances. The Code further requires that the directors ensure 
that the company has defined the operating principles of inter-
nal control procedures and monitors the effectiveness of such 
control. Additionally, listed companies should describe the cri-
teria according to which risk management is organised within 
the company and the manner in which the internal-audit func-
tion of the company is organised.
The managing director is primarily responsible for ensuring 
that the accounts of the company comply with the law, where-
as the directors are responsible for overseeing the managing 
director’s actions.
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As explained above, many listed companies have estab-
lished audit committees that, among other things, monitor the 
efficiency of the company’s risk-management systems. In addi-
tion, some listed companies, especially those in the financial 
sector, have established specific compliance and risk-manage-
ment functions in their organisation. 
remuneration 
The Code recognises that appropriate and competitive remu-
neration is an essential tool for recruiting the best possible 
management for the company. Another aim of remuneration is 
to increase the commitment of the board, the managing direc-
tor and other executives to pro mote the interests of the compa-
ny and its shareholders. The level of directors’ remuneration in 
Finnish listed companies, including financial institutions, has 
been quite moderate regardless of some public criticism.
The general meeting decides the remuneration payable to 
the directors. Directors who are shareholders can participate 
in the decision-making regarding remuneration. However, 
according to standard practice, the remuneration is decided on 
before the election of directors. The board, on the other hand, 
decides the remuneration of the managing director, as well as 
other compensation payable to him or her. As stated above, a 
remuneration committee consisting of non-executive directors 
may be established to prepare and supervise the appointment 
of, and compensation for, the managing director and other 
executives.
According to the Code, the company must publish on its 
website a remuneration statement containing a comprehensive 
description of remuneration within the company. The remu-
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neration statement must contain information on the finan-
cial benefits of the board, managing director and supervisory 
board as well as information on the decision-making process 
and main remuneration principles. In general, remuneration 
schemes should be drawn up in a way which promotes the 
competitiveness and long-term financial success of the compa-
ny. Remuneration schemes should also contribute to the devel-
opment of shareholder value. Furthermore, remuneration 
schemes should be based on predetermined and measureable 
criteria relating to performance and result. 
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The context
In Norway, there are at present (January 2014) 252,455 lim-
ited liability companies, of which 251 are public companies. 
As of 31 December 2013, there were 218 Norwegian 
companies the shares of which were traded on a Norwegian 
regulated market place (the Oslo Stock Exchange and Oslo 
Axess). Of these companies, 186 companies were quoted on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange and 32 on the Oslo Axess. Including 
the number of companies which are quoted on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange, there are 15 Norwegian savings banks with equity 
instruments quoted on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
Only public limited companies may list their shares on a 
* Gudmund Knudsen is a partner of Advokatfirmaet ba-hr da , Law Firm, 
Oslo. Harald Norvik is a business professional with a long career as ceo, 
board director and chair in major listed Norwegian companies, co-founder 
and board member of the Norwegian Institute of Directors.
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Norwegian regulated market place. Such companies, which 
are the subject of this report, are hereinafter referred to as »list-
ed companies«. The aggregate market capitalisation of these 
listed companies as of 31 December 2013 was approximately 
nok 1,968 billion. Almost 70 % of this value was attributable 
to 17 companies, of which Statoil asa was by far the largest 
with a market capitalisation of approximately nok 469 bil-
lion.
The Norwegian Government (the »Government«) is the 
single largest investor, holding approximately 35 % of the 
aggregate market capitalisation of listed companies. The Gov-
ernment’s ownership of listed shares is distributed among the 
8 companies, Statoil asa, Telenor asa, dnb asa, Yara Inter-
national asa, Norsk Hydro asa, Kongsberg Gruppen asa, 
Cermaq asa and sas ab, of which 5 (Statoil asa, Telenor asa, 
dnb asa, Yara International asa and Norsk Hydro asa) are 
among the 8 largest companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange). 
Having an ownership share between 34 % (in dnb asa) and 
67 % (in Statoil asa), the Government is a dominant share-
holder in all of the aforementioned companies. The main pur-
pose of the Government’s ownership in listed companies is to 
maximise the value of its shares and to contribute to the sound 
and profitable development of the companies. In addition, the 
Government may also want to maintain the companies’ head 
office in Norway as a motive for the ownership. 
A number of the other large listed companies have a single, 
private, major shareholder, such as Orkla asa, Marine Har-
vest asa, Aker Solutions asa and Fred. Olsen Energy asa.
Foreign investors (investors not domiciled in Norway) hold 
approximately 37 % of the aggregate market capitalisation, 
with other Norwegian investors (funds, companies, individu-
als) having the remaining holdings. 
Individuals’ holdings in listed companies are low and 
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account for less than 4 % of the companies’ market capitali-
sation. Also, historically, individual ownership has been very 
low. There is no obvious explanation why this is the case other 
than a lack of tradition for individuals to invest directly in listed 
companies. Rather, they would typically invest in funds which, 
in turn, make investments in listed (and other) companies. 
The private, large shareholders typically play an active own-
ership role, including taking seats on the board. The Govern-
ment has as a somewhat different policy of not being directly 
represented on the board of companies in which it has a signifi-
cant ownership stake. Rather, the Government will typically 
be represented in the nomination committee for the board. In 
recent years, the Government has also exercised an increasing-
ly active ownership policy by publicly setting defined expect-
ations for companies with particular focus on, among other 
things, corporate governance, corporate social responsibility 
including anti-corruption, and remuneration of senior execu-
tives. The Ministry of Trade and Fisheries gives an account of 
the Government’s ownership in a report to the Norwegian Par-
liament (»the ownership report«), which is published at multi-
year intervals. In this report, the Ministry, among other things, 
presents the Government’s expectations to the companies. 
The structure of ownership in listed companies is, as a main 
rule, fully transparent. All listed companies must maintain a 
register of shareholders in a licensed securities registry, the only 
one being the Norwegian Central Securities Depository (Verdi-
papirsentralen). The register is public in the sense that anyone 
can, upon request to the company, obtain access to informa-
tion regarding the ownership of listed companies.
The market for both listing new companies and takeovers 
of already listed companies has traditionally been very active in 
Norway. For example, in 2013 there were 12 new listings and, 
from 2007 to 2013, there was an aggregate of 121 new listings. 
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During these periods, there were 35 takeover offers in 2013 
and a total of 183 takeover offers from 2007 to 2013. It should 
be noted that, with respect to takeover offers, the same compa-
ny could be counted more than one time in the previous figures 
if, during this period, it was subject to both a voluntary offer 
and a subsequent mandatory offer or squeeze-out. Despite the 
active market for takeovers, it is generally unlikely that many 
of the large-cap companies will be subject to takeover offers in 
the near future, partly due to the significant holding of the Gov-
ernment in many of these companies and partly due to other 
major shareholders with a long-term investment horizon.
The regulatory framework
law and other statutory regulation
Norwegian public companies are governed by the Public Com-
panies Act, which is supplemented in important areas (e.g. 
information requirements, investor protection and account-
ing) by other mandatory laws such as the Securities Trading 
Act, the Stock Exchange Act and the Accounting Act. 
The Public Companies Act contains both mandatory and 
non-mandatory rules, in respect of which the company’s arti-
cles of association may deviate from the non-mandatory rules. 
The current Norwegian Public Companies Act was adopt-
ed in 1997, but has roots back to the previous companies legis-
lation of 1976, 1957 and 1910. The 1976 Act was introduced 
following a Nordic co-operation which led to a Nordic compa-
nies legislation which, to a great extent, was based on the same 
model – both with respect to structure and content. Although 
subsequent legislation has not been developed through a simi-
lar Nordic co-operation, the current Nordic companies laws 
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do to a large extent, have a similar structure and are based on 
similar fundamental principles. This especially applies to the 
regulation of corporate governance issues. 
Several provisions of the Public Companies Act have been 
introduced or amended due to eu-regulations. In the context of 
corporate governance, the provisions of Directive 2007/36/ec 
on shareholder rights are of particular interest. This Directive 
was implemented in Norway through a law of 19 June 2009 
no. 77 and applies to listed companies only. The purpose of the 
Directive is to generally improve the shareholders’ opportuni-
ties to exercise influence in listed companies. The implementa-
tion of the Directive has, among other things, resulted in new 
provisions, as well as amended provisions, in Chapter 5 of the 
Public Companies Act (regarding the general meeting of share-
holders, convening general meetings, and information to the 
shareholders in connection with general meetings) which are in 
accordance with the provisions of the Directive. 
Self-regulation – systems and practices
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance 
(the »nccg«) establishes important and heavily emphasised 
guidelines for corporate governance in Norway. The nccg has 
been developed by a broadly composed committee of repre-
sentatives from 9 central organisations with an overall objec-
tive of providing Norwegian listed companies with guidelines 
for governing the relationship between the shareholders, the 
board of directors and executive management more compre-
hensively than applicable legislation. The nccg consists of 
15 recommended principles of corporate governance, each of 
which is coupled with explanatory commentaries. 
The nccg is based on a principle of »comply or explain« 
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and is thus not directly legally binding upon its target compa-
nies. Nevertheless, the nccg has to some extent gained legal 
anchoring through the Accounting Act which requires that 
listed companies account for their principles and practice of 
corporate governance in their annual directors’ report. This 
requirement is also established in the continuing obligations 
of listed companies. In addition, companies applying for list-
ing on the Oslo Stock Exchange must report on the company’s 
corporate governance principles in their listing application or 
in an appendix thereto. By connecting the nccg to mandatory 
legislation and stock exchange regulations, the nccg has been 
established as guidelines with which companies should certain-
ly comply.
The Government’s ownership principles
In addition to the nccg, some investors have their own guide-
lines for exercising their ownership. Some of these guidelines 
are also normative to the corporate governance structure in 
Norway. Most important in this context are the Norwegian 
Government’s governance principles (the »nggp«) which 
apply to all state-owned companies (whether wholly or par-
tially owned). The aim of the nggp is to contribute to estab-
lishing predictable and clear frameworks for the Government’s 
various ownership positions. The nggp are in line with gen-
erally accepted corporate governance principles and concern 
key aspects of corporate governance such as equal treatment 
of shareholders, transparency, independence, composition and 
role of the board, etc. The following 10 principles are set out in 
the nggp: 
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 1. All shareholders shall be treated equally.
 2. There shall be transparency in the State’s ownership of 
companies.
 3. Ownership decisions and resolutions shall be made at the 
general meeting.
 4. The State shall establish result objectives for the compa-
nies, where appropriate in cooperation with other share-
holders. The board is responsible for realising the objec-
tives.
 5. The capital structure of the company shall be consistent 
with the objective of the ownership and the company’s 
situation.
 6. The composition of the board shall be characterised by 
competence, capacity and diversity and shall reflect the 
distinctive characteristics of each company.
 7. Compensation and incentive schemes shall promote the 
creation of value within the companies and be generally 
regarded as reasonable.
 8. The board shall exercise independent control over the 
company’s management on behalf of the owners.
 9. The board shall adopt a plan for its own work and actively 
work to develop its own competencies. The board’s activi-
ties shall be evaluated.
 10. The company shall recognise its social responsibility.
Basic structure of the governance system
Generally
The Norwegian structure of limited companies rests on a prin-
ciple drawing a fundamental line between a company’s man-
agement and its owners. A characteristic of the Norwegian 
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corporate governance structure is that the shareholders exer-
cise the highest authority in the company through the general 
meeting. Through the general meeting, the shareholders may 
decide on any matter provided that it has not been expressly 
made subject to the exclusive authority of another corporate 
body, e.g. the board of directors. This gives the shareholders 
(or, more precisely, the majority of the shareholders) superior 
authority over the board of directors and the managing direc-
tor (ceo). One of the key domains of the general meeting is to 
appoint and remove board members and thereby control the 
composition of the board.
A company’s management is divided into two corporate 
bodies; (i) a board of directors (consisting in practise only of 
non-executive board members) having the overall responsibil-
ity for the management of the company and (ii) a ceo who is 
in charge of day-to-day management. The general meeting is 
superior to the board of directors. Some companies also have 
a corporate assembly (see section 6) but, given that the general 
meeting appoints two thirds of the members of the corporate 
assembly, the existence of a corporate assembly does not affect 
the shareholders’ supreme authority in the company through 
the general meeting. 
Norwegian companies legislation is based on a majority 
principle which grants controlling influence to the shareholder 
(or group of shareholders) controlling the majority of votes 
at the general meeting. This majority principle provides for a 
secure and flexible governance system in which an important 
element is the majority shareholder’s control over the compa-
ny’s board of directors. However, the balancing of the majority 
principle against a set of rules relating to minority protection 
which limits the majority’s authority over individual share-
holders (or minority groups of shareholders) is an important 
feature in the Norwegian governance model. Such minority-
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protection rules also equip the minority shareholder(s) with 
legal tools to enforce the limitations to the majority’s authority. 
The Norwegian governance model is broadly drafted and 
is well-suited for different ownership models. This means that 
it can be suitable for both companies with a dominant share-
holder and companies with dispersed ownership. The Public 
Companies Act does thus not give preference to one ownership 
structure over another. 
A starting point of the Public Companies Act is that the 
principal task of the board of directors, as well as the other 
managing corporate bodies (i.e. the ceo and the corporate 
assembly), is to ensure the company’s interest in value creation 
and, as a consequence thereof, to promote the shareholders’ 
general interest in gains and dividends on the capital invest-
ed in the company. However, an important addition to this is 
that the managing bodies are also entitled – and sometimes 
obliged – to consider interests other than the shareholders’, e.g. 
the interests of employees, creditors, the company’s contract 
parties and the company’s obligations towards society and the 
environment. The common view is that the board of directors 
of Norwegian companies must to some extent have a broader 
perspective than the sole economic interest of the sharehold-
ers. This particular point is reflected in the nccg which recom-
mends that the board of directors »… should define the com-
pany’s basic corporate values and formulate ethical guidelines 
and guidelines for corporate social responsibility in accord-
ance with these values«. In addition, the nggp presupposes 
that companies have a social responsibility.
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Employee representation 
Since 1972, there have been rules in Norwegian companies leg-
islation which grant companies’ employees the right to elect 
members to the board of directors and the corporate assembly. 
Today, such rules are considered to be a fundamental charac-
teristic of the Norwegian governance system. 
The main rule regarding employee representation is that 
one third of the members of the board of directors and/or one 
third of the members of the corporate assembly are elected by 
and among the employees. The employee representatives act as 
ordinary members of the board/corporate assembly and have 
the same authority and responsibility as the members elected 
by the general meeting.
The rules regarding employee representation are further 
described on page 223, Employee representatives on the board 
of directors, and on page 233 with regard to the corporate 
assembly.
The general meeting 
Generally
The general meeting as key forum for the  
exertion of shareholder influence
The general meeting is the highest corporate authority in a 
Norwegian limited company and a forum in which all share-
holders, without regard to the size of their shareholding, have 
an unconditional right to be present (either personally or by 
proxy) and speak, and to exercise their rights and influence as 
a shareholder. 
An essential premise for the shareholders being able to 
211Corporate Governance in Norway 
exercise their authority in the company is that they are kept 
informed of the company and its operations. On this basis, and 
in addition to having a right to be present at the general meet-
ing, the shareholders enjoy extensive rights to obtain informa-
tion about the company’s matters. In this context, a distinction 
can be made between a shareholder’s right to receive infor-
mation without prior enquiries (e.g. the company’s annual 
accounts, annual report, background information for the mat-
ters to be discussed at the general meeting, etc.) and a right to 
receive information following an active request by the share-
holder. An example of the latter is information which can influ-
ence the judgement regarding the company’s financial position. 
The authority of the general meeting 
A key element in a corporate governance context is that the 
shareholders, through the general meeting, exercise supreme 
authority in the company. Through the general meeting, the 
shareholders can instruct and control other corporate bod-
ies, including the board of directors and its composition. The 
general meeting can also, as a main rule, reverse resolutions 
adopted by other corporate bodies and directly resolve on all 
company matters to the extent there are no third parties, e.g. 
contracting parties, who have rights vis-a-vis the company 
which prevent the general meeting from making such deci-
sions. 
The general meeting is obliged to resolve on matters that 
are expressly made subject to its authority pursuant to the Pub-
lic Companies Act, such as adoption of the annual accounts 
and approval of the board’s statement on remuneration to 
executive personnel. Matters concerning the company’s capi-
tal are also generally subject to the general meeting’s authority, 
i.e. increases and reductions in share capital, mergers, demerg-
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ers and dividend distributions. With respect to the latter, the 
Public Companies Act is coupled with recommendations and 
guidelines in the nccg concerning, among other things, divi-
dend policies and capital requirements.
Notwithstanding the elevated authority of the general meet-
ing, it rarely occurs that the general meeting formally instructs 
the board of directors or reverses its resolutions. Rather, in 
practice, disagreements between the majority shareholders 
and the board of directors or an individual board member are 
resolved by the majority shareholder(s) replacing the board 
of directors/board member with a new board/board member 
in whom it has confidence, or by the resignation of board/
board member from the board. One reason for this pragmatic 
approach is probably that, by formally instructing the board 
of directors on a specific matter, the instructing shareholder(s) 
can assume personal responsibility for the resolution subject to 
its instruction. Formal instructions from the shareholder(s) can 
also form a basis for a court of law to look beyond the limited 
liability of a company and establish more extensive liability for 
the company than that provided for by the Public Limited Act 
(i.e. »piercing the corporate veil«).
Contact between management and  
shareholders outside the general meeting
Outside the general meeting, the shareholders do not have for-
mal authority to govern the company or to instruct the board 
of directors or to influence the company affairs. This does not, 
however, prevent the shareholders and management from 
having contact outside the general meeting when it comes to 
matters unrelated to the exercise by the shareholders of their 
legal authority. Oppositely, such contact is rather common in 
companies with one dominant shareholder and is often also 
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seen in companies with dispersed ownership, as the main 
shareholder(s) will have a need to be kept informed and up-to-
date on important matters related to the company’s operations 
and development. In addition, main shareholder(s) may also 
wish to give their input regarding the company’s operations to 
management, and management may need to discuss matters 
with the main shareholder(s) to avoid falling out of step with 
them on important matters regarding the company. In matters 
in respect of which the general meeting has the final author-
ity – e.g. in matters regarding increasing and decreasing the 
company’s share capital, granting authority for the company 
to acquire its own shares, mergers and demergers – the man-
agement will usually have discussed the matter with the main 
shareholder(s) before it is presented to the general meeting. It 
is, however, important to note that, if a shareholder receives 
inside information, the shareholder will become an »insider« 
pursuant to the Securities Trading Act. This means, among 
other things, that the shareholder will be prohibited from trad-
ing in the shares and will be obliged not to disclose the informa-
tion. A shareholder with inside information must also be added 
to the company’s list of insiders.
The extent and substance of the contact between manage-
ment and the shareholders vary to a great extent from one com-
pany to another. In any case, it is important that informal con-
tact between management and the company’s shareholders is 
kept within certain limits to make clear that it is the company’s 
management, i.e. board of directors and ceo, which has the 
responsibility and authority to manage the company’s opera-
tions. Contact with the shareholders should thus principally 
be of an informative nature and, to the extent that the share-
holders present comments or proposals to the management, 
they cannot be of an instructive character. It is also important 
to ensure that the contact between management and the main 
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shareholder(s) does not violate the other shareholders’ rights in 
the company and that the contact is kept within the framework 
of, among other things, the principle of equal treatment of 
shareholders. To this end, the board and management must be 
particularly cautious not to disclose information to the main/
dominant shareholder(s) without providing the same to the 
minority shareholder(s). 
Voting rights and share classes
A starting point in the Norwegian companies legislation is that 
each share shall carry the same economic and organisational 
rights in the company. This principle is formally anchored in 
the Public Companies Act and is also reflected in several spe-
cial provisions of the Act. It is, however, important to note that 
the Public Limited Act to a large extent allows companies to 
deviate from the principle of equality by adopting articles of 
association which establish different share classes and limita-
tions on the shares’ voting powers (either connected to persons 
or share classes).1 
Notwithstanding that the Public Companies Act is rather 
open and flexible with respect to adopting share classes and/
or limitations on voting powers, there are at present just three 
Norwegian listed companies which have listed shares without 
voting power (»B shares«). With the exception of these three 
companies, all of the listed companies act in accordance with 
the principle that each share carries the same economic and 
organisational rights. This is probably explained by the fact 
that the nccg recommends that the company should only 
1. If the aggregate nominal value of the shares subject to limitations on 
voting powers exceeds more than 50 % of the company’s share capital, such 
provision in the articles of association must be approved by the Department of 
Trade and Fisheries.
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have one share class. In addition, deviations from the principle 
of equality are subject to other regulations. For example, the 
Listing Rules for the Oslo Stock Exchange stipulate that listed 
companies may only disregard votes from shares with limited/
non-existing voting power if there are reasonable grounds for 
such rejection. Listed companies with limitations on the voting 
powers must also give notice of such limitations in their annual 
report. 
form of the general meeting, notice procedures, etc.
Convening the general meeting 
The general meeting is, as a rule, convened by the board of 
directors (however, in companies with a corporate assembly, 
the articles of association may determine that the general meet-
ing shall be convened by the chair of the corporate assembly). 
If the board of directors (or the chair of the corporate assembly, 
where applicable) does not convene a general meeting to be 
held according to law, the Public Companies Act permits the 
shareholders to take measures necessary to convene the meet-
ing at the company’s expense, including requiring that the gen-
eral meeting be convened by a district court. 
Shareholders representing at least 1/20 of the share capital 
of the company may require that an extraordinary sharehold-
ers’ meeting be held to discuss one or more specific matters. In 
such case, the board of directors shall ensure that an extraor-
dinary shareholders’ meeting is held no later than one month 
following the demand by the auditor or shareholders.
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Notice of a general meeting 
The Public Companies Act contains special provisions regard-
ing notices and information to be provided to shareholders in 
listed companies in order to assure shareholder influence. The 
provisions ensure that all shareholders are made familiar with 
the general meeting, including the agenda for the meeting, are 
given an opportunity to prepare for and attend the meeting, 
and to speak and vote at the general meeting. 
The nccg supplements the above by recommending that 
the board of directors should »… take steps to ensure that as 
many shareholders as possible may exercise their rights by par-
ticipating in general meetings of the company, and that general 
meetings are an effective forum for the views of shareholders 
and the board«. To that end, the nccg recommends that the 
steps taken by the board of directors include, among other 
things, making the notice for the general meeting and any sup-
porting documents electronically available on the company’s 
website, ensuring that the documents distributed are sufficient-
ly detailed and comprehensive so that they allow the share-
holders to form a view on all matters to be considered at the 
meeting, and setting a deadline for giving notice of participa-
tion at the general meeting which is as close as possible to the 
date of the meeting.
Content of the notice of the general meeting
Both companies and securities legislation set out requirements 
regarding the content of the notice of the general meeting. 
According to these provisions, the notice of the general meet-
ing shall, among other things, list the matters to be considered 
by the meeting, as well as a specific and precise description of 
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the procedure the shareholders must follow in order to be able 
to participate and vote at the general meeting. 
Agenda for the general meeting and right  
to propose matters for discussion 
The Public Companies Act affords each shareholder of the 
company the right to have matters addressed at the general 
meeting. Notice of such matters must be given to the board of 
directors at least one week prior to the date of the deadline for 
convening the general meeting, together with a proposal for 
a resolution or an explanation for putting the matter on the 
agenda. 
Meeting procedures
Participation, proxies and voting 
As a starting point and main rule of the Public Companies Act, 
the general meeting adopts resolutions at physical meetings. 
The Act does, however, allow shareholders to exercise their 
shareholder rights without being physically present at the gen-
eral meeting, e.g. by being represented by proxy and by using 
electronic communications such as real-time video transmis-
sions, which are alternatives that may provide for a simpler 
and more convenient way for the shareholders to exercise their 
shareholder rights. 
The latter alternative was introduced in the Public Compa-
nies Act in 2009 together with a possibility to submit votes in 
writing (including through electronic communications) prior 
to the general meeting. These introductions were (among oth-
ers) a result of the implementation of Directive 2007/36/ec on 
shareholder rights in Norwegian corporate legislation. 
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The nccg recommends that shareholders who cannot 
attend the meeting in person should be given the opportunity to 
vote. To this end, the company should (1) provide information 
regarding the procedures for being represented at the meeting 
through a proxy, (2) nominate a person who will be available 
to vote on behalf of shareholders as their proxy and (3) to the 
extent possible, prepare a form for the appointment of a proxy 
which allows separate voting instructions to be given for each 
matter to be considered by the meeting and for each of the can-
didates nominated for election.
The opportunity to allow shareholders to be present at the 
general meeting through electronic communications is not 
applied in practice. This can be said to be partly due to the fact 
that companies are not interested in taking on the financing 
and development of secure electronic systems for such par-
ticipation, and partly due to companies not experiencing an 
actual need for opening up for this alternative over and above 
other alternatives, such as being represented by a proxy holder 
and submitting votes in writing (including through electronic 
communications) prior to the general meeting. The latter is, to 
a certain extent, applied in practice (unlike the possibility of 
being electronically present at general meetings). 
Proxy advisors
With respect to the actual voting at the general meeting, a prac-
tice of using so-called proxy advisors has been increasingly 
adopted during the last decade, most commonly by institution-
al shareholders. The proxy advisors are professional analysts 
who provide advice on how the shareholders should exercise 
their voting powers at the general meeting. The advice can 
either be provided based on the shareholders’ expressed own-
ership principles, or be of a more general nature. The proxy 
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advisers help the shareholders stay up to date on their invest-
ments by taking on the task of analysing the consequences of 
the matters that are presented to the general meeting. However, 
critics are concerned that extensive use of proxy advisors caus-
es unwanted harmonisation of the governance of Norwegian 
companies which does not always take into consideration the 
specific needs of a company’s business and operations. 
Majority requirements
See page 240.
The board of directors
Applicable law
Chapter 6 of the Public Companies Act sets out provisions 
governing the board of directors, the ceo and the corporate 
assembly. The board of directors and ceo are mandatory cor-
porate bodies in all Norwegian public limited liability compa-
nies.
A corporate assembly is, as a rule, mandatory in companies 
having more than 200 employees, but agreements not to estab-
lish a corporate assembly may be reached between the compa-
ny and the employees or unions. This option not to establish a 
corporate assembly by agreement is exercised to a great extent 
in practice, which means that only a limited number of Norwe-
gian companies actually have a corporate assembly.
In addition to the mandatory requirements to a company’s 
management set out in the Public Companies Act (and related 
legislation), the nccg contains various recommendations con-
cerning the board of directors and its work, e.g. on nomina-
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tion committees (section 7), composition and independence 
of the board of directors and corporate assembly (section 8), 
the work of the board of directors (section 9), risk manage-
ment and internal control (section 10) and remuneration of the 
board of directors (section 11). 
Appointment and removal of board members
Generally 
The starting point of the Public Companies Act is that the 
board members are elected for a period of two years, pro-
vided that the company’s articles of association do not state 
other wise. The term cannot, however, exceed four years. The 
nccg recommends against electing board members for a peri-
od exceeding two years in listed companies. In practice, it is 
increasingly common to elect board members in listed compa-
nies for a  period of one year. 
The board members are elected by the general meet-
ing, which also determines whether deputy directors shall be 
elected. In companies with a corporate assembly, this body 
is responsible for electing the board members. A decision to 
remove board members may be taken by the same corporate 
body authorised to elect the board members, which means that 
removal of board members is normally resolved by the general 
meeting. A characteristic of the Norwegian structure is that 
the general meeting (i.e. the major shareholder(s)) may replace 
a board member at any time during his or her term without 
cause. This grants the major shareholders authority to at any 
time determine the composition of majority of the members of 
the board of directors. Board members who are elected by the 
employees cannot be removed by the general meeting. 
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Nomination committees
The nccg recommends that the task of proposing eligible 
candidates for the board of directors, as well as proposing the 
board members’ remuneration, be prepared by a nomination 
committee. This recommendation is followed by a majority of 
the Norwegian listed companies in practice, even though there 
is no legal requirement to appoint a nomination committee.
Nomination committees are playing an increasingly impor-
tant, practical role in the process of finding eligible candidates 
for a company’s board of directors. The increased importance 
of the work of the nomination committee may be explained 
by an increased focus on the composition, competence and 
quality of the board members, as well as the implementation 
of rules governing gender representation (see page 223) which 
has added an additional consideration to the process of putting 
together the board of directors.
Whether or not a company shall have a nomination com-
mittee is usually (but not necessarily) governed by the com-
pany’s articles of association. As the use of nomination com-
mittees is not required by law, the nccg recommends that the 
appointment of nomination committees should be included in 
the company’s articles of association, and guidelines (which 
may be separate from the articles of association) for the com-
position, election and remuneration of the members of the 
nomination committee.
The nomination committee is elected by – and acts as a sup-
porting committee to – the general meeting. The general meet-
ing also determines the guidelines as to the manner by which 
the committee shall carry out its work. According to the nccg, 
the composition of the nomination committee should reflect the 
interests of the company’s shareholder community. In compa-
nies with one dominant shareholder, such a shareholder has, as 
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a rule, one representative in the nomination committee. Other-
wise, each of the company’s main shareholders tend to be repre-
sented in the committee. In companies in which the Government 
has a large shareholding, the Government usually requests that 
a nomination committee be appointed and that one representa-
tive in such committee be appointed by the Government. 
The nccg emphasises that the nomination committee must 
be independent of the company’s board of directors and man-
agement/administration, and that no more than one member 
of the committee should be an existing board member in the 
company. If an existing board member is a member of the nom-
ination committee, such a board member should not run for 
re-election. 
The nomination committee’s work in providing justified 
recommendations regarding candidates for election to the cor-
porate assembly (in companies having a corporate assembly) 
and the board of directors may be extensive and time-consum-
ing. In carrying out its work, the committee may interview pos-
sible candidates and may also seek assistance from the com-
pany’s administration and/or external advisers (e.g. external 
recruiting firms). The board’s own evaluation of its work and 
competence (see pages 232–233) is usually made available to 
the nomination committee and forms part of the basis of the 
nomination committee’s work. 
An important part of the nomination committee’s work is 
to agree on eligible candidates with the main shareholder(s). 
Accordingly, the nomination committee will have contact with 
the shareholders while preparing its recommendations. The 
committee will usually also discuss its recommendations with 
the board of directors or the chair of the board. It is, however, 
important to note that the general meeting, when appointing 
new members of the board, is not in any way bound by the rec-
ommendations presented by the nomination committee.
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Size and composition of the board of  
 directors and corporate assembly
Generally 
As a starting point, the board of directors shall consist of at 
least three members (five in companies with a corporate assem-
bly). There are no corresponding limits on the maximum num-
ber of board members a company can have. In practice, the 
boards of directors in Norwegian listed companies tend to con-
sist of between 6 and 10 members, of which one third is elected 
by and among the employees.
As regards the composition of the board of directors, at 
least half of the board members shall be resident within the 
eea. Further, since 2006, Norwegian companies legislation 
has contained requirements relating to gender representa-
tion on the board of directors of public limited companies. As 
a consequence of such requirements, each gender must, at a 
minimum, be represented by approximately 40 % of the total 
number of board members elected by the general meeting. 
For listed companies, further guidelines and recommenda-
tions regarding the board’s composition are set out in the nccg 
as described below. Such guidelines shall ensure the independ-
ence and expertise of the board members. 
Employee representatives on the board of directors 
A fundamental element of Norwegian corporate law is the 
employees’ right to be represented on the board of directors. 
Such right is established by law through the Public Companies 
Act and the main rule is that up to one third of the board mem-
bers shall be elected by and among the employees. 
If the company has a corporate assembly, the board mem-
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bers shall be elected by the corporate assembly. In such cases, 
the employees do not elect their members to the board of direc-
tors directly but, rather, through the employee representatives 
of the corporate assembly who have a right to elect one third of 
the board members. 
The rules regarding employee representation are briefly as 
follows:
The main rule regarding employee representation states 
that, in companies with more than 200 employees, one third of 
the members of the corporate assembly (see page 219 and 233) 
shall be elected by and among the employees. In such compa-
nies, the employee representatives in the corporate assembly 
may require that one third of the company’s board members 
shall be elected among the employees. 
In a company with more than 200 employees, in which it 
has been agreed not to have a corporate assembly (see page 
219), the employees shall, in addition to the possibility of elect-
ing one third of the board members as described above, either 
elect a board member (and a deputy board member) or two 
observers to the board of directors. 
In companies with more than 50 but less than 201 employ-
ees, the employees may require that one third and at least two 
of the members of the board of directors shall be elected by and 
among the employees. 
In companies with more than 30 but less than 51 employ-
ees, the employees may require that a member of the board of 
directors and an observer shall be elected by and among the 
employees.
If a company is part of a group of companies, it may be 
agreed that the employees in the whole group shall be regard-
ed as employees of the company – in practice, of the parent 
company – when applying the rules regarding employee repre-
sentation. If the parties do not enter into such agreement, the 
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publicly appointed Industrial Democracy Board (»Bedrifts-
demokratinemnda«) may decide, at the company’s or the 
employees’ request, that the employees of the company group 
shall be regarded as employees of the company. 
The above-mentioned rules imply that employees usu-
ally are represented on the board of directors in companies 
with more than 30 employees, or in company groups with as 
many employees. In companies with a corporate assembly, the 
employees are also represented in that corporate body.  
Once elected to the board or to the corporate assembly, the 
employee representatives are fully authorised members of the 
relevant corporate body and have the same rights, obligations 
and responsibilities as the other members. In this context, it is 
important to note that employee representatives, in the same 
way as other members of the board/corporate assembly, are 
obliged to consider the company’s best interests rather than 
specific interests of the company’s employees.
Requirements of the board  
members – independence
The principal task of the board members is to attend to the 
interests of the company and the shareholders as such. The 
board members are thus not representatives of individual 
shareholders (or groups of shareholders). On the contrary, 
the Public Companies Act requires that the board members, 
when acting in that capacity, represent the company and the 
shareholder community, which is also the prevailing opinion 
in practice. Neither individual board members nor the chair 
of the board have any individual authority outside the board. 
The Public Limited Act does not set out specific require-
ments for the board of directors, including their independence, 
other than prohibiting a company’s ceo from being a member 
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of the board of directors. However, the NCcg in general terms 
recommends that the composition of the board of directors 
should ensure that it »…can attend to the common interest of 
all shareholders and meets the company’s need for expertise, 
capacity and diversity«, and that attention be given to ensur-
ing that »…the board can function effectively as a collegiate 
body«. 
More specific recommendations on the independence of the 
board members are presented in the subsequent paragraph of 
the nccg, in which it is recommended that the »…composi-
tion of the board of directors should ensure that it can operate 
independently of any special interests«. To this end, it is recom-
mended that the »…majority of the shareholder-elected board 
members should be independent of the company’s executive 
personnel and material business contracts«, and that »[at] 
least two of the members of the board elected by shareholders 
should be independent of the company’s main shareholder(s)«. 
With respect to the division between executive and non-exec-
utive board members, the nccg recommends that neither the 
ceo nor any other person in an executive position should be a 
member of the board of directors. To the extent the board does 
include executive personnel, it is recommend that »…the com-
pany should provide an explanation for this and implement 
consequential adjustments to the organisation of work of the 
board, including the use of board committees to help ensure 
more independent preparation of matters for discussion by the 
board…«. The Norwegian companies legislation does not sep-
arate between executive and non-executive personnel as such. 
However, the board of directors of Norwegian companies may 
be regarded as »non-executive« in practice.
Further guidelines regarding when a member of the board 
of directors can be considered independent are provided in the 
commentaries to the nccg in which it is explained that a board 
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member in general may be considered independent when he or 
she has no business, family or other relationships that might be 
assumed to affect his or her views and decisions. The commen-
taries elaborate by setting out the following points that should 
be considered when evaluating whether a member of the board 
is independent of the company’s executive management or its 
main business connections. 
•	 The	individual	has	not	been	employed	by	the	company	(or	
group, where applicable) in a senior position at any time in 
the last five years;
•	 The	 individual	 does	 not	 receive	 any	 remuneration	 from	
the company other than the regular fee as a board member 
(does not apply to payments from a company pension);
•	 The	individual	does	not	have,	or	represent,	business	rela-
tionships with the company;
•	 The	individual	does	not	have	any	cross-relationships	with	
executive personnel, other members of the board of direc-
tors or other shareholder-elected representatives;
•	 The	individual	has	not	at	any	time	in	the	last	three	years	
been a partner or employee of the accounting firm that cur-
rently audits the company.
Norwegian listed companies show a high level of compliance 
and respect for the above recommendations regarding the 
board’s composition and independence. 
The board members’ dependency on, and  
responsibility to, the (main) shareholder(s)
A fundamental principle is that, outside the general meeting, 
the shareholders/a majority shareholder is not authorised to 
instruct board members on matters to be dealt with by the 
board. It is only through the general meeting that the share-
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holders are authorised to give instructions, and an instruction 
must in such case be directed to the board as a collegiate body 
and not to individual board members. This applies to the fullest 
extent also to board members who are appointed by or elect-
ed following a proposal from the main shareholder. Contact 
between the board members and the shareholders which is too 
close can constitute a violation of the principle of equality and 
can also expose the shareholders to liability for damages if the 
shareholders, through contact with the board/board member, 
contribute to a board resolution which causes the company or 
a third party to incur a loss. 
On this basis, the discussion regarding the board members’ 
responsibility towards the shareholders (and the main share-
holder in particular) principally relates to the general meeting’s 
control over the board’s management of the company and the 
general meeting’s opportunity to replace a board/board mem-
bers in which the shareholders no longer have confidence (see 
page 220, Generally).
A more recent »trend« for shareholders to influence the 
management of a company outside the actual general meet-
ing is to publish its expectations regarding the position of 
the company related to specified interests, e.g. such as social 
responsibility. This practice is, among other things, employed 
by the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisher-
ies (which publishes its ownership expectations in its annual 
document on ownership policies) and functions as a transpar-
ent and effective way of expressing general ownership expec-
tations outside the formal route of providing specific instruc-
tions through the general meeting. This approach is generally 
viewed as a positive development in ownership behaviour as 
it appears predictable and transparent for both the board of 
directors and others. It is, however, important to note that such 
expressed ownership expectations must be generally presented 
229Corporate Governance in Norway 
in order to distinguish them from actual instructions from the 
shareholders to the board of directors, which can only be given 
in the shareholders meeting. 
Board committees
The Public Companies Act requires that listed companies of a 
certain size appoint an audit committee to advise on and pre-
pare certain matters for the board of directors. However, the 
members of the audit committee are elected by and among the 
board members so that board members who are in executive 
positions in the company cannot form part of the audit com-
mittee. In addition, it must be ensured that at least one of the 
members of the audit committee is independent of the compa-
ny’s operations and possesses qualifications from accounting 
or auditing. 
Apart from the requirement of having an audit committee, 
the Public Companies Act neither requires nor prohibits the 
establishment of specialised board committees. However, it 
should be noted that, to the extent board committees are estab-
lished, such committees cannot be granted authority to resolve 
upon matters which are to be dealt with by specified corporate 
bodies according to law. Thus, the principal responsibility for 
the duties being delegated to a board committee will always 
remain with the corporate body which, according to law, is 
responsible for the relevant task(s). Further, the responsibility 
of each board member, for example, always rests with the indi-
vidual board member without regard to the fact that the board 
has structured its work by establishing board committees. The 
work being carried out by a board committee must therefore 
only be viewed as controlling or preparatory or advisory for 
the board’s discussions. 
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The use of committees is recommended by the nccg to sup-
plement the corporate bodies established by law, e.g. a nomi-
nation committee (see nccg section 7), an audit committee 
(see nccg section 9 (4)) and a remuneration committee (see 
nccg section 9 (5)). 
In practice, there are divided opinions on the use of board 
committees. While some are of the opinion that the use of 
board committees is effective, others find it most effective if the 
full board participates in the discussions of all board matters.  
Duties and responsibilities, business-judgment rule
The board of directors has the principal responsibility for the 
management of the company and for supervising the com-
pany’s day-to-day management and activities in general. The 
duties of the board of directors can generally be divided into 
three main groups; (i) to manage the company, (ii) to control 
the day-to-day operations of the company, and (iii) to keep the 
shareholders, creditors, employees, governmental bodies and 
others informed of the company’s day-to-day operations. The 
ceo is principally in charge of executing the board’s resolu-
tions, running the company’s operations and addressing exter-
nal relations. Accordingly, the ceo usually represents the com-
pany externally in the media and other relations. 
The rules regarding the board of directors’ responsibility 
for the management of the company and its responsibility for 
supervising the company’s activities are set out principally in 
sections 6–12 and 6–13 of the Public Companies Act. Accord-
ing to the Public Companies Act, companies in which some of 
the board members are elected by and among the employees, 
the board of directors shall adopt rules of procedure which lay 
down rules regarding the work and administrative procedures 
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of the board of directors. In practice, most Norwegian listed 
companies have prepared board instructions which lay down 
such rules of procedure for the board of directors. 
The board’s responsibility for the management of the com-
pany includes ensuring that the company’s activities are sound-
ly organised, drawing up plans and budgets for the activities of 
the company, staying informed of the company’s financial posi-
tion and ensuring that its activities, accounts and asset man-
agement are subject to adequate control.
The role of the chair of the board
All Norwegian limited companies must have a chair of the 
board. The chair of the board is elected among the board mem-
bers. If the general meeting has not appointed the chair, the 
board members shall themselves appoint a chair. In compa-
nies having a corporate assembly, the corporate assembly shall 
appoint the chair. The nccg recommends that the chair be 
appointed by the general meeting to the extent the Public Com-
panies Act (or other legislation) does not provide for another 
solution (as it does when it comes to companies with a corpo-
rate assembly).
The chair has certain formal duties towards the general 
meeting, e.g. that he or she is obliged to be present at the gen-
eral meeting, and is normally in charge of opening the meeting. 
In connection therewith, the chair shall prepare a list of the 
shareholders present (or represented by proxy) and how many 
shares and votes each shareholder represents. In may also be 
necessary for the chair to resolve difficult questions regarding 
voting rights at the general meeting. To this end, the chair’s list 
of shareholders and votes represented at the general meeting 
may have a determining influence for the result of the voting at 
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the general meeting. On this basis, the Public Companies Act 
provides for a right for shareholders representing 5 % of the 
share capital of a company to demand that the District Court 
appoint an independent person to open the general meeting. 
The chair shall ensure that matters of »current interest« 
are presented to the board. This rule indirectly implies that the 
chair has a duty to keep himself or herself continuously up to 
date on material matters regarding the company. To this end, it 
is important that a good connection is established between the 
chair and the company’s operative management and that rou-
tines are in place to ensure that relevant matters are presented 
to the board. 
The Public Companies Act imposes certain formal duties 
on the chair, but does not grant the chair the authority to act 
independently of the board. However, in practice, the chair will 
play an important role as a result of having close contact with 
the company’s management. With respect to this contact, it is 
important to note that the chair should not become too deeply 
involved in the day-to-day management of the company or in 
the preparation of matters for the board. It is important that 
the chair bases his or her decision on the board’s discussions 
and not on the chair’s prior contact with management. 
Board evaluation
It is common practice to carry out an annual evaluation of the 
work of the board of directors and this is also recommended by 
the nccg which stipulates that the board of directors should 
»...evaluate its performance and expertise annually«. The 
evaluation should include an evaluation of the composition of 
the board and the manner in which its members function. The 
commentaries to the nccg assume that such evaluation will be 
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more comprehensive if it is not intended for publication. How-
ever, the evaluation should be made available to the nomina-
tion committee and form part of the basis for the nomination 
committee’s work and evaluations. It is also recommended in 
the nccg that the board of directors consider using an external 
person to facilitate the evaluation of its work. The actual use of 
external evaluators varies to some extent in practice.
corporate assembly 
A special feature of the Norwegian governance model is the 
obligation to appoint a corporate assembly in companies with 
more than 200 employees. The corporate assembly shall, as 
a rule, consist of 12 members or a higher number divisible 
by three, of which two thirds of the members of the corpo-
rate assembly shall be elected by the general meeting, while 
the remaining third is elected by and among the company’s 
employees. 
The principal tasks of the corporate assembly consist of 
board elections and, following a recommendation from the 
board of directors, to resolve on matters regarding signifi-
cant investments in relation to the company’s resources, and 
any rationalisation or alteration of the company’s operations 
which may cause extensive changes or a re-allocation of the 
company’s work force. 
One could argue that the existence of a corporate assembly 
with such powers challenges the main principle of the share-
holders exercising the highest authority in the company. How-
ever, given that two thirds of the corporate assembly is elected 
by the general meeting, the corporate assembly does not affect 
the authority of the general meeting as such. The general meet-
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ing, i.e. the major shareholder(s), may at any time and without 
reason replace the elected members of the corporate assembly.
The Public Companies Act allows the company and a 
majority of the employees or unions comprising two thirds 
of the employees to enter into agreements to not establish a 
corporate assembly. It is common practice to enter into such 
agreements. A consequence of these agreements is that the 
employees instead have extended rights and obligations to be 
represented on the board of directors by direct elections. 
The statutory auditor 
Brief overview: appointment, dismissal,  
 duties and responsibilities
All public limited companies are required to appoint an audi-
tor who is registered and authorised to act as auditor. The audi-
tor is elected by the general meeting as its trusted representative 
and serves as auditor until replaced by another auditor.
The primary task of the auditor is broadly to verify that 
the company’s annual report is in accordance with applicable 
legislation. The auditor shall also ensure that the company has 
seen to the satisfactory management of its assets and that prop-
er controls are in place. 
According to the Auditors Act, the auditor shall have at 
least one annual meeting with the board of directors without 
the ceo being present. In listed companies, the auditor shall be 
in contact with the audit committee and, among other things, 
give the committee a description of the main elements of the 
audit.
The audit is an important part of the shareholders’ moni-
toring of the board of directors’ management of the company. 
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The auditor shall present a report concerning the audit to the 
general meeting. In the event the auditor finds circumstances 
which may give rise to liability on the part of a member of the 
board of directors, a member of the corporate assembly or the 
ceo, this must be noted in the audit report. 
The auditor shall attend the general meeting when the mat-
ters to be dealt with are of such character that the auditor’s 
attendance is deemed necessary. Otherwise, the auditor has, 
according to law, a right (but no obligation) to be present at 
the general meeting. However, it should be noted that the com-
mentaries to the nccg (regarding general meetings) go beyond 
the law on this point and recommend that the auditor attend all 
general meetings of the company.
The executive management 
Structure of the executive management:  
 single CEo or management board
All Norwegian public limited companies must have one or sev-
eral ceos. In practice, Norwegian listed companies have only 
one ceo.  
Appointment and removal
The ceo is as a rule appointed by the board of directors. The 
Public Companies Act allows the general meeting or the cor-
porate assembly to appoint the ceo, but this is not commonly 
done in listed companies. The trust and close relationship that 
must exist between the board of directors and the ceo (as a 
result of the ceo being the trusted subordinate of the board 
236 a p p e N d i x  c   
and in charge of executing its resolutions) make the appoint-
ment of the ceo an essential board assignment which is not 
suitably exercised by other corporate bodies in the company. 
With respect to the removal of the ceo, the rule is that the 
same corporate body which can appoint the ceo (i.e. normally 
the board of directors) may also remove him or her from the 
position. It is usual in listed companies to enter into an agree-
ment with the ceo which allows the board to remove the ceo 
at any time without cause.
Duties and responsibilities
The ceo is in charge of the day-to-day operations of the com-
pany. The authority of the ceo is generally limited with respect 
to cases which, based on the company’s situation, or of an unu-
sual nature or major importance. The ceo is subordinate and 
reports to the board of directors while the board, in turn, has a 
duty to supervise the ceo. As result of being a superior corpo-
rate body, the board of directors may also instruct the ceo on 
the day-to-day operations of the company. 
It is the responsibility of the ceo to appoint other admin-
istrative employees, including the company’s management. 
However, in practise, the ceo is likely to discuss management 
appointments with the board or the chair so that the board can 
intervene if it disagrees with the appointment. 
237Corporate Governance in Norway 
remuneration
The board of directors 
Except in cases in which the company has a corporate assem-
bly, the remuneration to the board members shall be deter-
mined by the general meeting. The Public Companies Act does 
not contain rules or guidelines with respect to the size of the 
remuneration to the board members, but further guidelines are 
provided in the nccg which states that the »…remuneration 
of the board of directors should reflect the board’s responsi-
bility, expertise, time commitment and the complexity of the 
company’s activities« and that the »remuneration … should 
not be linked to the company’s performance«. The nccg also 
states that share options should not be granted to board mem-
bers. The level of the remuneration paid to board members in 
Norwegian companies varies in practice, but has historically 
been generally low compared to other countries.
The CEo 
The remuneration to the ceo is determined by the board of 
directors. To this end, the board of directors produces a state-
ment including guidelines regarding the determination of the 
salary and other remuneration to the company’s executive 
personnel, including the ceo, for the next financial year. This 
statement is subject to the consideration of the annual general 
meeting each year.
The guidelines set out in the statement from the board of 
directors are, as a rule, not binding upon the company unless 
this is stated in the company’s articles of association. Howev-
er, as regards the guidelines for remunerations in the form of 
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shares, subscription rights, options and other forms of remu-
neration connected to the company or company group’s shares 
or share price, the guidelines must be approved by the general 
meeting and are then binding upon the board of directors. In 
practice, this means that the board of directors cannot enter 
into binding agreements on »share-based« remuneration to 
executive personnel, including the ceo, before the statement 
on remuneration to the company’s executive personnel has 
been approved by the company’s general meeting. 
Minority protection
Generally. limitations on the majority  
 shareholder’s influence 
The Public Companies Act has several provisions which bal-
ance the majority principle (i.e. that the shareholder (or group 
of shareholders) controlling the majority of votes at the gen-
eral meeting controls the company) against the interests of the 
minority shareholders. Such provisions are jointly referred to 
as the minority-protection provisions and constitute an impor-
tant set of rules which reflect the fundamental principle of 
equality in Norwegian company legislation. 
The minority-protection rules consist of provisions of vari-
ous nature, such as general provisions concerning, among oth-
er things, abuse of authority, conflict of interests and related-
party transactions, as well as provisions regarding majority 
requirements and procedural requirements for certain resolu-
tions made by the general meeting.
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The general provisions against abuse of authority
The main material limitation on the majority’s authority over 
the other shareholders is set out in a general anti-abuse pro-
vision, i.e. section 5–21 of the Public Companies Act. This 
provision prohibits the general meeting from adopting any 
resolution which may provide certain shareholders with an 
unreasonable advantage at the expense of the other sharehold-
ers or the company. The anti-abuse provision is particularly 
relevant in areas in which the Public Companies Act does not 
provide specific rules to protect specific interests of the minor-
ity shareholders.
For listed companies, the anti-abuse provision in the Public 
Companies Act is coupled with a provision on equal treatment 
in the Securities Trading Act and in the Continuing Obligations 
of the Oslo Stock Exchange. The latter indicates that any mate-
rial breach can be sanctioned by a fine imposed by the Oslo 
Stock Exchange or the Stock Exchange Appeal Board. 
Section 5–21 of the Public Companies Act, which limits the 
influence of the majority shareholder, can be viewed in con-
nection with section 6–28 of the Public Companies Act, which 
prohibits the board of directors, the ceo and others represent-
ing the company from misusing their position to give share-
holders or others an unreasonable advantage at the company’s 
expense. This provision also prohibits the board of directors 
and the ceo from effecting resolutions made by other corpo-
rate bodies which violate mandatory laws or the company’s 
articles of association. The provision also applies to the corpo-
rate assembly. 
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Majority requirements at the general meeting
Simple majority
A fundamental principle (with important exceptions) is that 
resolutions adopted by the general meeting are reached by sim-
ple majority of the votes cast (i.e. more than 50 %). If a pro-
posal receives an equal number of votes, the rule is that the vote 
of the chair of the general meeting is decisive. However, at elec-
tions or hirings, the person who receives most votes is deemed 
elected. If two candidates receive an equal number of votes, the 
election shall be determined by drawing lots. 
The practical implication of the majority principle is that 
the majority shareholder or majority shareholders are assured 
control over the board of directors and thereby the manage-
ment of the company. 
Qualified majority
Exemptions from the rule regarding simple majority are made 
with respect to certain matters, e.g. in cases regarding amend-
ments to the articles of association. This means that a quali-
fied majority of at least two thirds of both the votes cast and 
the share capital represented at the shareholders’ meeting must 
vote in favour of the proposed resolution. A minority of a third 
or more of the shares represented at the shareholders’ meeting 
can thus block a proposal to amend the articles of association 
of the company. Such qualified majority is also required with 
respect to resolutions to increase and reduce the share capital, 
mergers, demergers, dissolution and winding-up of the com-
pany, as well as for resolutions to waive the shareholders’ pre-
emptive rights to subscribe for shares in a share capital increase 
(private placements). 
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Certain amendments to the articles of association require 
an even greater majority from the general meeting. This applies 
to proposals to implement a consent requirement for share 
transfers, pre-emption rights, requirements as to the qualifica-
tions of the shareholders of the company and limitations to the 
shares’ economic rights. This entails, among other things, that 
restrictions on the shares’ negotiability must be subject to sub-
stantial consensus by the general meeting. The nccg is stricter 
than the Public Companies Act in this respect and recommends 
that the company’s articles of association be free from any form 
of restriction on the negotiability of the shares. 
In order to provide the minority shareholders with special 
protection against certain resolutions, the Public Companies 
Act expressly requires that the following resolutions be sup-
ported by all shareholders or all shareholders who are affected 
by the resolution: 
•	 Increasing	the	shareholders’	obligations	to	the	company;
•	 Limitations	on	the	transferability	of	the	company’s	shares	
in ways other than by consent requirements, pre-emptive 
rights or qualification requirements; 
•	 That	shares	shall	be	subject	to	forced	redemption;	
•	 That	 the	 legal	 position	 of	 previously	 equal	 shares	 is	
changed; 
•	 That	the	shareholders’	right	to	dividends	or	to	the	com-
pany’s assets is reduced by a resolution that the company’s 
objective shall not be to achieve economic profit for the 
shareholders.
Quorum requirements
Unlike the other corporate bodies, the Public Companies Act 
does not establish »quorum requirements« as such for the 
general meeting, i.e. rules making the authority of the general 
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meeting dependent on a certain number of shareholders being 
present. Such requirements can, however, be established in the 
company’s articles of association, but in practice this is never 
implemented in Norwegian listed companies. 
Conflicts of interest and  
 related-party transactions
Conflicts of interest
At the general meeting, a shareholder cannot vote in matters 
concerning legal actions against himself/herself or concerning 
his or her obligations to the company. A shareholder cannot 
vote in matters concerning legal actions brought against other 
parties or such parties’ liability to the company if such share-
holder has a material interest in the matter which may be in 
conflict with the interest of the company. 
A board member cannot participate in discussing or resolv-
ing matters which are of special importance to such board 
member or any person related to the board member. This 
applies to the extent the board member is deemed to have a 
major personal or financial special interest in the matter. This 
also applies in respect of the ceo.
The provision on conflicts of interests covers, among other 
things, matters regarding whether the company shall enter into 
a contract to which a board member is a party and matters 
regarding compensation for the board member’s own work. 
It also encompasses situations in which a party entering into a 
potential contract with the company is a company in which a 
board member has an economic interest. 
243Corporate Governance in Norway 
Related-party transactions
As a starting point, the Public Companies Act does not pre-
vent transactions between the company and its shareholders. 
However, such transactions raise specific concerns due to the 
risk of misusing a dominant position to transfer funds from 
the company to one or more shareholders by disguising the 
transactions as business agreements. In particular, transactions 
with related parties raise concerns with respect to preserving 
the principal of equality and the protection of minority share-
holders, given that these transactions open up the possibility of 
obtaining advantages at the company and minority sharehold-
ers’ expense. On this basis, the Public Companies Act contains 
several provisions regarding both material and procedural 
requirements with respect to certain resolutions and/or agree-
ments with related parties. 
A fundamental principle is that agreements between the 
company and its shareholders should be on market terms 
(»arm’s-length principle«). The provision stipulates that trans-
actions between companies in the same group shall be on mar-
ket terms, and that any material agreement between such par-
ties shall be made in writing. Further, the provision stipulates 
that costs, losses, income and gains which cannot be attributed 
to a specific group company must be divided between the group 
companies in accordance with sound business practice. 
On the procedural side, there are several provisions requir-
ing that certain resolutions and/or agreements entered into by 
the company must be presented to, and approved by, the gen-
eral meeting in order to be valid and binding upon the com-
pany. By establishing such requirements, the shareholders are 
assured access and influence on specified matters which as such 
are deemed to be of importance for preserving the interests of 
the shareholders as a whole. One important procedural provi-
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sion is set out in section 3–8 of the Public Companies Act. This 
provision requires that agreements between the company and 
its shareholders (as well as board members and ceo) shall be 
entered into on market terms. By establishing strict procedural 
requirements for such types of agreements, the legislature has 
endeavoured to prevent hidden value transfers from the com-
pany to its shareholders (and to the majority shareholder in 
particular), disguised as business agreements.
other minority rights
Rights of a minority of a certain size
A shareholder who alone or together with other shareholders 
reaches a certain ownership level, may enjoy more extensive 
shareholder rights than those granted to an individual share. 
One minority right is the right to demand that an extraordinary 
general meeting be held. This right may be exercised by share-
holders holding more than one twentieth of the share capital of 
the company. There are no requirements as to the nature of the 
matters to be addressed following such request other than that 
the demand must specify a »certain matter«. 
If a proposal to investigate the company’s »establishment, 
management or certain specified matters regarding the man-
agement or the accounts« is supported by at least 10 % of the 
share capital represented at the general meeting, any share-
holder may request that the District Court initiate an investiga-
tion of the company. 
Shareholders who own at least one twentieth of the share 
capital may request that the District Court set a dividend which 
is higher than that set by the general meeting. The Court shall 
consider whether the dividends that have been resolved are 
unreasonably low »taking into consideration the shareholders, 
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the company’s liquidity and its affairs in general«. The minor-
ity shareholders can thus object to being »starved out« of the 
company by a dominant shareholder keeping the dividend dis-
tributions »unreasonably low«. 
Some guidance as to what may be deemed as »unreasona-
bly low« dividend distributions can be found in section 3 (1) of 
the nccg which stipulates that the company should have »… 
equity capital at a level appropriate to its objectives, strategy 
and risk profile«. According to the commentaries to this provi-
sion, an assumption must be made that if a company retains 
capital which is over and above the amount needed to keep 
the company’s equity at a level appropriate to the company’s 
objectives, strategy and risk profile, there must be a justifica-
tion why such surplus is not distributed to the shareholders 
through dividend payments. 
Individual shareholder rights
The individual shareholder rights comprise, most importantly, 
economic rights in the form of a right to a pro rata share of the 
dividend distributions from the company (to the extent such 
rights have not been reduced or eliminated in the company’s 
articles of association). In addition, all shares enjoy certain 
organisational rights that are immune from being reduced or 
eliminated through the articles of association. For instance, all 
shareholders have, without regard to the size of their share-
holding, an unconditional right to be present (either personally 
or by proxy) at the company’s general meetings. It is thus suf-
ficient to have one share in order to gain access to the general 
meeting and the information provided to the shareholders in 
connection therewith. In addition, all shareholders have a right 
to have specified matters addressed by the general meeting. 
Such right is exercised by the shareholder(s) sending a notice 
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to the company’s board of directors no later than one week 
prior to the deadline for convening the general meeting (see 
page 186, Agenda for the general meeting and right to propose 
matters for discussion).
The Public Companies Act also provides each shareholder 
with a right to information. To this end, each shareholder has a 
right to receive the annual accounts, the board’s statement and 
the auditors’ statement and the statement from the corporate 
assembly. At the general meeting, each shareholder can also 
demand information regarding circumstances that may be sig-
nificant for the approval of the annual accounts and the annual 
report, matters which are presented to the general meeting and 
the company’s economic situation. The shareholders’ right 
to information is far-reaching and can only be denied to the 
extent the information demanded cannot be provided with-
out disproportionate harm to the company. An unconditional 
right to information about the company and its operations is 
provided to shareholders representing the majority of the votes 
at the general meeting.
Legal proceedings against a resolution  
adopted by the general meeting
A shareholder who believes that a resolution adopted by the 
general meeting has been adopted illegally or is not in accord-
ance with mandatory law or the company’s articles of associa-
tion, can take legal action to have the resolution rendered void. 
( 247 )
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The context
In Sweden, there are at present some 450,000 limited liabil-
ity companies (aktiebolag or »ab«). The Swedish Companies 
Act (2005) divides limited companies into two categories: pri-
vate companies and public companies. There are around 1,000 
public companies. Public companies, but not private compa-
nies, may turn to the general public to raise capital.
There are at present1 265 Swedish public companies whose 
shares are traded on Swedish regulated markets (i.e., the main 
markets of Nasdaq Stockholm and Nordic Growth Market 
ngm). Such companies, which are the subject of this report, 
* Rolf Skog is the Director General of the Swedish Securities Council, a 
company law expert at the Swedish Ministry of Justice and an Adjunct Profes-
sor at the University of Gothenburg. Erik Sjöman is a member of the Swed-
ish Securities Council and the Listing Committee of Nasdaq Stockholm, and a 
capital markets and public m&a partner at the Vinge law firm.
1. The statistical data in this report typically are as of January 2014 or as 
close as possible to that date.
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are hereinafter referred to as listed companies. Approximately 
90 % of the Nasdaq Stockholm companies’ total market capi-
talisation is attributable to less than 60 large-cap companies, 
whereas the mid-cap and small-cap companies account for the 
remaining 10 %. There are also some 240 companies, most 
of them small, whose shares are traded on multilateral trad-
ing facilities (mtfs) such as Nasdaq First North, Nordic mtf 
and AktieTorget. These companies and the listed companies 
are sometimes jointly referred to as publicly traded companies. 
This report, however, deals only with the listed companies.
From a historical perspective, private owners have domi-
nated the ownership of Swedish listed companies. In the early 
1950s, nearly 75 % of the market capitalisation of the Stock-
holm Stock Exchange (now Nasdaq Stockholm) was directly 
held by individual investors. The remaining 25 % or so was 
owned in part by family-controlled foundations, holding com-
panies and (closed end) investment companies, and in part by 
listed companies themselves, which had significant holdings in 
other companies. Institutional portfolio investors were practi-
cally non-existent at the time.
Two decades later, in the mid-1970s, direct holdings by 
individual investors had declined to around 50 % of the mar-
ket’s capitalisation, and by the mid-1980s it had dropped to 
25 %. Today, less than 15 % of the total market capitalisa-
tion of the Nasdaq Stockholm market is attributable to direct 
shareholdings by individuals. Institutional investors account 
for more than 85 %. 
The reasons behind the institutionalisation of shareholder 
structures are well known. Due to, among other things, chang-
es in savings, pension and tax legislation, capital accumulation 
has been collectivised and increasingly channelled through 
institutional investors. These institutions, in turn, have invest-
ed more of their assets in the stock market. Over a number of 
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years, pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and 
other institutional portfolio investors have been net buyers of 
shares, while individuals have been net sellers. Moreover, insti-
tutions have been over-represented in new share issues, where-
as individuals have been correspondingly underrepresented. 
Importantly, despite this institutionalisation of the owner-
ship structure, a majority of the listed companies still have a 
single or limited number of major shareholders. Recent data 
show that approximately two thirds of Swedish listed compa-
nies had one shareholder holding at least a 20 per of the total 
number of votes in the company. Further, in more than one 
sixth of the listed companies, the blockholder had a majority 
holding of at least 50 % of the votes. These large sharehold-
ers typically play an active ownership role and take particular 
responsibility for the governance of the company, including, 
importantly, through taking seats on the board. This, of course, 
is an entirely different landscape compared to the United King-
dom and the United States. It is also worth noting that Swedish 
institutional investors are reasonably active in the governance 
of the companies in which they have significant investments, 
typically not through taking seats on the boards but through 
active involvement in nomination committees and participa-
tion at general meetings, etc. Swedish institutions are also often 
actively engaged in rule-making in corporate governance mat-
ters. They are, for example, represented on the Swedish Cor-
porate Governance Board as well in the Swedish Securities 
Council. They also commonly publish ownership policies and 
similar policy documents.
The structure of ownership is fully transparent. All compa-
nies must maintain a register of their shares and shareholders. 
Share registers are maintained by a central securities deposito-
ry, the only Swedish one being Euroclear Sweden. The register 
is public (with the exception only of insignificant holdings), so 
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that anyone can gain access to information on the ownership 
structure of a certain company. 
The percentage of foreign ownership in Swedish listed com-
panies was small up until the mid-1990s, when Sweden joined 
the eu and abolished all restrictions on acquisitions of shares 
in Swedish companies. Today more than 40 % of the total 
capitalisation of Swedish listed shares is attributable to foreign 
ownership. Not surprisingly, the main reason for the increase 
in foreign ownership of Swedish listed shares is that foreign 
institutional investors with global portfolios have adjusted 
their holdings to include Swedish equities. Similarly, due to 
more liberal investment regulations, Swedish institutions have 
reduced the portion of Swedish shares in their portfolios dur-
ing the same period. 
Takeover bids for listed companies are common on the 
Swedish market.
The regulatory framework
Corporate governance in Swedish listed companies is regulat-
ed by a combination of written rules and generally accepted 
practice. The framework includes the Companies Act (2005), 
the Swedish Corporate Governance Code (2005, amended in 
2010) and the rules of the market places on which shares are 
admitted to trading, as well as statements by the Swedish Secu-
rities Council on best practices in the Swedish securities mar-
ket. Finally, for companies becoming the object of a takeover 
bid, key provisions are included in the Takeovers Act (2006) 
and the Swedish Takeover Code. 
The Companies Act applies to both private and public com-
panies, unless otherwise expressly stated in specific provisions. 
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In some instances, there are certain provisions of the Act that 
only apply to listed companies. These rules, many of which 
emanate from eu directives, are typically stricter than those 
applicable to non-listed companies. The Companies Act con-
tains general rules regarding the governance of the company. 
The Act specifies which governance bodies must exist in a com-
pany, the tasks of each body and the responsibilities of the peo-
ple in each of these positions. 
The Corporate Governance Code covers many issues not 
covered by the Companies Act. Furthermore, the Code com-
plements the Act by placing more stringent demands on listed 
companies in certain respects, while simultaneously allowing 
them to deviate from rules in individual cases; the ‘comply-or-
explain’ principle. The Code applies to all Swedish companies 
with shares traded on a regulated market in Sweden. At pre-
sent, these markets are the main markets of Nasdaq Stockholm 
and Nordic Growth Market ngm.
The Corporate Governance Code is administered by the 
Swedish Corporate Governance Board, one of three self-regu-
lating bodies within the Swedish Association for Best Practices 
in the Securities Market. This non-profit association, the prin-
cipals of which are nine major, business-sector associations, 
organises the self-regulation on the Swedish securities market. 
The other two self-regulating bodies are the Swedish Securities 
Council and the Swedish Financial Reporting Board.
The Code has received general acceptance on the Swedish 
market and the experiences have so far been positive. The listed 
companies obliged to apply the Code generally do so and dem-
onstrate an ambitious attitude towards complying with it. The 
majority of companies report none or only minor deviations 
from the Code. 
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Basic structure of the governance system
As described above, the Swedish stock market is historically 
characterised by long-term engaged controlling sharehold-
ers typically willing to invest the time and money necessary to 
govern their companies for the benefit of themselves as well 
as of the minority shareholders. The Swedish corporate-gov-
ernance model generally recognises the importance and value 
of long-term engaged controlling shareholders and provides a 
regulatory environment where such shareholders are able to 
build and maintain their stakes and exercise the corresponding 
governance rights. At the same time, importantly, the Swed-
ish model is neutral towards the actual ownership structures 
of the individual companies. The model does not prevent or 
discourage companies with more dispersed shareholder struc-
tures and the model works flexibly and well in such contexts 
as well. Indeed, as pointed out above, more than 85 % of the 
total market capitalisation of the Nasdaq Stockholm market is 
attributable to institutional investors.
The Swedish corporate governance model is based on a 
clear and simple hierarchical governance structure relying on 
(i) the supremacy of the shareholders’ meeting (the general 
meeting), (ii) a board of directors nominated and appointed by 
the shareholders on which the majority of directors may well 
be, and not uncommonly are, appointees of controlling share-
holders, and (iii) a one-person, day-to-day executive manage-
ment function appointed by the board of directors. The board 
is made up exclusively of non-executive directors, with the pos-
sible exception of one person from the executive management, 
usually the ceo.
Thus, the Companies Act stipulates that companies must 
have three decision-making bodies in a strict hierarchical rela-
tionship to one another: the general meeting, the board of 
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directors and the ceo. There must also be a controlling body, 
the statutory auditor, appointed by the general meeting.
The right of dominant shareholders to actually exercise 
control over a company is coupled with strong minority pro-
tection. The Companies Act is designed to prevent dominant 
shareholders from unduly extracting private benefits from 
the company. This is achieved, among other things, through 
qualified majority requirements for certain types of resolutions 
and through a strict prohibition on the general meeting and 
the board taking any action which would give a shareholder 
or anyone else an undue advantage to the disadvantage of the 
company or any other shareholder.
As already mentioned, the shareholdings of institutional 
investors have increased significantly during the last few dec-
ades. Since the aim of institutional investors is not to engage 
in the long-term management of a company in which it holds 
shares, some critics claim that institutional investors do not 
exercise their voting rights and do not act in the long-term 
interests of the company but, rather, focus on short-term share 
price increases. This notwithstanding, Swedish law does not 
impose any corporate governance obligations on sharehold-
ers (institutional or others), thus granting absolute discretion 
to the shareholders whether to exercise their voting rights or 
not. The issue of passive shareholding has to some extent been 
addressed in the Corporate Governance Code, which contains 
several provisions aimed at creating favourable conditions for 
active and responsible shareholding. There are, however, no 
generally applicable rules comparable to the uk Stewardship 
Code and, as mentioned above, the community of Swedish 
institutional investors is, in any event, typically more active 
and engaged in corporate governance matters than in some 
other markets.
From a structural point of view, corporate governance of 
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Swedish listed companies can be described as a third alterna-
tive to, on the one hand, the so-called unitary-board system 
(one-tier), predominantly used in the United States and the 
United Kingdom and other countries with an Anglo-American 
legal tradition and, on the other hand, the dual-board system 
(two-tier), used in many Continental European countries. 
Compared with those, the Swedish Companies Act provides 
for a unitary-board system but with non-executive boards and 
the executive duties statutorily delegated to a separate, one-
person, ceo function. As already mentioned, the main gov-
ernance bodies – the general meeting, the board and the ceo 
– make up a strictly hierarchical chain of command in which 
each body is fully subordinate to the next higher body.
The general meeting
As described above, the Swedish corporate governance model 
is based on a hierarchical structure relying on the supremacy 
of the general meeting. Thus, the general meeting is the com-
pany’s highest decision-making body and the key forum for 
the exertion of shareholder influence. The general meeting 
may decide on any issue which does not expressly fall within 
the exclusive competence of another corporate body. In other 
words, the general meeting has a sovereign role over the board 
of directors and the ceo.
The general meeting decides, among other things, on the 
election and dismissal of individual directors of the board 
as well as on their remuneration. The general meeting also 
appoints the company’s statutory auditor. 
The general rule under the Companies Act is that all shares 
confer the same right in the company. However, the articles of 
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association may provide that shares of different classes with 
different rights in the company may be issued. This means that 
a Swedish company can, for example, issue shares of different 
classes that are distinguished by their voting power. However, 
the maximum voting ratio between high vote and low vote 
shares may not exceed 1:10. The system of dual-class com-
mon stock is widely used among Swedish listed companies. In 
the beginning of the 1990’s, around 85 % of these companies 
had multiple classes of shares carrying different voting rights 
whereas, today, slightly more than half of the listed companies 
apply this system. Almost without exception, the voting ratio is 
1:10. Shares without voting rights cannot be issued.
Although there is an increasing use of equipment for elec-
tronic voting and counting of votes, resolutions at general 
meetings are still typically adopted through acclamation. A 
single shareholder may call for vote counting, but even in such 
situations, unless an electronic voting facility is used, votes 
are usually only counted to the extent necessary to reach the 
majority requirement for the resolution concerned, in most 
cases more than 50 %. This means that, for most resolutions 
at Swedish general meetings, there is no information about the 
total number of affirmative, negative and abstained votes cast. 
As a general rule, resolutions at general meetings are 
adopted by simple majority vote and no special quorum 
requirements apply. However, certain resolutions require a 
qualified majority. As already discussed, the right of dominant 
shareholders to actually exercise control, potentially by way 
of shares with multiple voting rights, is coupled with strong 
minority-protection rules. The requirement of qualified major-
ity for certain types of important resolutions – where, impor-
tantly, shares with multiple voting rights typically are counted 
without regard for their multiple votes – is an important part 
of this protection. Such qualified-majority requirements (typi-
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cally, two-thirds of the votes cast and the shares represented at 
the general meeting, but in some instances even more) apply, 
for example, to amendments to the articles of association or 
directed issuances of shares or other equity securities. Equally 
important is the prohibition on the general meeting and the 
board taking any action which would give a shareholder or 
anyone else an undue advantage to the disadvantage of the 
company or any other shareholder.
Due to conflict of interest, a shareholder may not, in per-
son or through a proxy, vote in respect of (i) legal proceed-
ings against him or her, (ii) his or her discharge from liability 
in damages or other obligations towards the company, or (iii) 
legal proceedings or a discharge as referred to in points (i) and 
(ii) in respect of another person, where the shareholder in ques-
tion possesses a material interest which may conflict with the 
interests of the company. 
Each shareholder has the right to participate in the general 
meeting and to vote the shares owned. Shareholders who are 
not able to attend in person may exercise their rights by proxy. 
As a general rule, proxy solicitation by the company is not 
permitted. However, a company’s articles of association may 
allow the company to distribute proxy forms to the sharehold-
ers, where the shareholder may indicate its voting instructions 
(Yes/No) regarding the various items on the agenda which are 
then executed by the proxy stated in the form. However, this 
possibility is rarely used.
Generally speaking, the rights of the individual sharehold-
er are relatively far-reaching in Sweden. Thus, for example, 
a single share suffices for the right to have items included in 
the agenda of general meetings (provided that the request is 
submitted in due time to be included in the notice of the meet-
ing), to file counter-proposals at the meeting and to pose ques-
tions to the board and management, to which they must duly 
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respond. Most of the provisions of the eu Shareholder Rights 
Directive (2007) were a part of the Swedish system long before 
the Directive. In addition, minorities of certain size (typically, 
10 % of all shares) are afforded particular rights, such as the 
right to have a special examiner appointed to review certain 
aspects of the company’s actions.
A company is required to hold one annual general meeting. 
In addition, extraordinary general meetings may be convened 
at any time by the board, including (mandatorily) upon writ-
ten request by the company’s statutory auditor or a minority 
of shareholders together holding at least 10 % of the shares. 
At the annual general meeting, the shareholders must, among 
other things, resolve upon the adoption of the annual accounts 
and the allocation of profits and losses, appoint board mem-
bers and an auditor, and decide on fees for the board members 
and the auditor. The meeting must also resolve on any other 
matter duly included on the agenda. A special Swedish feature 
is the obligation of the annual general meeting also to resolve 
upon discharge from liability for the board members and the 
ceo. Such discharge relates to each person individually to 
the effect, very briefly, that the management of the company 
is approved and that no claims for damages, except in certain 
special circumstances, may be brought against the individual.
In practice, at the annual general meetings of Swedish listed 
companies typically all major shareholders and most domestic 
institutional investors participate, while foreign investors are 
typically represented by proxies.
In addition to agenda items required by law or the compa-
ny’s articles of association, the annual general meetings of list-
ed companies normally include a speech by the ceo, followed 
by a q&a session where shareholders can ask questions about 
the company’s affairs. These sessions are used by, for example, 
private individual shareholders, the Swedish Small Sharehold-
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ers Association, and Swedish as well as foreign institutional 
investors to ask questions and express views on the manage-
ment of the company, leading sometimes to quite lengthy dis-
cussions. Resolutions on executive remuneration, including 
incentive plans, are also taking up an increasing part of annual 
general meetings.
The board of directors
Duties and responsibilities
As already mentioned, the Companies Act stipulates that com-
panies must have three decision-making bodies in a hierarchi-
cal relationship to one another: the general meeting, the board 
of directors and the ceo. The board is responsible for the com-
pany’s organisation and the management of the company’s 
affairs. The extensive decision-making authority assigned by 
the law to the board of directors is primarily limited by the 
legal provisions giving the general meeting exclusive decision-
making powers on certain matters – for example, amendments 
to the articles of association, election of board members and 
auditors and the adoption of the balance sheet and income 
statement – and by the board’s general obligation to comply 
with any specific directives passed by the general meeting (pro-
vided that they are not illegal). A board member owes his or her 
duties to the company as a whole (i.e., to all shareholders) and 
not to any particular shareholder with whom he or she may 
have close ties. 
The board’s obligation to ensure that the company’s organ-
isation is appropriate entails, among other things, having in 
place sensible administrative procedures and routines and a 
good choice of employees. The board’s responsibility for the 
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management of the company’s affairs includes a responsibil-
ity for, in principle, all duties where the general meeting is not 
the exclusive decision-maker. This includes, of course, making 
long-term strategic decisions regarding the company’s future 
policy and focus.
Furthermore, the board must ensure that the company’s 
organisation is structured so that accounting, management of 
funds and the company’s finances in general are monitored in 
a satisfactory manner. By virtue of this provision, emphasis is 
placed on the board’s responsibility for the company’s organ-
isation in light of the economic issues of significance for the 
company. Depending on the structure of the organisation, the 
need for control may, however, vary from company to compa-
ny. Naturally, it is up to the board of directors to ensure that the 
company’s control functions are structured in a manner which 
meets the needs in the individual case. 
Further, the board is required to ensure that the company 
has adequate internal controls and for malised routines to 
ensure that approved principles for financial reporting and 
internal controls are applied, and that the company’s financial 
reports are prepared in accordance with legislation, applicable 
accounting standards and other requirements for listed com-
panies.
The board must appoint a ceo who will be in charge of the 
day-to-day management of the company. To maintain a clear 
hierarchical governance structure, the board is required to 
clarify the allocation of work between the board and the ceo 
through written instructions. 
The Companies Act does not, in principle, contain any sub-
stantive provisions concerning a company’s business opera-
tions or how the board is to conduct the company’s business, 
except for the obligation to pursue a profit and comply with 
the provisions of the articles of association. In addition, there 
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are no specific provisions on corporate social responsibility 
in Swedish corporate legislation. Nevertheless, specific legis-
lation in other segments together form a comprehensive net-
work for the protection of external stakeholders and society 
at large – for example, employment law, work environmental 
law, environmental law, competition law, marketing law, tax 
law, etc. – with which a company must comply.
Appointment and removal;  
 nomination committees
The principal rule of the Companies Act is that the board of 
directors is appointed by the general meeting. 
Board members are elected by plurality vote, i.e. the person 
who has received the largest number of votes is elected. There 
is no requirement that the winner gain an absolute majority of 
votes. 
While the Companies Act explicitly regulates the election 
of board members, it is silent on the process of nominating 
the candidates for board positions. This is, on the other hand, 
probably the most well developed and important aspect of the 
Corporate Governance Code. 
In general terms the Code states that the general meeting’s 
decisions on election and remuneration of the board of directors 
(and auditor) are to be prepared in a structured, clearly stated 
process governed by the shareholders, ensuring well-informed 
decision making. Hence, listed companies are to have a nomi-
nation committee, the task of which is to propose candidates 
for the post of chair and other members of the board, as well as 
fees and other remuneration to each mem ber of the board. The 
nomination committee is also required to make proposals on 
the election and remuneration of the statutory auditor.
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The nomination committee must consist of at least three 
members, one of whom is to be appointed committee chair. 
The majority of the members of the nomination committee 
are to be independ ent of the company and its executive man-
agement. Neither the ceo nor other members of the executive 
management may be members of the nomination committee. 
Typically, representatives of the 3–5 largest shareholders in the 
company are appointed members of the committee. However, 
at least one member of the committee must be independent of 
the company’s largest shareholder or group of shareholders 
that act in concert in the governance of the company.
Members of the board of directors may be members of 
the nomination committee but may not constitute a majority 
thereof. Typically, only one (usually the chair of the board) is a 
member of the nomination committee. Neither the chair of the 
board nor any other member of the board may be the chair of 
the nomination committee. 
The nomination committee is required to submit a proposal 
to the annual general meeting regarding the size of the board 
and nominates a corresponding number of candidates for elec-
tion for a one-year term. Any shareholder may (at or prior to 
the meeting) propose additional candidates for consideration 
or suggest an alternative board size, but this is rare in practice. 
Where the board size and the number of candidates are identi-
cal, which is usually the case in practice, a single vote in favour 
is sufficient to elect a candidate to the board. Technically each 
director is elected individually, although it may in such situa-
tions appear to some observers as if the proposal were a bun-
dled resolution. 
A board member’s term of office is one year, unless other-
wise prescribed in the articles of association. 
A board member is always entitled to resign early. He or she 
does so by giving notice of resignation to the board of direc-
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tors. No reason needs to be stated for the resignation. 
A board member elected by the general meeting may also 
be removed from his or her appointment at any time by the 
general meeting. This is due to the fact that an appointment as 
board member is strongly based on trust. If the shareholders 
no longer have confidence in one or more board members, an 
extraordinary general meeting can be held at any time in order 
to resolve on termination of the appointment of the member 
concerned. The dismissal can take place immediately and with-
out cause and the dismissed member is not entitled to pursue 
any claim for compensation. Under Swedish rules, there can be 
no us-style staggered boards.
Regarding remuneration of directors, see below.
Size and composition
The board of directors of a public company must comprise at 
least three members. Legal persons may not be board members.
The board may also include employee representatives, 
either voluntarily through a resolution by the general meeting 
or pursuant to mandatory provisions contained in the Board 
Representation (Private Employees) Act.
Among the listed companies, the average number of board 
members (excluding employee representatives) is 6.5 mem-
bers. Dividing the companies into different categories accord-
ing to size shows that there is a positive correlation between 
size and the number of board members. Among large-, mid- 
and small-cap companies, the average is 8.3, 6.6 and 5.8 mem-
bers, respectively. 
With the exception of general principles for board compo-
sition set out in the Corporate Governance Code and certain 
formal requirements contained in the Companies Act – for 
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example, that a legal person, child, undischarged bankrupt or 
a person who is subject to an injunction against trading must 
not be a board member – there are no explicit rules in the Com-
panies Act or in the Code governing the composition of the 
board or the qualifications to be possessed by its members. 
In line with the hierarchical governance model, the choice of 
board members is left to the discretion of the shareholders at 
the general meeting.
According to the Corporate Governance Code, the board 
must have a size and composition that enables it to manage the 
company’s affairs efficiently and with integrity. The composi-
tion must be appropriate to the company’s operations, phase 
of development and other relevant circumstances. According 
to the Code, the board members elected by the general meeting 
are collectively to exhibit diversity and breadth of qualifica-
tions, experience and background. 
During the last couple of years gender distribution on the 
board has been a recurring theme in the Swedish public debate. 
Proposals have been put forward for legislation but so far the 
Government has resisted any form of legislative intervention 
and left the matter to the business sector to regulate internally. 
According to the Corporate Governance Code, companies are 
to ‘strive for equal gender distribution on the board’. Current-
ly, women hold around 24 % of all board positions in listed 
companies. Although this is a substantial increase from about 
6 % ten years ago, the development has stagnated in the last 
few years and the issue is a matter of continued heated debate.
The average age of board members in the listed companies 
is 57 years, with little differences between companies of differ-
ent size. 10 % of the board members are 70 years old or more. 
The composition of the boards also reflects the continued 
internationalisation of Swedish business and the increased 
foreign ownership of Swedish listed shares. Some 15 % of the 
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board positions are held by foreigners and, in 22 companies, 
half or more of the board members are foreigners. 
As also mentioned elsewhere in this report, an important 
aspect of the Swedish corporate governance model is a strict 
division of duties and responsibilities between the board and 
the executive management. This is manifested in two impor-
tant ways. The first is that according to long-standing practice, 
today codified in the Corporate Governance Code, not more 
than one person from the company’s executive management 
may be a board member. To the extent this possibility is used at 
all, which is the case in about 36 % of the companies, this posi-
tion is usually taken up by the ceo, who is in any event enti-
tled to participate in board meetings. Hence, for all practical 
purposes, Swedish boards are non-executive. The second is the 
requirement, as set out in the Companies Act, that the alloca-
tion of duties between the board and the ceo is to be clarified 
through written instructions. 
There are no provisions in the Companies Act concerning 
independence of directors, with the exception that in a public 
company the ceo may not be chair of the board and a special 
requirement regarding the composition of audit committees. 
However, the concept plays an important role in the Corpo-
rate Governance Code, although the definition differs from 
that applied in most countries outside the Nordic region. A 
distinction is made between, on the one hand, independence 
in relation to the company and its executive management and, 
on the other hand, independence in relation to the company’s 
major shareholders (defined as owners of more than 10 % of 
the shares or votes of the company). Based on this distinction, 
the Code prescribes that the majority of board members are 
to be independent in the first sense, and that at least two of 
these directors are also to be independent in the second sense. 
This means that it is possible for major shareholders of Swed-
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ish companies to appoint a majority of board members with 
whom they have close ties. This is in line with the Swedish posi-
tive view of active and responsible ownership.
A director’s independence is to be determined by a general 
assessment of all factors that may give cause to question the 
individual’s independence. The Code contains a list of factors 
that should be considered. 
Board committees
Under the Companies Act and/or the Corporate Governance 
Code, all listed companies must have a nomination committee, 
a remuneration committee and an audit committee. However, 
as stated above, the nomination committee in Swedish corpo-
rate governance is not a board committee but a committee set 
up by the shareholders at the annual general meeting.
Furthermore, as to the remuneration committees and the 
audit committees, the board as a whole may elect to perform 
the duties of these committees. Hence there is no unconditional 
obligation for Swedish boards to set up separate sub-commit-
tees for these or any other purposes. This reflects the fact that, 
as pointed out in the previous sub-section, Swedish boards are 
non-executive, which means that conflicts of interest between 
the board and the executive management are less of an issue 
than what is the case, for example, in a mixed executive/non-
executive board under a one-tier governance system. Instead, 
the question of establishing board sub-committees for the pur-
pose of dealing with specific duties becomes primarily a matter 
of efficient organisation of the board’s work, a question that is 
left to the individual boards to decide.
Swedish board committees may only be comprised of board 
members. Furthermore, delegation of work from the board 
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of directors, including the establishment of board commit-
tees to prepare its decisions on certain issues, does not relieve 
the board from the ultimate responsibility for the company’s 
organisation and management or the responsibility to ensure 
satisfactory control of the company’s accounting, funds man-
agement and finances. The responsibility remains with the 
board, which must demonstrate care when assigning a task to 
another party and must regularly check to ensure that the party 
who has assumed certain duties is indeed carrying them out 
in a satisfactory way. Accordingly, most board committees of 
Swedish companies are given mainly preparatory tasks, leav-
ing the important decisions to the board itself.
Employee representatives
Employment representation on corporate boards is governed 
by the Board Representation (Private Employees) Act, under 
which the employees’ right to be represented on the board of 
directors depends on (i) the number of employees of the com-
pany in question (or in case the company is the ultimate parent 
of a group, the number of employees in the whole group) and 
(ii) whether the company is bound by a collective agreement. 
If the company, or the group as applicable, has more than 25 
employees, two employee representatives may be appointed 
and, if the company has more than 1,000 employees and is 
engaged in different lines of businesses, three representatives 
may be appointed.
It should be noted that employee board representation 
is an employee right but not an obligation. Accordingly, it is 
not uncommon for employees to abstain from making use of 
their rights in this respect, sometimes perhaps in exchange for 
 other benefits. In fact, slightly less than 40 % of listed company 
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boards today include employee representatives.
The employee representatives are appointed by the trade 
union to which the company is bound by a collective bargain-
ing agreement. Hence, if the company is not bound by a collec-
tive agreement, employee representatives need not be appoint-
ed. The number of employee representatives in a board may 
not exceed the number of other board members. The employee 
representatives are typically employees of the company but do 
not have to be.
Pursuant to the Companies Act, the employee representa-
tives on the board of directors are equated with other board 
members, unless otherwise stated in the Board Representation 
(Private Employees) Act or the Companies Act. Thus, as a gen-
eral rule, the employee representatives on the board have the 
same rights, obligations and responsibilities as any other board 
member. 
Conflicts of interest
According to the Companies Act, a board member or the ceo 
may not address a question regarding (i) an agreement between 
the board member or the ceo and the company, (ii) an agree-
ment between the company and a third party where the board 
member or the ceo in question has a material interest which 
may conflict with that of the company, or (iii) an agreement 
between the company and a legal person which the board 
member or ceo alone or together with a third person may rep-
resent.
Point (i) covers, for example, questions regarding the entry 
into supply contracts or compensation for own work per-
formed. Point (ii) covers situations involving an agreement 
between, for example, a person closely related to the board 
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member (or ceo) and the company. Point (iii) entails, for 
example, that a member of the board of a bank, who is also a 
member of the board of an industrial company, cannot partici-
pate in a decision by the industrial company’s board to take up 
a loan with the bank in question. It is irrelevant whether he or 
she has had anything to do with the matter in the capacity of 
member of the board of the bank. 
A board member or ceo can also be deemed to have a con-
flict of interest in situations other than those directly covered 
by the Companies Act. In situations involving the ‘appearance 
of impropriety’, he or she should not participate in the hand-
ling of the matter in question. 
The purpose of the conflict-of-interest rules is to protect the 
company’s, i.e. ultimately the shareholders’, interests. Accord-
ingly, such rules may be set aside if all shareholders agree. 
Under special provisions of the Companies Act, certain 
resolutions regarding issuances and transfers of securities to 
board members, the ceo, other employees and certain other 
related parties must be passed by the general meeting and are 
subject to a 9/10 qualified-majority requirement. Further-
more, outside the scope of these special provisions, according 
to Statement 2012:05 by the Swedish Securities Council, in 
the event that a listed company decides to transfer shares in 
a subsidiary or a business or other assets to an officer of the 
company – provided the transfer is not insignificant to the com-
pany – a resolution concerning the transfer must be adopted or 
approved by the general meeting.
Before the proposed resolution is presented to the general 
meeting, the board of directors must obtain a valuation opin-
ion from an independent expert and prepare a report regard-
ing the proposed transfer. The opinion and the report must be 
made available by the company and posted on the company’s 
website prior to the general meeting that will address the issue. 
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The opinion and the report must also be presented at the gen-
eral meeting. The aforementioned will also apply where the 
company or its subsidiary adopts a resolution to acquire assets 
from an officer of the company.
Except for the rules described above, there are no rules in 
the Companies Act or the Corporate Governance Code regard-
ing related-party transactions.
Board evaluation
The Companies Act does not contain any provisions concern-
ing evaluation of the board’s performance. Under the Corpo-
rate Governance Code, however, the board of directors and 
the ceo are to be regularly and systematically evaluated. The 
results of the evaluation are to be made available to the nomi-
nation committee. 
The chair of the board bears the ultimate responsibility for 
organising the evaluation and for informing the nomination 
committee of the results in relevant regards.
Role of the chair of the board
The Companies Act prescribes that the board is to elect a 
chair from among its members. However, nothing prevents 
the general meeting, in its capacity as the company’s highest 
decision-making body, from appointing the chair of the board. 
According to the Corporate Governance Code, the chair is to 
be elected by the general meeting, which is today also the gen-
eral practice among listed companies.
The task of the chair is to preside over the work of the board 
and to ensure that the board performs its duties as prescribed in 
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the Companies Act and other legislation. Under the Corporate 
Governance Code, the chair is required to ensure that the work 
of the board is conducted efficiently and that the board fulfils 
its obligations. In particular, the chair must (i) organise and 
lead the work of the board with a view to creating the best pos-
sible conditions for the board’s activities, (ii) ensure that new 
board members receive the necessary introductory training, as 
well as any other training that the chair and the member agree 
is appropriate, (iii) ensure that the board regularly updates and 
develops its knowledge of the company and its operations, 
(iv) be responsible for contacts with the shareholders regard-
ing ownership issues and communicate shareholders’ views to 
the board, (v) ensure that the board receives sufficient infor-
mation and documentation to enable it to conduct its work, 
(vi) in consultation with the ceo, draw up proposed agendas 
for board meetings, (vii) verify that the board’s decisions are 
implemented and (viii) ensure that the work of the board is 
evaluated annually.
Decision making
The Companies Act does not require a certain minimum num-
ber of board meetings to be held each year, but the chair of the 
board must ensure that meetings are held when needed. The 
rules of procedure of the board are to state how often meetings 
are to be held. Any board member and the ceo may, however, 
request that a board meeting be convened at any time. In prac-
tice, most listed-company boards normally meet 5–10 times 
per year, although in special circumstances, e.g. in crisis situa-
tions, the meeting frequency may be considerably higher.
According to the Companies Act, the board is quorate if 
more than one half of the total number of board members, 
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including employee representatives, or such higher number as 
prescribed in the articles of association, are present. 
If a board member has a conflict of interest with respect to 
any issue or issues to be considered at the meeting, such mem-
ber is deemed to be absent. If this results in the meeting not 
being quorate with respect to the issue or issues on which the 
member has a conflict of interest, an alternate member who 
does not have a conflict of interest can be called to attend the 
meeting instead. However, according to the Corporate Gov-
ernance Code, there are to be no alternate board members.
In order for board members to make decisions on differ-
ent issues, they must have received satisfactory information as 
a basis for the decision. Such information may include writ-
ten material as well as an oral presentation. The information 
must be easy to understand and informative. Everything that 
is of importance for consideration of the matter must be stated 
in the material. The chair bears the ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring that this is the case.
Board resolutions are adopted by a simple majority. Thus, 
in a board comprising six members, if all members are present 
a decision must be supported by four members. If not all mem-
bers are present, at least one third of the entire number of board 
members must support the resolution in order for the resolu-
tion to be valid. In the event of a tied vote, the chair has a cast-
ing vote. The articles of association may prescribe either strict-
er or more lenient majority requirements than stated in the 
Companies Act. In Swedish board practice, dissenting opinions 
by board members elected by the general meeting are very rare, 
i.e. there is a strong preference to reach unanimous decisions. 
272 a p p e N d i x  d  
Shareholder protection
As mentioned above, there is a strict prohibition on the board 
(and the general meeting) taking any action which would give 
a shareholder or anyone else an undue advantage to the dis-
advantage of the company or any other shareholder. As men-
tioned above, there is a general limitation of the board’s gen-
eral obligation to comply with any specific directives passed 
by the general meeting, in that the board must not comply with 
shareholder instructions which are illegal. These restrictions, 
together with the various other rules discussed herein form the 
shareholder-protection regime for Swedish companies as far as 
actions by the board are concerned.
The executive management 
The ceo, which is the single-person executive management 
function of a Swedish company, is responsible for the day-
to-day management of the company’s affairs. According to 
the Companies Act, the day-to-day management of the com-
pany includes all measures that, taking into consideration 
the scope and nature of the company’s business, are not of an 
unusual nature or major significance. For example, this may 
include agreements with customers and suppliers, employ-
ment agreements, etc. Any agreements which are uncom-
mon or of major significance for the company, when viewed 
in light of their content, long-term nature, or the values at 
stake, do not fall within the scope of day-to-day management. 
To maintain a clear hierarchical governance structure, the 
board is required to define the allocation of duties between the 
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board and the ceo through written general instructions, to be 
reviewed annually. 
The ceo is responsible for the operation of the company 
and the execution of the board’s decisions. Furthermore, he or 
she must take the measures required to ensure that the com-
pany’s accounts are maintained in accordance with law and 
that the management of funds is conducted in a satisfactory 
manner. 
The ceo is subordinate to the board of directors and is 
appointed and dismissed at the discretion of the board. The 
Companies Act does not state any specific term of office for 
the ceo. He or she is normally appointed as an employee until 
further notice.
The board may instruct the ceo on how day-to-day man-
agement issues are to be handled or decided. Within the frame-
work defined by the Companies Act and the company’s articles 
of association, the ceo is obliged to follow instructions given 
by the board. The board itself may also decide on matters that 
are part of day-to-day management, although this is normally 
avoided in practice. In fact, there is a generally embraced norm 
of conduct of boards to strictly respect the line of demarcation 
of duties vis-à-vis the ceo.
The ceo may be a member of the board but not its chair. 
As already mentioned, irrespective of whether the ceo is a 
member of the board or not, he or she has the right to attend 
and speak at board meetings provided that the board does not 
decide otherwise in a particular situation.
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remuneration
Director and executive remuneration is addressed both in the 
Companies Act and the Corporate Governance Code. The 
philosophy underlying Swedish regulation and practice in 
this respect is that all remuneration should be decided upon 
by the next higher governance body than that to which the 
remuneration applies. In other words, no one is to have any 
decisive influence over one’s own remuneration. Furthermore, 
the Code states that »remuneration and other terms of employ-
ment of members of the board and the executive management 
are to be designed with the aim of ensuring that the com pany 
has access to the competence required at a cost appropriate to 
the company, and so that they have the intended effects for the 
company’s operations«.
Remuneration of the board 
Remuneration of the board in a Swedish limited liability com-
pany is, and has always been, a matter for the general meeting 
to decide. Hence, on the basis of the proposal from the nomi-
nation committee, it is for the general meeting to decide fees 
and other compensation in respect of the board duties of each 
of the board members. It is not permissible for the meeting to 
determine a lump sum which the board can allocate between its 
members as it sees fit.
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Remuneration of the CEo and executive management
Ten years ago, executive remuneration was largely the exclu-
sive province of the chair and the ceo, with little or no involve-
ment by institutional investors (controlling investors being 
the exception as they are able to provide input on executive 
remuneration through their membership on the board). Today, 
Swedish companies are required to include a binding resolu-
tion on the remuneration policy on the agenda of the annual 
general meeting (a »say-on-pay« resolution). 
Under the Corporate Governance Code, the general meet-
ing is to decide on all share and share-price-related incen tive 
plans for the executive management. The decision of the gen-
eral meeting must include all the principal conditions of the 
plan. Background material and documentation pertaining 
to the proposed plan must be made available to shareholders 
in due time prior to the general meet ing. The documentation 
must be clear and simple enough to allow shareholders to form 
an opinion on the reasons for the plan, the principal conditions 
of the plan and any dilution of the share capital that may result 
from it, as well as the total cost to the company of different 
conceivable outcomes.
Share and share-price-related incentive plans are to be 
designed with the aim of achieving increased alignment 
between the interests of the participating individual and the 
company’s shareholders. Plans involving acquisition of shares 
should be designed so that a personal holding of shares in the 
company is promoted. The vesting period or the period from 
the commencement of an agreement to the date for acquisition 
of shares must be no less than three years.
Owing to these approval provisions and the increasing 
use of share-based incentive plans (particularly in large listed 
companies), it is common for Swedish companies to consult 
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their largest shareholders on executive remuneration matters 
in advance of annual general meetings. And, while Swedish 
boards have always decided the ceo’s remuneration pack-
age, their involvement in setting overall remuneration policy 
in listed companies has expanded in recent years. As already 
mentioned, the board is required to establish a remuneration 
committee, the main tasks of which are set out in the Code.
The statutory auditor
With the exception of small private companies according to 
certain size criteria, all Swedish limited liability companies 
must have at least one statutory auditor. The articles of associa-
tion may prescribe that the company is to have more than one 
auditor, a practice that was previously common among major 
listed companies but is now generally abandoned. Thus, most 
Swedish listed companies today have but one auditor.
In listed companies, at least one of the auditors must be a 
chartered accountant. An audit firm may be appointed auditor, 
but in such case the audit firm must appoint an individual as 
auditor-in-charge for the client company.
The company’s statutory auditor is appointed by the gen-
eral meeting. Thus, auditors of Swedish companies are given 
their assignment by, and are obliged to report to, the share-
holders, and they must not allow their work to be governed 
or influenced by the board or the executive management. This 
approach must be evaluated in light of the recently adopted eu 
rules on the reform of the audit sector.
The primary task of the auditor is to examine the com-
pany’s annual report and accounting practices as well as the 
management of the board of directors and the ceo. In the case 
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of a parent company, the auditor will also examine the consoli-
dated accounts. 
The auditor will submit an auditor’s report to the gener-
al meeting following each financial year. Part of the auditor’s 
mandate is to recommend whether the annual general meeting 
should adopt the balance sheet and the profit and loss account, 
whether the board members and the ceo should be granted 
discharge from liability, and whether the company’s results 
should be appropriated in accordance with the board’s pro-
posal.
The auditor has the right to be present at general meetings 
of the company, and upon request by the board he or she is 
obliged to participate. In practice the auditor is normally pre-
sent at all general meetings of listed companies, often giving at 
annual general meetings an oral presentation of the audit work 
during the year and the resulting audit report.
The auditor constitutes an important part of the share-
holders’ monitoring of the board and the management of the 
company. However, the auditor also plays an important role 
in safeguarding the interests of other stakeholders, primarily 
creditors. Furthermore, in certain circumstances the auditor 
may be obliged to report to the police regarding crimes com-
mitted by board members or the ceo, typically crimes of an 
economic nature that might cause damage to the company.
In addition to the statutory auditor, a minority represent-
ing at least 10 % of all shares in a company or one third of 
the shares represented at the general meeting may require the 
appointment of a minority auditor who will participate in the 
audit together with the other auditor(s).
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Minority protection
As already mentioned, the right of dominant shareholders to 
actually exercise control over a company, potentially by way 
of shares with multiple voting rights, is coupled with strong 
minority-protection rules. Although there is some potential 
for further improvements, this is a key feature of the Swedish 
governance model, counterbalancing the rights of dominant 
shareholders.
The Companies Act is designed to prevent dominant share-
holders from unduly extracting private benefits from the com-
pany. This is achieved, among other things, through quali-
fied-majority requirements for certain types of resolutions 
and through a strict prohibition on the general meeting and 
the board taking any action which would give a shareholder 
or anyone else an undue advantage to the disadvantage of the 
company or any other shareholder.
As a general rule, resolutions at general meetings are adopt-
ed by simple majority vote and no special quorum require-
ments apply. However, certain resolutions require a qualified 
majority. The requirement of qualified majority for certain 
types of important resolutions – where, importantly, shares 
with multiple voting rights typically are counted with disregard 
of their multiple votes – is an important part of this protection. 
Such qualified majority requirements (typically, two-thirds of 
the votes cast and the shares represented at the general meet-
ing, but in some instances even more) apply, for example, to 
amendments to the articles of association or directed issuances 
of shares or other equity securities.
Equally important is the prohibition on the general meeting 
taking any action which would give a shareholder or anyone 
else an undue advantage to the disadvantage of the company or 
any other shareholder.
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Due to conflict of interest, a shareholder may not, in per-
son or through a proxy, vote in respect of (i) legal proceed-
ings against him or her, (ii) his or her discharge from liability 
in damages or other obligations towards the company, or (iii) 
legal proceedings or a discharge as referred to in points (i) and 
(ii) in respect of another person, where the shareholder in ques-
tion possesses a material interest which may conflict with the 
interests of the company. 
Generally speaking, the rights of the individual shareholder 
are relatively far-reaching in Sweden and hence most of the 
provisions of the eu Shareholder Rights Directive (2007) were 
a part of the Swedish system long before the Directive. In addi-
tion, minorities of certain size (typically, 10 % of all shares) 
are afforded certain rights, such as the right to have a special 
examiner appointed to review certain aspects of the company’s 
actions.
As mentioned above, there is a strict prohibition on the 
board (as well as on the general meeting as mentioned above) 
taking any action which would give a shareholder or anyone 
else an undue advantage to the disadvantage of the company 
or any other shareholder. As mentioned above, there is a gen-
eral limitation of the board’s general obligation to comply with 
any specific directives passed by the general meeting in that the 
board must not comply with shareholder instructions which 
are illegal. These restrictions, together with the various other 
rules discussed herein form the shareholder protection regime 
for Swedish companies as far as actions by the board are con-
cerned.
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 Background and purpose of the study
The prevalence of control ownership in listed companies is 
an important characteristic of Nordic corporate governance. 
However, comprehensive data documenting this is difficult to 
find. It was therefore decided to carry out a special sub-study 
aimed at analysing the degree of ownership concentration in 
companies on the Nordic stock markets using the uk stock 
markets as a benchmark. The collection of data was commis-
sioned to sis Ägarservice, a Stockholm-based consultancy spe-
cialised in the analysis of ownership and board data for listed 
companies.1
1. sis Ägarservice ab: www.aktieservice.se. The research team was made 
up of ceo Daniel Fristedt, staff members Svetlana Kesareva and Åsa Larsson, 
ad hoc employed students Mathilda Alm and Nils Voigt Dahl, and statistical 
expert Per Sundqvist, under the leadership of sis founding partner Sven-Ivan 
Sundqvist.
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 Methodology
For the Nordic countries, all domestically domiciled companies 
listed on the primary national stock exchange of the respective 
countries during the period May–June 2014 were included in 
the study. This amounted to 131 companies for Denmark, 119 
for Finland, 136 for Norway and 239 for Sweden, totalling 
625 companies for the Nordic region as a whole.2 
For the uk, a sample of 116 companies was randomly 
selected from all companies listed on the lse Main Market 
during June and July 2014, excluding companies with non-uk 
domicile and companies without ordinary shares, in all a popu-
lation of 820 companies. Hence, contrary to the Nordic data, 
the analysis of the uk material is subject to random error, the 
probable importance of which is indicated below. 
The data source for Sweden was sis Ägarservice’s own data 
base, while home pages and/or latest available annual reports 
of the companies listed on the respective stock exchanges were 
used for the other Nordic countries and the uk.
Two »cut-off levels« of control ownership were applied, 
namely at least one shareholder controlling more than 20 % 
and 50 %, respectively, of the total votes of the company. The 
20 % level was chosen in order to obtain comparability with 
earlier studies of the same kind,3 while the 50 % level was cho-
sen because it represents absolute majority power of a single 
shareholder. 
A »shareholder« was defined as a physical individual or a 
specific legal unit, e.g. a company, a foundation, the State, etc. 
Hence, no consideration was given to the existence of so-called 
2. These numbers deviate slightly from those reported in Table ii.2 (p. 44) 
due to the exclusion here of companies with foreign domicile and because of 
new listings and de-listings since the end of 2013.
3.  E.g. those referred to in Chapter ii (p. 48) of the main report.
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»ownership spheres« which are fairly common on the Nordic 
markets, i.e. groups of shareholders with more or less strong 
mutual ties which tend to act in concert as a single »meta share-
holder« of the company. Although consideration of such own-
ership spheres could be seen as resulting in a more truthful pic-
ture of the prevalence of control ownership, it would involve a 
considerable degree of subjective judgement and has therefore 
not been deemed a worthwhile pursuit in this study. 
For the breakdown of the results based on company size, 
the size categories used in Table ii.3 (p. 46) have been used. 
This classification system has also been »manually« applied to 
the uk sample.
 results
The first table below shows the number of companies analysed 
for each country and its breakdown into size categories.
The second table shows the number and share of companies 
– in total and per size category – having at least one shareholder 
in control of more than 20 % of the votes of the company. All 
numbers are rounded off to the nearest whole number.  
When comparing the Nordic numbers with those for the 
uk, it should be kept in mind that the latter are based on a 
randomly chosen sample and hence subject to statistical error.4 
At a 95 % confidence level, this amounts to ± 7.4 percentage 
points for the exact estimate 26.7 % for all uk companies, i.e. 
the true population percentage can be assumed to lie between 
4. It would be a highly relevant research effort to extend this investigation 
to a complete survey of the uk as well as selected other European markets. 
However, due to time and financial constraints, this has not been possible with-
in the framework of this study.
283ownership  Concentration on the Nordic Stock  Markets 
NuMBER of companies analysed per country.
 Denmark finland Norway Sweden uK
all companies 131 119 136 236 116
large-cap 23 25 27 55 29
Mid-cap 23 40 43 73 29
small-cap 85 54 66 108 58
SHARE AND underlying number of companies with at least one shareholder 
controlling more than 20 % of the votes of the company.
Share (number)  
of companies Denmark finland Norway Sweden uK
all companies 57 % (74) 54 % (64) 65 % (89) 67 % (158) 27 % (31)
large-cap 74 % (17) 36 % (9) 82 % (22) 78 % (43) 31 % (9)
Mid-cap 52 % (12) 53 % (21) 65 % (28) 55 % (40) 24 % (7)
small-cap 53 % (45) 63 % (34) 59 % (39) 69 % (75) 26 % (15)
SHARE AND underlying number of companies with at least one shareholder 
controlling more than 50 % of the votes of the company.
Share (number)  
of companies Denmark finland Norway Sweden uK
all companies 28 % (37) 15 % (18) 23 % (31) 17 % (40) 5 % (6)
large-cap 35 % (8) 16 % (4) 33 % (9) 20 % (11) 14 % (4)
Mid-cap 26 % (6) 13 % (5) 19 % (8) 10 % (7) 0 % (0)
small-cap 26 % (22) 17 % (9) 21 % (14) 20 % (22) 3 % (2)
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19.4 % and 34.1 %. For the breakdown categories, the sam-
ples are too small to make the calculation of statistical errors 
meaningful.
The third table shows the corresponding results for the 
50 % control level. Here the statistical error margin of the 
exact uk estimate of 5.2 % is ± 3.7 percentage points at a 95 % 
confidence level, which gives an interval of uncertainty of 
1.5 % to 8.9 %. This further underscores the desirability of a 
broader study of the uk market.
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